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COPXRIGUT DEPQSm 



THE WAR OF POSITIONS 



BY J 
LT. COLONEL PAUL AZAN, Litt.D. 

OF THE FRENCH ARMY 



WITH A PREFACE BY 

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH E. KUHN. U S.A. 
TRANSLATED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 




CAMBRIDGE 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 

1917 






COPYRIGHT, 1917 
HARVARD tTNIVERSITT PRESS 



AUG 13 1917 

©G!,A470749 



PREFACE 

IT is unfortunate that authors of books are so rarely 
known to their readers. This is especially true of 
books dealing with professional matters. In such cases 
one would like to be assured that the author really 
knows his subject, and is not merely a tyro feeding his 
readers with self-derived knowledge. 

In Lieutenant Colonel Paul Azan we have a fine type 
of the French officer, a representative of that noble, 
glorious, and chivalrous Army which has for three years 
challenged the admiration of the world, friend and foe 
alike. He has learned his subject, not only theoreti- 
cally, but also practically, through long service in the 
trenches and at the expense of honorable wounds. It 
is to be regretted that all who read his book cannot 
know the author personally. 

A War of Positions, such as is being waged to-day, has 
never been known before — at least not on anything 
approaching the present scale. It has been made pos- 
sible by the mutual action and reaction of firearms and 
of field works, aided on both sides by the recent progress 
of all sorts of technical inventions. 

In the exposition of his subject Lieutenant Colonel 
Azan has presented the fundamental principles of the 
war of positions in an exceptionally clear and able 



PREFACE 

manner. While written primarily for the soldier, the 
book is full of interest for the layman, and will enlighten 
the latter as to why it is so difficult to attain a military 
decision between antagonists fairly equal as to num- 
bers, resourcefulness, and industrial development. 

JOSEPH E. KUHN, 

Brigadier General, General Staff, 
President Army War College. 
I 

Army War College, 

July U, 1917. 



INTRODUCTION 

THE present war, with its multitude of new forms, 
has come as a surprise to that school of writers who 
believed that they could find the secret of victory in 
certain immutable precepts. 

They might have avoided this misconception by a 
study of history. There they would have learned that 
although the same great principles of strategy brought 
victory to Hannibal, to Caesar, and to Napoleon, yet 
tactics have undergone countless fluctuations in the 
course of centuries, on account of the development of 
armament. 

The curve of tactics is ever varying, yet always con- 
tinuous. Among those forces whose resultant deter- 
mines its direction, two in particular have greatly 
increased in recent years, the destructive power of 
cannon, the resisting capacity of field works. A careful 
evaluation of the importance of these forces in the 
recent wars of the Transvaal, of Manchuria, and of 
the Balkans has made it possible to sketch this curve 
day by day, to note its sinuosities, and to follow its 
development in a new direction. 

Yet all this time certain arm-chair theorists, closing 
their eyes to actual facts, have still remained in the 
domain of speculation. As a basis for their doctrines, 
they have taken the victories of Napoleon, or the battles 



INTRODUCTION 

of 1870. In their wake a number of men of intelligence 
have been drawn by their imagination or by their 
enthusiasm into the realm of hypothesis and fancy, to 
the entire neglect of those quahties of reflection and 
judgment, which constitute the true value of a leader. 

In the present war a similar state of affairs has been 
seen. How many military critics have proclaimed the 
impossibility of laying down general rules, on the ground 
that the conditions of battle were constantly changing! 
From time to time they have announced the passing 
of a new milestone in the evolution of tactics; it was 
merely the milestone which their intelhgence had passed 
on its road towards reality. 

Since October 1914 the tactical curve has under- 
gone but shght modifications. The two opposing forces 
of artillery and field works have, perhaps, gained still 
further in importance, each one developing in order to 
overthrow the other. But the essential principles of 
strategy and of tactics which govern the course of the 
present war have really changed but little since that 
date, nor can they ever vary but by slow degrees. 

This work, in which an attempt is made to state 
these principles, is written for those who have not, as 
yet, taken part in this war, in order to spare them a 
difficult and dangerous apprenticeship. Perchance it 
will also give food for study and reflection to those of 
my young comrades who are seeking day by day, at 
the price of untold efforts, suffering, and bloodshed, to 
hasten the hour of victory. 



CONTENTS 






PAGE 


Peeface 


. . iii 


Introduction 


. . V 


PART I 




THE PRESENT WAR 





CHAPTER I 

Character and Forms of Warfare 

General Characteristics 5 

Different Forms of Warfare 7 

CHAPTER II 
Combat on a Front 

Fronts in General 12 

Normal and Intensive Attrition 13 

Principles of the Offensive on a Front 15 

Role of the High Command in an Offensive 18 

The Defensive 21 

CHAPTER III 

R6les and Functions of the Different Arms 
OF the Service 

Infantry 23 

Artillery 26 

Engineers 27 

Cavalry 29 

Aviation Corps 31 



CONTENTS 

PART II 
POSITIONS 

CHAPTER I 

Organization of Positions 

Definition of Positions and their Elements 37 

Trenches 38 

P^an of Organization 40 

OutUne of the First Line Trench 41 

Interior Shape of the Trench 43 

Communicating or Doubling Trenches 46 

Support Trenches 48 

Covering Line for Artillery 49 

Boyaux 50 

Shelters, Observation Posts, etc 52 

CHAPTER II 
Trench Duties 

Liaison 54 

The Stay in the Trenches 60 

Role of the Commanders 61 

Activities of the Troops 62 

Supply of the Trench 64 

CHAPTER III 

Relief 

General Principles of Relief 67 

March of a Unit from its Cantonment to the Trenches . 68 

Replacing of the Unit in Line 69 

Return of the Unit Relieved 74 



CONTENTS 

PART III 
ATTACK ON A POSITION 

CHAPTER I 

General Remarks on Offensive Combat 

Part Played by the Different Arms in the Engagement . 82 
R61e of the Command 85 

CHAPTER II 

Preparation of the Attack 

Detailed Study of the Two Opposing Positions .... 88 

Material Am^nagement of the Departure Position . . 91 

Smashing the Enemy's Position 95 

Physical, Professional, and Moral Training of the Troops 100 

CHAPTER III 

Attack 

Formations Adopted for the Attacking Units .... 103 

Mechanism of March and of Combat 104 

Struggle Inside the Position 110 

Night Fighting 116 

Orders, Reports, and Liaisons 118 

Liaisons during the Attack 121 

Liaison of the Attacking Troops with the Artillery . . 123 

Forwarding of Reserves, Munitions, and Food .... 125 

Organization of the Conquered Position 126 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

Pursuit 

Maintenance of Contact with the Enemy 129 

Continuity of Movement beyond the Position .... 130 
Disorder and Demorahzation of Troops in Retreat and 

of Reserves 133 

Taking the Enemy's Lines in the Rear 136 

Role of the Command 137 

CHAPTER V 
March of Approach 

Preparation of the Approach 141 

Execution of the Approach 142 

R61e of the High Conamand 145 

PART IV 
DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

CHAPTER I 

General Observations on Defensive Fighting 

Preliminary Remarks 151 

CHAPTER II 

Organization of the Defensive 

Detailed Study of the Two Positions 154 

Material Am^nagement of the Position 155 

Physical and Moral Preparation of the Troops .... 157 

Role of the Command 158 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER III 

Defense 

Maintenance of the Troops under Bombardment . . . 160 

Defense of the First Line 162 

Fighting in the Interior of the Position 164 

CHAPTER IV 

Retreat 

Re-alignment of the Front 166 

Retreat under Hostile Pressure 168 

CHAPTER V 

Retour Offensif 

Objects and Methods 171 

Conclusion 172 

Glossary 179 



PART I 
THE PRESENT WAR 



War, as it is waged to-day, presents a new aspect. This is not 
exactly the same in all countries; since the length and geo- 
graphical nature of the fronts, as well as the strength and 
quality of the armies in Belgium, France, Italy, Serbia, and 
Russia are not comparable. Everywhere, however, the gen- 
eral characteristics of the war remain the same, since they are 
the result of two essential factors: the destructive power of 
heavy artillery and the defensive efficiency of field works. 

It is a mistake to say that there are different principles of 
war for different fronts, or different countries. War between 
two adversaries, who possess sufficient forces, similar arms, and 
equivalent moral courage, is always dominated by the same 
principles, and produces the same effects. If it takes a different 
form, it is because one of the adversaries is notably inferior 
to the other. Such, for instance, is the case when an army 
without artillery and without munitions is opposed to one pro- 
vided with all the modern engines of destruction. Under such 
circumstances, war assumes the aspect of the chase, and 
involves similar momentary risks; but there can be no doubt 
as to the outcome; victory is certain, and cannot be long 
delayed. 



CHAPTER I 

CHARACTER AND FORMS OF WARFARE 

General Characteristics 

The development of armaments has profoundly affected the 
conditions of combat between two armies. 

The infantry of each side suffers enormous losses when it is 
exposed to the fire of machine guns, of field or of heavy artil- 
lery; moreover, in order to hold its ground, it is obhged to dig 
itself in. Furthermore, it must surround itself with accessory 
defenses, in order to avoid surprise by the enemy's infantry. 

Consequently the assailant is held in one position. When 
he tries to envelop the flanks of the enemy, troops are rushed 
to the menaced point, stop him, and hold him in the same 
way in a position beside the first one. 

And so the lines extend farther and farther until both ends 
rest simultaneously on impassable barriers, the sea or neutral 
countries, which are the lateral limits of the fronts. 

Thus it is that, after the first encounters, a long ribbon 
called a trench is unrolled automatically along the front of 
each army. Between the two trenches is a neutral zone of 
variable width, at the most of some hundreds of yards. 

If, in the present war, the adversaries could have foreseen 
from the beginning the part which " the trench " was destined 
to play, they would have made other preparations. Each 
would have built a veritable " Chinese wall," destined to 
guarantee the integrity of his national territory. From the 

[5] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

very first day, the struggle would have assumed the aspect 
that it has since acquired. This is exactly what happened on 
the Austro-Italian front. 

The trench dug along the front of each of the armies does 
not remain in the form of a single line. The points which are 
most important by reason of their eventual strategic or 
tactical value are strongly organized ; they become centres of 
resistance, made up of a redoubt, around which extend systems 
of trenches. 

One or many centres of resistance, along with the trenches 
wliich surround or unite them, constitute a position. 

Each position occupies a zone of very variable extent. 
This zone corresponds ordinarily to the task, offensive or 
defensive, which a large unit, army, army corps, or division, 
is expected to perform. 

A position has both an offensive and a defensive function. 
It is in the shelter of its intrenchments that the attack to be 
carried out by a large unit is prepared: it is also by means of 
this organized position that an advance of the enemy can be 
repelled. 

The front of an army is made up of all the positions placed 
side by side in an unbroken line, and resting throughout its 
depth on well chosen successive lines. 

Behind the front, other positions are prepared and main- 
tained, especially at points of strategic or tactical importance, 
in order to arrest an eventual retreat of the troops from the 
front line. 

Combat between two opposing armies consists in attacking 
and defending positions. The offensive as well as the defen- 
sive may be local, multiple, or general, according to whether 
[6] 



CHARACTER AND FORMS OF WARFARE 

it occurs in a limited zone, in several different zones, or along 
the entire front. 

A general offensive, in the proper sense of the word, is 
impossible on a very widely extended front; to execute and 
maintain it would demand immense resources both in men and 
materiel. Therefore a combat characterized by a multiple 
offensive in a certain number of zones and by a multiple defen- 
sive in the complementary zones, along a widely extended 
front, is termed a general offensive. 

Different Forms of Warfare 

The present war may be called a war of positions. 

It seems to resemble a war of sieges, but really differs from 
it in many respects; in certain special contingencies, however, 
it permits a real war of sieges to take place. 

Lastly, it stamps its special characteristics upon war of 
movement, in those exceptional cases in which the latter be- 
comes possible. 

Whenever two adversaries are approximately equal in 
power, the war of positions is the only one possible. Admit- 
ting that the line of resistance of one of them may be tempo- 
rarily pushed back on a large extent of front, and that two or 
even three successive lines of positions may be carried, there 
always remains in the rear another line of positions, under the 
cover of which the vanquished party may reorganize his 
forces; the parts of the front adjoining that which has given 
way accept the necessity of retirement and set themselves to 
work to straighten out the line. War of movement is, there- 
fore, restricted to the space which separates the positions 
captured from the positions behind them. 

[7] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

If, on the other hand, a victorious offensive definitively cuts 
the enemy's line, war of movement may find wider scope. 
Either the beaten troops become demoralized and, if pursued 
with energy, throw their own reserves into disorder — thus 
causing a disaster which the resistance of a few fragments of 
the line will have great difficulty in repairing; or else the rem- 
nants of these troops, falling back on imshaken reserves, are 
able, with them, to rally on new positions; in this latter case 
eaqh fragment individually experiences war of movements, 
though it tends to establish itself, for actual fighting, in a 
position which it either reinforces or prepares afresh. 

War of movement is thus, for the time being, generally 
imposed by the stronger on the weaker side; in fact it logically 
betokens the beginning of victory. But it modifies itself more 
or less rapidly, according to the courage or the tenacity of the 
defeated troops, into a war of positions; it thus permits the 
equilibrium of combat to be reestablished and a new line of 
resistance to be formed. Then the war of positions begins 
again. 

There are, nevertheless, circumstances in which the war 
does not present the aspect of two lines of opposing positions, 
each endeavoring to force the other back, but in which it 
resumes the features of a war of movement. 

These instances are as follows: 

1. When one of the armies is insufficiently supplied either 
with men or materiel, to cover the fronts which it must hold; 

2. When one of the armies, having its front well supplied, 
lacks sufficient reserves either in men or in materiel, to go to 
the rescue in case a breach is made. This might occur when a 

[8] 



CHARACTER AND FORMS OF WARFARE 

belligerent, enfeebled by the wastage of the war, did not 
soon enough accept the necessity of shortening his front. 

3. When the armies facing each other have to manoeuver 
over a large space in comparison with the amount of their 
effectives — as in East Africa or Equatorial Africa, in Meso- 
potamia, etc. 

In these different instances, the troops are no longer held in 
by a continuous barrier which prevents manoeuvering. And 
yet, when they come into contact, they all consolidate their 
positions by digging trenches, by providing them with acces- 
sory defenses, by utilizing their artillery to the best possible 
advantage. Thus the actual combat, which follows these 
preparations, takes on the same character as the war of 
positions. 

Movement, when it becomes possible, is limited, further- 
more, by a reason other than the encountering of organized 
positions; this is the difficulty of transporting an adequate 
supply of materiel and of provisions. 

Bold and rapid manoeuvers, such as used to be carried 
out, have become very difficult. Napoleon could say that he 
" made war by the legs of his soldiers," because his success 
came through bringing up his infantry by forced marches, in 
order that, at the critical moment, they should intervene on 
the battle field. 

To-day, it is the heavy artillery which must be moved in 
order to win. For this, railroads are necessary, or at least 
excellent roads that will support immense burdens. As the 
defeated army is certain to destroy, or at least to injure, its 
lines of communication in its retreat, it becomes necessary to 
repair them. The preparation of gun-emplacements, and of 

[9] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

ammunition depots, demands much labor; for the heaviest 
guns it is even necessary to construct platforms. The installa- 
tion of telephones betv/een the observing stations, the guns, 
and the commanders is a long affair. The artillery fire must 
be adjusted on new targets. All these preparations take time. 
Lastly, tliis artillery will be of very little use in the battle if it 
is not furnished with an enormous amount of ammunition, 
capable of being supplied without interruption; this one great 
need, with which are connected so many others relative to the 
suppljdng of the troops, makes essential a system of communi- 
cations in which railroads, coming as close as possible to the 
front line, are necessary. 

Rapidity and range of movement in the present war are, 
consequently, proportional to the mobility of the heavy 
artUlery. 

The most important feature of moving from one position to 
another no longer consists in the approach of the infantry and 
of the field artillery, but rather in the transportation and in the 
setting up of the heavy artillery. Movement is made easier 
if it be possible to keep in hand a supply of heavy materiel 
loaded on wheels or tractors, ready to follow instantly in the 
wake of victorious troops. 

Detachments of all arms excepting heavy artillery, but in- 
cluding field pieces, motor-carried guns, and armored cars, may 
have important results in a pursuit; they may also promote 
success by effecting a surprise or by making a diversion. But 
they cannot assault a strongly organized position defended by 
seasoned troops. 

To gain victory, it is essential to have heavy artillery in as 
large quantities as possible, furnished with up-to-date means 
of transport, and supplied with abundant ammunition. 

[10] 



CHARACTER AND FORMS OF WARFARE 

This heavy artillery must be of the rapid-fire type, since in 
the same length of time a rapid-fire gun will throw as many 
projectiles as several slow-firing ones, since it can be much 
more easily moved and installed in a new position, and since 
it demands fewer men to handle it. 

The considerable breadth of the zone in which an attack 
must be carried out, from one position to another, demands 
immense expenditure of ammunition, and causes rapid deterio- 
ration of the guns. Only intensive manufacture can keep up 
with this prodigious consumption of cannon and shells. 

Thus the present war is, from many points of view, a war of 
materiel. 



[11] 



CHAPTER II 

COMBAT ON A FRONT 

Fronts in General 

A irofit is, from the strategic point of view, an unbroken 
liAe of positions, limited in length by an insurmountable 
obstacle at each end. 

A front is generally subdivided into a series of zones, each 
of which, by an extension of meaning, is called a front. This 
occurs particularly when several allied nations share the same 
front; in such cases one speaks, according to the nationality of 
the troops engaged, of the Belgian front, the English front, the 
French front. 

Whatever may be the number of fronts held by a single 
nation or by several allied nations, one essential principle must 
dominate in the conflict: the perfect coordination of efforts. 

For a nation, acting independently, this coordination is 
ensured by the Commander-in-Chief. For a group of alUed 
nations, it is secured by a single body, a sort of Superior Coun- 
cil, whose orders are executed by the Commanders-in-Chief on 
each front. 

The judicious distribution of human effectives or of material 
reserves, the opportunities of bringing them into action, the 
intensifying or easing up of attacks on this or that front are 
thus regulated by a supreme authority whose sole aim is to 
win. 
C12: 



COMBAT ON A FRONT 

Victory is obtained by the destruction of the armies of the 
enemy. On every front, therefore, this is the result which must be 
attained. 

Normal and Intensive Attrition 

Combat on a front is the sum total of the daily engagements 
which occur there, both offensive and defensive. 

Its aim is the destruction of the enemy's army. 

This array is protected by a trench, a long barrier bristling 
with positions. It has at command reserves which are dis- 
tributed behind the principal zones, ready to move toward 
any threatened point. 

The endeavor is to compass the destruction of this army 
by attrition. 

Attrition is the loss in men and in materiel imposed upon the 
adversary during a definite period. 

Attrition in men is irreparable. Even supposing that a 
higher birth rate may more than compensate the losses of a 
nation, this increase will be of no advantage to the armies 
for twenty years. Attrition in men is estimated by adding 
together the killed and the permanently disabled. Its real 
importance is determined at any given period by comparing 
two numbers: the total number of men who were subject to 
mobilization at the beginning of the war or have become so 
since, and the total number of the killed and unfit. 

Attrition in materiel may be repaired by increased activity 
in the factories. Thus its real importance is estimated by the 
difference between production and consumption; it depends, 
furthermore, on the difference between the stock of raw 
material and the demands of manufacture. If either one of 
these differences diminishes to the vanishing point every 

[13] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

increased demand for consumption and every accidental 
delay in production may mean disaster. 

Attrition is the more dangerous for a nation, all of whose 
fronts are being engaged, in that it possesses the less reserves. 
There comes a moment in fact when the dearth of effectives is 
reflected not only in the number of troops at the front, but 
also in the number of workers in the factories. Then it 
becomes necessary either to shorten the front, or to diminish 
industrial production. 

Attrition, on the contrary, is less dangerous for a nation 
which has a considerable reservoir of human reserves. 

In any event, it is always necessary to keep a close watch on 
attrition in materiel, since the number of cannon adequately 
furnished with munitions is often more important than the 
number of battahons in the line. Hitherto, it was the infantry 
of the two opposing sides that came into collision; the victory 
went to that one which at the last moment could avail itself 
of further reserves to throw in against the troops already ex- 
hausted by the combat. But to-day the effect of artillery on 
the earthworks and guns of the enemy is the decisive factor in 
success; victory goes to that army which has guns in good 
condition and abundant munitions, as against an enemy whose 
suppUes have given out. The flinging of innumerable infantry- 
men against batteries that are still intact results in nothing but 
useless slaughter. 

Normal attrition occurs in zones wliich are stationary, 
in other words, in trench warfare. It carmot lead to any deci- 
sive result. On the other hand its effectiveness must never be 
lost sight of, and is frequently pointed out to the troops 
engaged, because it stimulates their morale and their activity 
during those periods when operations have slowed down. 

[14] 



COMBAT ON A FRONT 

Intensive attrition occurs either through offensive opera- 
tions which are conducted for the purpose of seeking out the 
enemy in his entrenchments, and which cost him heavy losses 
in men and in materiel, either through capture or destruction ; 
or by defensive actions which prohibit the enemy from access 
to occupied positions. 

It is the methodical offensive of the infantry, prepared and 
accompanied by a powerful artUlery fire, which at a given 
moment causes a break in the balance of power between the 
two armies by reason of intensive attrition throughout a 
large zone. 

Principles of the Offensive on a Front 

The offensive on a given front is always general, in the sense 
that all zones are constantly preparing for conflict, and are 
continually studying the methods of conducting a successful 
advance. 

Attacks are actually set in motion, however, only in a few 
zones, since it would demand unlimited reserves both in men 
and in materiel to sustain them over the entire front. 

The principle of economy of forces in a general offensive, 
therefore, makes it advisable not to attack in certain zones. 
In particular, it is wiser to rest on the defensive when opposite 
positions the taking of which would have no important tactical 
results, or which would necessitate sacrifices disproportionate 
to possible gains. 

The zones of attack are determined by the Commander-in 
Chief. They are always considerable in extent, from fifteen 
to twenty miles or more, and ordinarily correspond to the 
strength of an army. Attacks executed on a narrower front 

[15] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

force the troops into a salient, and thus expose them to consid- 
erable losses without obtaining any result. 

The zones of attack are the object of thorough prelimi- 
nary study, which bears on the organization of the terrain, as 
well as on the configuration and the defense of the enemy 
positions. This study takes into account the measure of com- 
pleteness reached by the preparations for the offensive in all 
zones. The troops in the trenches should devote themselves 
linremittingly to these preparations. 

Each zone, whether or not it be in the plan of attack, has at 
call its own reserves. General reserves, in as large numbers as 
possible, are at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. 

Different attacks are not necessarily simultaneous; if they 
occur in succession it tends to disconcert the enemy. 

One of them is ordinarily considered the principal attack. 
It has as its object the capture of one or of many successive 
positions. It aims to enlarge the breach already made, and to 
bring about the fall of the positions on either side of it. 

Secondary attacks are as far as possible made at other 
points. Their purpose is not only to make the enemy uncer- 
tain as to the direction of the principal attack and to hold in 
place the reserves of the different zones, but also to disor- 
ganize and break the enemy's lines and to cause him to move 
back. 

Every attack ought to be conducted with extreme vigor, 
until its predetermined object is entirely accomplished. The 
chief officer charged with executing it should assure himself 
beforehand that he has at his disposal the means necessary to 
carry it through. It is not for him to ask whether his is the 

[16] 



COMBAT ON A FRONT 

principal or secondary attack, but merely to take to heart the 
idea that his success may give the victory to his country. 

Luck plays a great part in battles. An attack considered at 
the beginning as secondary may become the principal one, if its 
crushing success in the zone where it occurs brings about 
unhoped for results. 

Thus, every partial attack, having no other aim than that of 
" making a demonstration " ought to be avoided. It can 
result in nothing useful. Even the capture of a few trenches 
does not deceive the enemy, and often costs the troops engaged 
heavier losses than an attack of great magnitude. 

Two conditions are essential to the success of an offensive: 
secrecy of preparation and rapidity of execution. 

Secrecy is obtained by the disciplined discretion of the troops 
and of the civil population; by the constant carrying on of 
work of the same character along the whole front; by the 
ceaseless watchfulness of the aviators, which prohibits recon- 
naissance by the enemy's aviators. 

Rapidity is ensured by the habits of order and discipline of 
the troops; by knowledge of and obedience to the rules relat- 
ing to the occupation of positions; by the foresight of the 
generals and their staffs during their preliminary studies and 
the period of preparation. 

A successful attack makes a breach in the front line of 
the enemy, a breach which becomes deeper and wider each 
day through the fall of lateral and successive positions. 

The result is that other parts of the front, in danger of being 
attacked from the rear, are obliged to fall back in order to 
straighten the line. 

Cl7] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

This is the movement for which all the troops in line are 
watching. Through incessant activity they try to keep the 
enemy fixed where he is; they thus prohibit him from retiring 
his artillery and clearing the men from his trenches; they 
inform themselves concerning his situation and his intentions 
by every possible means, especially at night. 

On learning of the expected retreat they follow up the enemy's 
troops closely, harass them in every possible way, and pursue 
t^em without respite. Not only do they thus secure a large 
section of territory, of which the possession may be useful; 
but above all they bring about the capture or destruction of 
men and materiel in large quantities, which is a sure token of 
victory. 

R6le of the High Command in an Offensive 

The Commander-in-Chief chooses the zones of attack, de- 
termines the effectives which he will devote to each of them, 
and fixes the day on which the attack shall take place. 

He confides his purpose to each of the army commanders 
whose business it is to direct an attack. He indicates to each 
of them the zone which is to be his, the task entrusted to him, 
the effectives and material resources at his command, and the 
ultimate aim for him to attain. 

Each army commander acting on these data attends to the 
distribution of his army corps and to the drawing up of the 
reserves at his disposal; he indicates to every commander of 
an army corps his zone of attack, the part he is to play and 
his successive objectives; he gives all the orders necessary for 
the reconnaissance of the enemy's positions, the preparation 
of the terrain, the organization of supplies. 

[18] 



COMBAT ON A FRONT 

Every army corps commander gives orders relative to the 
preparation and execution of the attack within the limits of 
his own zone and his own particular mission. 

When the date agreed on for the attack is near, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, who has been kept constantly informed as to 
the state of preparation for the different attacks, makes certain 
that this preparation is absolutely complete. He launches the 
attacks at the moment which seems to him opportune, 
either simultaneously or in succession. 

During every attack, exactitude and continuity of informa- 
tion from the top to the bottom of the official ladder are one 
of the essential conditions of success. 

The army commander continually reports to the Com- 
mander-in-Chief the objectives reached, subsequent possibili- 
ties, and diflSculties encountered. For this it is necessary that 
he himself should be accurately informed. It is moreover es- 
sential that he should have precise information, in order to be 
able to play his personal part, limited though it be, in the 
action which he has prepared, since he has to send in his 
reserves at the right moment if the attack appears to be 
approaching success, and must not waste them uselessly if 
the attack has encountered insurmountable difficulties. 

It is the army commanders, who, by their reports, furnish 
the Commander-in-Chief with the means of making a decision; 
for, in the equation to be solved, they substitute concrete num- 
bers for algebraic symbols. Whatever may be the accuracy of 
the data which the General may have collected beforehand as 
to the objective of the attack, he cannot foretell the enemy's 
capacity of resistance, because this depends on factors impos- 
sible to estimate — the destructive effect of the attacking 

[19] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

artillery, the quality of the enemy's Command, the tenacity of 
his troops in defense, etc. — factors which are completely 
revealed only during the course of the attack. 

Only the Commander-in-Chief who is informed as to the 
collective result of the attacks has sufficient knowledge to 
continue them, to develop them, or to stop them. 

When he has discovered the zone in which it is to his interest 
to continue his efforts, he directs his general reserves thither 
aAd diminishes gradually those attacks which have become 
secondary. At need he even draws upon the reserves of other 
zones in order to turn the scale of victory. 

The rapid transport of troops to the theatre of the principal 
attack is assured by railroads, of wliich the entire system has 
been steadily improved and completed in view of the pos- 
sibility of such eventuality; by motor transport, which can be 
utihzed up to the immediate neighborhood of the front. 

Thus the Commander-in-Chief distributes his reserves of 
men and materiel with a full knowledge of actual conditions, 
in order to accompUsh the end which he has constantly before 
j^ijn — the destruction of the hostile army. The attainment of 
predetermined objectives and the taking of powerful positions 
are simply the means destined to bring him nearer to this aim. 

Every army commander acts according to the same prin- 
ciple in his own zone of attack. If his task is completely 
accomplished, new horizons may suddenly open before him. 
He has his own reserves at his disposal, and is thus enabled to 
keep his troops going and the front line supphed, while he is 
waiting for the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. 

Although the idea of destroying the enemy remains the 
supreme rule of war, it must never be the guiding star of an 

[20] 



COMBAT ON A FRONT 

army corps or of an inferior unit; for if it were, there would in 
certain instances be grave danger of such units being drawn on 
toward positions where the High Command would have neither 
the wish nor the means to support them. Their initiative and 
dash find proper expression only within the limits of the tasks 
confided to them. When their leaders see larger possibilities, 
they report immediately to their superior officers; the army 
commanders report to the Commander-in-Chief, and while 
waiting for his decision, give such preUminary orders as the 
situation demands, in order to enable them to follow up the 
success without delay. An attack should never be set in mo- 
tion unless the means of putting it through have been prepared. 

The Defensive 

To rest on the defensive cannot lead to any decisive result. 

The losses which it causes do not prevent the enemy from 
concentrating his forces for attack whenever and wherever he 
wishes ; its effects can in no case suffice to bring the enemy to 
terms. 

A local defensive may be determined on for certain zones, to 
be maintained during the period of a general offensive; but 
it is subject to rules which prohibit it from being passive; 
these rules will be studied later in the section entitled Defense 
of a Position. 

A general defensive may be considered as a possibility, when 
the enemy has taken the initiative in operations along the 
whole front, but even then, passivity is no more excusable 
than in a local defensive. 

The role of the High Command in such a case is analogous 
to that which it plaj^s in an offensive. 

[21] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

The Commander-in-Chief, fully informed by frequent and 
precise reports as to the progress of the different attacks which 
he must meet, discovers the principal one; at an opportune 
moment he proceeds to the redistribution of his reserves and of 
his materiel. His presence of mind, decision, and judgment 
should enable him to avoid a haste which might be irreparable 
or a delay which might be fatal. 

It is his duty to choose the moment when the enemy is 
repairing his losses or has made a blunder to launch a counter 
attack of great dimensions. 

If he has kept in hand sufficient reserves he may even pass 
to the counter-offensive, and win a victory that could not have 
been gained by a direct offensive against an adversary demor- 
alized by the failure of his attempts and the losses of his 
troops. 

Army commanders conform to the same principles within 
the limits of their zones of attack and the orders that have 
been given them. They, in particular, have it in their power 
to arrest the attack of the enemy and to regain the advantage 
by means of opportune counter attacks. 

As to army corps and lesser units, it is their absolute duty, 
except in case of formal orders to the contrary from the High 
Command, to hold the positions confided to their charge, cost 
what it may. 

A wise and vigorous defensive may prepare the way, through 
the losses imposed by it on the adversary, for an ultimate 
offensive which will break the enemy's front and, in conse- 
quence, bring victory. 



[22] 



CHAPTER III 

r6les and functions of the different 
arms of the service 

Infantry 

Infantry is powerless without the aid of artillery, which 
shares with it the principal role in combat. But its task is the 
finest and the most heroic; since, in spite of the curtain of fire 
with which the artillery tries to protect it, the infantry is 
obliged deliberately to expose itself to danger and to pour out 
its blood generously in order to win success. 

It acts by movement and by fire. During an attack on a 
position, its movement assumes the character of successive 
assaults, since its object is to carry lines situated at short 
distances from each other. As a result of the protection 
given to the enemy by his trenches, the bayonet no longer 
plays as important a part in these assaults as formerly; it is 
superseded or replaced by the grenade, the revolver, and the 
knife. 

Its movement assumes the aspect of a march of approach 
when it occurs between two positions more or less widely 
separated from each other. 

By the use of appropriate formations the infantry can pass 
through artiUery barrages or diminish the effects of machine- 
gun and rifle fire. From the time it enters the zone of combat 
it ought absolutely to avoid close order formations such as 
columns of four. 

[23] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

On the defensive, movement consists in counter attacks 
which, launched at an opportune moment, may have a de- 
cisive effect; and in retours offensifs in case the Unes have 
been carried. 

Infantry fire is the work of the rifle, the machine gun, the 
French automatic rifle, the revolver, the rifle grenade, and the 
hand grenade — and those artillery pieces called infantry 
cannon, trench mortars, etc. 

On the offensive, fire plays a less important part than 
formerly. It is begun with rifle and machine gun, when an 
advance cannot otherwise be made. Under these circum- 
stances it becomes a means of progression for the whole 
fighting line, as well as a moral support for the skirmisher 
who has been obUged to stop; but its employment, when it 
becomes general on an attacking front, indicates either serious 
difficulties or betokens a repulse. 

Rifle grenades, French automatic rifles, as well as machine 
guns boldly placed and cleverly managed, throw the enemy 
into disorder, oblige him to dig in, and cause losses. These 
weapons make it possible to keep up the advance little by 
little. On the approach to the trenches which are being 
attacked, and during the course of the struggle which de- 
velops around them, French automatic rifles, hand grenades, 
and revolvers take their toll from the enemy's infantry. Port- 
able pieces, such as the 37 mill. (1.5-inch) gims, bring success 
against machine guns and defenses which remain in being. 
These pieces, furthermore, render important service in con- 
tinuing the advance. 

On the defensive, fire retains all its effectiveness. A line of 
infantry under shelter, which keeps its presence of mind, has 

[24] 



DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE 

a good chance of stopping the enemy by means of its machine 
guns, its rifles and its grenades. Even if it has been shaken 
by the fire of the enemy's artillery, even if its trenches and its 
accessory defenses have been smashed in, it can lay low its 
assailants before it comes to a hand to hand conflict, and with 
the bayonet dispose of the demoralized survivors. 

Machine guns, employed with the same audacity as on the 
offensive, play a considerable part, especiallj^ by flanking fire 
and enfilade. French automatic rifles, kept under cover dur- 
ing the bombardment, are set up at an opportune moment; 
they demand, for transportation and service, a less numerous 
personnel than machine guns; handled by experienced and 
resolute marksmen, they have great effect. Indeed, if these 
weapons are skilfully utiUzed on the defensive, it is often 
possible to hold the first line with a smaller number of troops. 
Trench artillery, which is not intended to accompany an 
advance, but only to prepare the way for it by its effect on 
the enemy's trenches, may be more powerful than pieces 
which are taken forward with the infantry; it is, however, 
sometimes put out of action by the enemy's preparatory 
bombardment, and cannot be speedily replaced. 

To sum up: infantry can make no attempt against a posi- 
tion unless the artillery has destroyed the accessory defenses, 
smashed the trenches and demoraUzed their occupants. To 
succeed, furthermore, it must needs advance with prudence 
and method, with the constant support of its artillery, and 
display to the full its courage and its energy. 

On the other hand, infantry sheltered by its trenches, which 
cUngs to the terrain with the determination to hold it at 
whatever cost, may inflict enormous losses on the assailant 
and stop his advance. 

[25] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

Artillery 

Artillery plays a preponderant part in combat. On the 
offensive it thorouglily prepares the attack; it protects the 
infantry during the action and facilitates its advance. Finally 
it is moved forward if the position is captured, in order to 
make the pursuit easier and to prepare if necessary the attack 
on the next position. 

On the defensive, it fires on the concentrations and on the 
changes of position of the enemy's troops as these are reported. 
It deUvers barrages when the infantry calls for them. At the 
order of the commander it effects concentrations of fire, which, 
on account of the great range of the pieces, can be accomplished 
without moving them; these concentrations are directed upon 
those points where it is desirable to subject the enemy to the 
severest kind of pounding. Lastly, it can assign to batteries 
and isolated pieces the task of catching the ranks of the 
assailants as much as possible by flanking fire or enfilade; 
these pieces fire until the last moment, sacrificing themselves, 
if need be, for the infantry. 

Heavy artillery acts through destructive fire on well-defined 
objectives and on strictly limited zones; on it devolves the 
duty of putting out of action or at least of neutralizing the 
enemy's artillery; it alone is able to smash organized defen- 
sive positions which have been long established and con- 
stantly improved. 

Field artillery has the task of destroying accessory defenses 
or lightly built shelters, and of firing on the enemy's troops. 
Its mobiUty permits it to take part in the forward movement 
of the infantry, to continue its indispensable support, and to 
play a r61e in pursuit. 

[26] 



DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE 

Trench mortars are used in the preparation of an attack 
and may even smash, quite unaided, the enemy's first line. 
During the combat the lightest of them may constitute a 
sort of "infantry artillery," advancing in the wake, and at 
the disposal, of the infantry units. Tanks are automatically 
moving pieces, capable of traversing every kind of ground; 
they accompany or precede the infantry, in order to facilitate 
the accompUshment of its task. 

The first essential to make it possible for the artillery to fire 
to good advantage is that it should be able to see. The choice 
of permanent observing stations for the artillery should be 
primarily determined by this consideration, and is of great 
importance. Indications furnished by the infantry, either 
during its stay in the trenches or during the course of its 
advance, are collected by special observers attached to it, and 
in constant communication with the batteries by telephone 
or other means. Lastly, in many instances, the aviators are 
alone able to furnish precise information concerning the 
objectives to be fired at and the adjustment of the guns; if 
provided with accurate observers they are invaluable collab- 
orators for the artillery; captive balloons are of great service 
to the heavy artillery. 

Waste of ammunition is a fault which cannot be too 
severely reprehended. A large expenditure is necessary when 
favorable opportunities present themselves, with the cer- 
tainty of attaining useful results; for that very reason a wise 
economy is the more indispensable when there is no definite 
target to fire at. 

Engineers 

The engineers are the constant and indispensable auxiliary 
of the infantry. Their role consists in organizing positions, 

[27] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

together with the infantry, in estabhshing and improving 
communications, and in executing or directing all sapping and 
mining operations. 

The war of positions has greatly developed the duties of the 
engineers, so much so, in fact, as to render them very onerous. 
They often have to be reserved for urgent or delicate opera- 
tions, while for the less important jobs a few non-commissioned 
officers and sappers direct, aid, and advise workmen from the 
infantry. ' 

On the offensive, the engineers have the duty of preparing 
the ways of access to the enemy, such as saps, and breaches 
for sorties in the accessory defenses. They do not have to 
open passages in the enemy's defenses, for this job devolves 
on the artillery, but only to improve them, whenever circum- 
stances permit. If possible, they connect the saps through 
which the troops emerge from their trenches with the first 
of the enemy's trenches which are taken. 

They follow the first waves into the trenches, in order to 
clean the latter out, to repair them, and if need be, to 
reverse them. 

If the position is taken, the engineers consolidate it rapidly 
with the aid of the infantry, provide it with accessory defenses 
and accumulate obstacles which can be used to oppose a 
counter-attack : not till later do they undertake a methodical 
and complete organization of the position. 

In case of a pursuit, they see to it that the places which can 
be utilized for the passage of automobiles, artillery, cavalry, 
and cycUsts are completely cleared, and constantly maintained 
in good condition. 

[28] 



DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE 

On the defensive, the engineers take part in the consolida- 
tion of the position according to orders given by the com- 
manding officer; they install and repair accessory defenses 
and construct all sorts of works intended to augment the re- 
sisting power of the trench, and the security of its occupants. 

The engineers have special charge of mining operations. 
They do not engage in them however except as a means to an 
end — such as the possession of an important post of observa- 
tion, or the occupation of a flanking salient; for the smashing 
of a trench has no great intrinsic importance. They are some- 
times obliged to do this, however, in order to oppose mining 
activities by the enemy ; in such cases they limit their opera- 
tions to those which are indispensable for purposes of pro- 
tection. 

Cavalry 

Cavalry plays a restricted part in the war of positions; it 
can only be utilized in pursuit when the offensive succeeds. 
On the other hand, it resumes its full activity in a war of 
movement. 

When a position has been taken, the cavalry, wliich up to 
this time has been kept in the rear, is brought forward by 
ways previously reconnoitered, and crosses the trenches by 
specially prepared bridges. Its officers must have famil- 
iarized themselves, by actual inspection and by means of 
maps, with the terrain on which they are going to send their 
troops into action; they receive from the High Command in- 
formation concerning the enemy, collected ever since the 
beginning of the engagement, and indications of the services 
they may be able to render, but they retain a large measure of 
initiative. 

[29] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

From that time on, the cavah-y has for its essential function 
the acceleration and completion of the rout of the enemy; 
for this purpose it operates by movement and by fire. It 
attempts to overtake the artillery units in position or in 
retreat; and, if it cannot catch up with them, to destroy them 
by its fire. It separates from their units delayed groups of 
infantry and stragglers, throws the reserves into confusion, 
causing heavy losses, and surprises transports and convoys. 
It spreads out behind the enemy's front, thus threatening from 
the rear the troops still in line; it breaks telegraph and tele- 
phone lines, cuts railways, occupies or keeps watch on centres 
of communication. It sends back frequent items of informa- 
tion to the commanding officer. 

This task presents very great difficulties. The crossing of 
the zone of hostile trenches can only be accomplished along 
routes reconnoitered either by the infantry or by cavalrymen 
sent on in advance. However great their bravery and their 
skill, the latter cannot ride across ground furrowed in all 
directions by trenches and boyaux, pitted with shell craters, 
and worst of all, strewn at every step with barbed wire. Even 
supposing that none of the hostile groups which usually hold 
out here and there can fire on them, they are soon dismounted 
by falls and injuries to their horses. Lastly, a single machine 
gun or a single piece of artillery may take frightful and almost 
immediate toll of them. 

Therefore cavalry must generally follow the roads in order 
to cross the zone of the hostile trenches; but if batteries 
succeed in getting them under fire — and this is easy on 
account of their limited speed — they are likely to be almost 
completely destroyed. 

[30] 



DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE 

Granted that it succeeds in surmounting these obstacles 
unchecked, the cavalry may, in the course of pursuit, en- 
counter a second position, and be exposed to the fire of the 
defending artillery. Only in case of deficient organization of 
this position, or of complete demoralization of the enemy, does 
it have the opportunity of effecting a surprise: and yet this 
chance should always be taken, for if success ensues, it will 
bring victory. 

Aviation Corps 

The aviation corps fulfills the functions of scouting, of 
observation, and of combat. It constitutes a permanent 
auxiliary to the High Command, and an indispensable adjunct 
of the artillery. 

It includes airplanes of different types, observation bal- 
loons, and dirigibles. 

The essential task of airplanes is to reconnoiter the enemy's 
positions; they make out the plan of his trenches, determine 
the location of field works and that of batteries; they achieve 
excellent results in observation by means of photography. 
They should also, in their daily expeditions, keep watch over 
the movements of the enemy on roads or on railroads, over 
changes of appearance in his shelters, over the works he has 
undertaken, and concentrations of his troops. All information 
furnished by these reconnaissances is sent as soon as possible 
to the High Command. 

Airplanes are the actual posts of observation for the artillery, 
when observers on the ground have an inadequate view; they 
adjust the fire of the batteries by means of signals or by wire- 
less messages; they attempt at aU times to discover and indi- 
cate hostile batteries not previously located. Artillery officers 

[31] 



THE PRESENT WAR 

should make themselves familiar with the science of aerial 
observation. 

During a battle, airplanes are both means of reconnais- 
sance and of coordination. They must keep an eye on the 
movements of the enemy, on concentrations for counter- 
attacks, on forward movements of the reserves, and on the 
directions in which the defeated troops retreat. At the same 
time they keep in sight of the attacking troops : they signal to 
the commander and to the artillery the position of the first 
line of infantry, and receive and transmit the latter's requests. 

Airplanes are also weapons of offense and defense. 

Their usual function on the offensive is to go over the 
enemy's territory in order to drop bombs on important tactical 
points: — railway stations, factories, camps, depots, barracks 
of reserves, points of concentration, centres of communication. 
Airplanes designated for bombardment are accompanied by 
swifter craft armed with machine guns or pom-poms, whose 
duty it is to protect them against possible attack. 

During a battle, they can play a valuable part by using 
their bombs, their cannon, and their machine guns against 
troops on the march and even against small defensive posi- 
tions. 

The defensive fimction of airplanes is to estabhsh barrages 
along the approaches to the front line. Battleplanes strive to 
prevent the observations and the attacks of hostile planes by 
launching themselves in pursuit of them and driving them 
down. Certain planes are specially used against observation 
balloons or dirigibles; they are armed with speciaUzed imple- 
ments for the burning or destruction of these machines. The 
enemy is thus hampered in the acquisition of information, 

[32] 



DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE 

the adjustment of his fire, and in making trouble behind the 

Unes. 

Observation balloons have the function of keeping watch 
over a definite area of the enemy's positions and of furnishing 
the Command with the information they have acquired. They 
are the constant auxiUaries of the heavy artillery, with which 
they are connected by telephone; the observers, carrying 
field glasses of long range and high magnifying power, indicate 
the target and control the fire. These balloons, placed at a 
sufficient distance from the enemy's fines to be compara- 
tively invulnerable to his artillery, are defended against aerial 
attack by battleplanes and anti-aircraft batteries. 

Dirigibles are used for fighting. As their vulnerabiUty by 
artillery fire prevents them from venturing over the enemy's 
territory by daylight, they are useless for recormoitering. 
Their offensive r61e is limited to the bombardment of positions 
of military importance, and their defensive role to opposing 
raids by hostile dirigibles. They are used in the defense of 
the seacoast, as in naval warfare, in order to indicate the 
movements of the enemy's vessels and to reveal the presence 
of submarines. 



[33] 



PART II 
POSITIONS 



CHAPTER I 

ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

Definition of Positions and their Elements 

A position generally coincides with a geographical entity. 
It is designated by a name borrowed from the geography of 
the locahty, such as that of a village (Langemarck) , of a moun- 
tain (Le Mort- Homme), or by a name created for the occasion 
{the Labyrinth). 

It comprises one of several centres of resistance. 

A centre of resistance is a tactical element composed of 
one or of several supporting points, such as villages, woods, 
heights, and surrounding field works. 

Positions and centres of resistance correspond to the natural 
topographical elements of the Front. 

In order to facilitate the distribution of the troops and the 
operation of the service, a position is generally subdivided 
into sectors or sub-sectors which are given geographical or 
numerical designations. 

These sectors and sub-sectors in turn include trenches, 
which are given geographical or numerical designations, or 
are named for brave men who have been killed in action. 

Positions are of variable importance. The measure of this 
depends on their strategical or tactical value, on their topog- 
raphy, on the value and configuration of the hostile positions 
opposite them, on the number and activity of the enemy's 

[37] 



POSITIONS 

troops, etc. The size of their garrisons depends solely on the 
measure of this importance, and not on their extent. 

Each sector and sub-sector corresponds to the extent of 
terrain which can be held by a unit of infantry — such as a 
brigade or a regiment. The density with which the unit must 
be distributed depends on the nature of the terrain, on its 
tactical importance, etc. Sectors and sub-sectors, therefore, 
have fixed garrisons, but variable areas. One of them may, 
cdnsequently, either become identical with a centre of resist- 
ance, or constitute a subdivision of it. 

Trenches 

The word " trench," as commonly employed, is used to 
designate, singly or as a whole, the elements which compose 
the front. 

The trench, in its original or specific meaning, is the shelter 
which is dug in the ground by the first hne skirmishers: it 
enables them to protect themselves from being hit or seen by 
the foe, and to get into touch with one another. It marks, on 
the terrain, the limit of the infantry's efforts during the com- 
bat; it traces the hne which this infantry has been unable to 
pass in its advance, or that on which it has stopped in its 
retreat. 

The trenches, in the most general sense in which they are 
spoken of by the troops, are the ensemble of the field works 
established by the infantry in any given position, to afford 
them shelter and a means of going about in proximity to the 
enemy. This ensemble contains trenches in the more specific 
sense, boyaux, shelters, observation posts, and depots. 

The organization of villages, of woods, and of other sup- 
porting points is effected according to the same principles as 

[38] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

in previous wars. It comprises, however, a more complete util- 
ization of underground work, and a more liberal equipment 
of the edges and the interior with machine guns. Whenever 
possible, it is essential that the details of tliis organization 
be concealed from the enemy's airplanes. The supporting 
point, which is often more easily visible than its surround- 
ings, should be made as far as possible to blend with the 
adjacent territory, on pain of being singled out for the heavy 
fire of the enemy's artillery. 

The study of a position, therefore, brings us back to that of 
the elements of which a trench or trenches are composed, 
when the ribbon-like ditch made by the first diggings of the 
skirmishers has progressively ramified itself for purposes of 
communication and of defense. 

First line trenches are connected with the rear by boyaux 
running perpendicular to them. Communicating and sup- 
port trenches are dug in a direction in general parallel to 
those of the first line, in order to support them or to provide 
additional space. A line of redoubts and trenches, called a 
covering line for artillery, is used to afford the cannon a greater 
measure of security in case of an enemy attack. Shelters 
are places dug in the ground, either separately or collectively, 
to protect the troops, their arms, and their macliine guns 
against projectiles or bad weather. Observing stations are 
topographical points, so situated as to be available for looking 
out in front, and so organized as to permit observation of the 
enemy, without being observed by him or exposed to danger. 
De-pots are shelters in which to keep munitions, grenades, 
materiel, water, and provisions, all of which may be imme- 
diately needed in case of battle. Emplacements for batteries are 

[39] 



POSITIONS 

used to install the pieces of different calibres at points suit- 
ably chosen from a technical point of view. They are provided 
with shelters and accessories, necessary for the proper service 
of the pieces, and the security of the gimners. 

Plan of Organization 

The general organization of a position is carried out in 
accordance with a complete plan, elaborated by the com- 
mander of the unit which occupies it. 

This plan contemplates, from the first, both the defense 
of the position captured, and the attack of the opposing posi- 
tion, and is for this reason divided into two parts; for 
works should usually be constructed with the double object 
of progressing further, and of retaining the conquered 
terrain. 

This plan is drawn up as soon as possible after the troops 
have been installed in the position, in order to avoid mistakes, 
discussions, and indecision. It takes into account the provi- 
sional work carried out on the orders of the commanders of 
sectors and of sub-sectors, in order to meet first needs. But, 
as soon as it has been settled, it is obligatory on every one to 
conform to it absolutely. 

In order that the organization of a position may be methodi- 
cal and homogeneous, it must be carried out not only with a 
view to the needs of the position as a whole, but also with a 
view to its continuance by subsequent occupants. Thus, in 
case of a relief, the plan of organization is faithfully trans- 
mitted to the new unit, and scrupulously followed out : it can 
only be modified on the order of the new commander of the 
position. 

[40] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

No trench ought to be considered as provisional, and 
destined to be abandoned in consequence of a forward move- 
ment. This conception, though it contains a measure of 
truth, is prejudicial to the security, comfort, and discipline of 
the troops. It often results in an inadequate defense, a make- 
shift installation, and in habits of carelessness and idleness. 

The outline of the first line trench depends, at the outset, 
solely on the hazards and difficulties of the actual combat, and 
does not always correspond to a tactical idea. 

Thus the initial outline of the trench may be modified as a 
whole, or in detail, in accordance with a thorough examination 
of the position. Such a modification, when carried out at 
leisure, in relative security, saves the defenders many mis- 
takes; otherwise they may be obUged to effect it under pressure 
from the enemy and in the midst of the gravest dangers. 
The hypothesis of a hostile attack, with all its consequences, 
ought to guide the commander of a position in reaching his 
decision, quite as much as the prospect of the resumption of 
the advance. 

There will seldom be any modification of the original out- 
line if the commander of a position decides to be guided by 
advice asked of subordinates. Either through vainglory or 
simple inertia, the commanders of small units — such as 
companies or battalions — often prefer to retain a defective 
line, rather than to abandon to the enemy a few hundred 
yards. Furthermore, in a consultation of this kind, neighbor- 
ing sectors and sub-sectors, as well as units in actual occupa- 
tion and reUef units, would have to be brought to agreement — 
which is impossible, save by the maintenance of the status 
quo. And yet, sometimes a sUght change will save losses 
which might ultimately prove very costly. 

[41] 



POSITIONS 

The final outline of the first line trench is determined, in 
principle, by the commander of the sector. It is approved by 
the commander of the position, who limits himself to such 
modifications as are necessitated either by the tactical situa- 
tion of the position, or by the need of good communication 
between the sectors. It constitutes the first element of the 
plan of organization. 

The outline of a trench is very difficult to decide upon at 
firfet sight, if account be taken of all the conditions, at 
times contradictory, which it must fulfil, and if due regard be 
had to the conformation of the terrain, to the situation and 
intentions of the enemy, to the security and well-being of the 
soldiers. Thus it is knowledge of the ground, aided by good 
judgment and keen observation, winch leads to the g-doption 
of the best measures. 

This reasoned outline is often found to coincide with that 
one which has been instinctively traced on the ground by the 
infantrjrmen when seeking to escape from artillery fire, to con- 
ceal themselves from the sight of the opposing infantry, to 
obtain a sufficient field of fire, etc. Often, also, this outline is 
very different from the one which would have been selected as 
a result of unintelligent application of theory. 

The trench must be continuous. It may, however, include 
zones less strongly held than others, at points where material 
obstacles offer a sufficient barrier to the enemy's efforts: yet 
care must be taken lest these obstacles disappear in fine 
weather (as might be the case with certain swamps) and to see 
that they are constantly swept by the fire of the neighboring 
trenches. Trenches which are thus lightly held are httle 
more than means of communication, but they have the 

[42] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

advantage of causing the enemy's aviators to believe that 
there is no discontinuity in the Une. 

Inactive zones without trenches, solely defended by artificial 
obstacles such as barbed wire entanglements, and by the 
oblique fire of cannon and macliine guns, present risks which 
are so great that they should as far as possible be avoided. 
They permit the enemy's fire to be concentrated on more 
Umited spaces, in which the troops suffer more losses; they 
prevent direct liaison between neighboring units, thus im- 
peding their mutual support and the concentration of their 
efforts; they expose the first line to the danger of being 
pierced in case the enemy succeeds in destroying the artificial 
defenses or in neutralizing the artillery fire ; they render more 
difficult the intervention of reinforcements in zones which 
have not been provided with shelter. These different defects 
outweigh advantages such as economy of forces and lightening 
of the service. 

The interior shape of the trench depends primarily on the 
nature of the soil. 

Generally speaking, a trench is so arranged as to permit 
the men in it to stand erect when firing, and has a parapet 
composed of the soil thi-own up in the process of construction. 
In this parapet loopholes are arranged for firing and obser- 
vation, and there is a step for those who use them to stand on. 

Trenches do not run in straight lines: they are interrupted 
every five or six yards by traverses. These traverses, dug in 
the natural soil, are about two yards tliick, and protect each 
compartment of the trench from projectiles ejcploding in 
the neighboring ones: they also prevent the enemy, in case he 
penetrates into one compartment, from enfilading the whole 
trench with his machine gims and his rifles. 

[43] 



POSITIONS 

First line trenches contain special emplacements and shelters 
for machine guns. The emplacements, carefully chosen, are 
distributed along the trench, in such fashion as to bear to the 
best possible effect on the important poiats of the enemy's 
Une, and also on the whole space between the two lines. A 
machine gun should operate on the flanks, that is to say, it 
should attempt to enfilade the lines of possible assailants. 
Each machine gun has a clearly marked sector of fire. The 
shelters are placed close at hand; they serve to protect the 
machine guns and those who serve them, when they are not 
firing. 

The location of emplacements and shelters of machine guns 
should not be apparent from the exterior shape of the trench; 
otherwise they are destined to be speedily destroyed by the 
enemy's artillery. Sometimes the shelter is put on the very 
line of the trench: the machine gun and gunners installed 
there are given an opportunity to fire through a loophole which 
is plugged with a sand-bag, and opened only at night or in case 
of an attack. The difficulty with this system is that it exposes 
the machine gun to the danger of being buried in the earth, 
and put out of action, in case its shelter is directly hit during 
a bombardment. Thus it is usually a better plan, despite the 
loss of time which results, to place the machine gun in a safer 
shelter a little behind the trench; in case of pressing danger, it 
can be put into action at some point, such as in a part of the 
parapet that has been destroyed, or else in a shell hole. 

It is useless to lay down any absolute rules relative to the 
outline or dimensions of a trench, or to the placing of the 
machine guns it contains, for the observance of such rules 
would often be rendered impossible by the nature of the soil. 

[44] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

Frequently the ingenuity of the troops hits on the form best 
suited to overcome local obstacles. 

In marshy ground, for instance, the trench is transformed 
into a parapet erected above the normal base of the ground. 
This parapet is made up of fascines, hurdles, gabions, sand- 
bags, etc.: it makes use of hedges and slopes; since it thus 
becomes very easy to see, it should be concealed in a multi- 
tude of different ways; false parapets are even erected to 
deceive the enemy. 

An essential condition which a trench should fulfill is that 
of permitting its occupants to shoot easily, in as large 
numbers as possible, and at the same time to remain under 
cover. This condition is often forgotten by troops in sectors 
which have remained quiet for some time; thus, with the 
idea of ensuring their comfort, the men put up contrivances 
and shelters which hamper or prevent access to the parapet, 
save at the spots reserved for the sentries. Commanders of 
units should be on the watch to prevent these abuses, and to 
cause loopholes to be made. 

Loopholes are arranged obliquely, partly in order not to 
expose those using them to direct fire, and partly to furnish an 
opportunity for flanking fire. They may be furnished with 
rifles on stands, pointed in the direction of danger. 

In reality these loopholes are of scant value as means of 
combat: they even limit the field of fire, and prevent fire 
from being concentrated on a determined objective. They 
rather constitute a means of keeping guard, and of looking out. 

Nevertheless, during periods of stationary fighting, these 
loopholes make it possible to inflict upon the foe losses which 
play a large part in the war of attrition. In case of a hostile 

[45] 



POSITIONS 

attack, they are for the most part destroyed by the enemy's 
bombardment; even if they should be spared, they would be 
of Httle use. It is rather on the remains of the parapet, and 
on shell holes that reliance must be placed : it is in these that 
machine guns and automatic rifles must be placed. 

Communicating or Doubling Trenches 

Behind the first line trenches, there are usually constructed 
what are called communicating trenches, connected with the 
fiist line ones by boyaux. Their location is determined by the 
plan of organization. In these communicating trenches the 
command posts of the leaders of sections are usually placed. 

These trenches play an absolutely different part from the 
first line ones, for they are not trenches to be fired from, save 
in cases where there is a sufficient slope of the ground. They 
are intended to afford shelter, rest, and sleep to the men who 
are not on duty; for this purpose they are furnished with 
dugouts arranged in accordance with the character of the 
ground, sometimes as deep as regular subterranean passages, 
sometimes on a level with the bottom of the trench, sometimes 
above it, in the sides of the trench, in niches, as it were. 

Comfortable second-line shelters afford a body of troops 
a considerable alleviation of their stay in a trench. The com- 
manding officers, when determining the periods of the reliefs, 
ought to take into account the conditions under which their 
troops have been placed in the line as well as the state of their 
health. 

In sectors where the character of the ground does not per- 
mit of the construction of suitable shelters the situation is 
infinitely more difficult. The soldiers possess only precarious 
refuges where their rest is constantly disturbed by the going 

[46] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

and coming of men bringing supplies and of patrols, by shots, 
and by those who are on the watch, etc. As a matter of fact 
they never get many consecutive hours of rest. 

From the tactical point of view, commimicating trenches 
are of great value. 

On the offensive, they permit the troops selected to follow 
the first waves of assault, and after them the reserves at the 
disposal of the commander, to get together near the departure 
parallel. 

On the defensive, they maintain, in immediate proximity 
to the firing trench, the troops which are to man it in case of 
alarm, without exposing them to useless fatigues. They are 
also of great help in expelling the enemy from the first line 
trench, in case he has been able to take it; for they make it 
possible to counter-attack him, or to hem him in by the 
boyaux. 

When the character of the ground renders impossible the 
construction of communicating trenches, it is a good plan to 
construct false ones. This subterfuge has the advantage of 
attracting to these trenches a large part of the fire of the 
enemy's artillery, and of not permitting him to suspect the 
weakness of the single front Une. 

Communicating trenches, although not in theory intended 
to play a part in combat, ought nevertheless to be protected 
by accessory defenses which should be as efficacious and as 
invisible as possible; for the enemy, who in his assaults will 
go straight ahead in order to gain ground without troubling 
about boyaux, will thus find himself stopped by unexpected 
obstacles which his artillery ■will not have been able to disarm 
or to destroy, and which, when encountered, may prove fatal 
to his elan. 

[47] 



POSITIONS 

Support Trenches 

A position, whether or not provided with a communicating 
trench, generally includes support trenches, some distance 
behind the first line. Their location is determined by the 
plan of organization, and is so chosen as to place them beyond 
the range of the enemy's barrages, which are intended to iso- 
late the first Une trenches from the interior of the position, 
when a hostile attack is in progress. 

, The command-posts of the battaUon commanders are placed 
on this line. 

Support trenches are designed to stop the enemy in case 
the first line is broken. They are, therefore, firing trenches 
which can be speedily occupied by the reserve imits, and which 
the first line units, when obliged to give way, attempt to reach. 
They may or may not be supplied with accessory defenses. 
According to the character and topography of the terrain, 
and according to the distance of the supporting trenches be- 
hind the first line, the reserve units told off to occupy them 
remain closer at hand or in more comfortable and less exposed 
shelters, a very short distance away. 

As a means of increasing the resisting power of these 
trenches, machine guns are placed in salients whence those 
parts of the terrain over which the enemy might advance may 
be swept by obhque fire or by enfilade. These machine gtms, 
which are only called upon in case the enemy breaks into the 
position, should nevertheless have their crews complete, and 
be all ready for action; their shelters, constructed in the most 
comfortable manner possible, are utilized as barracks for par- 
tial rest for the machine-gun crews of the first line. 

In order to complete the system of support trenches, which 
cannot be indefinitely developed in depth, other machine guns 

[48: 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

are placed here and there, either in sections of trench a few 
yards long, or in bombproof redoubts surrounded by accessory 
defenses; they should be able to sweep with their fire all im- 
portant points of approach, such as ravines, bridges, cross- 
roads, exposed passages of every sort, where the enemy cannot 
avoid advancing on a narrow front. These machine guns may 
do considerable damage to the enemy if their crews are re- 
solved to hold out till the last. Their shelters are generally 
furnished with a deep-cut or subterraneous boyau, which per- 
mits the materiel to be removed and the crew to escape to the 
rear at the last moment. 

It is often from the shelter of these support trenches that 
counter-attacks to stop the enemy's progress are prepared, or 
retours offensifs directed against his first fine. Thus their 
organization ought, as far as possible, to be planned with a 
view to the grouping and debouching of the units which are to 
be employed in these operations. 

As long as the support trenches are strongly held, the 
position is not in the hands of the enemy. 

If the position is taken, there remains behind it a second 
position, on which the fragments of the troops in the first may 
retire so as to stiffen the resistance, and so as to resume the 
offensive at the opportune moment. 

The covering line for artillery is made up of a line of trenches 
and redoubts which, for lack of time or means, may not always 
be continuous. The location of these works is determined by 
the general plan of organization. They are frequently placed 
on a reverse slope, so as to escape the fire of the enemy's 
artillery, and to confront assailants with an intact and unex- 
pected obstacle. 



POSITIONS 

The covering line for artillery, like the line of support, is 
permanently occupied. On this line are placed the command- 
posts for colonels. 

Boyaux are intended to connect the different trenches with 
one another, and with the rear. Their general direction 
is thus perpendicular to the first line trench and to the 
others. 

, Boyaux are essentially different from trenches in that they 
are solely means of communication, instead of being means of 
defense and of shelter. To this end they should be free from 
all encumbrances; it should therefore be forbidden to dig, 
along the sides of them, individual or collective shelters, dep6ts 
for materiel, munitions, water or suppUes. It is better to con- 
struct a new element of transversal trench than to risk 
causing difficulties in circulation. 

In principle, boyaux should be deep and narrow, so as to 
afford the best possible protection from the enemy's fire for 
the troops or carriers who are using them; but the dimensions 
depend primarily on the nature of the ground. 

The narrowness of the boyaux renders it difficult for men to 
pass one another in them. This difficulty may be obviated by 
constructing turnouts at stated distances, so that supply 
porters and laborers can stand aside while troops go by, or 
rest without obstructing circulation; or so that units may set 
down men who have been wounded while passing through the 
boyaux. It is also an excellent plan to settle on the direction 
in which each boyau is to be followed — certain ones for 
going forward, others back; signs with arrows should indicate 
these directions, and if need be sentries may be posted to see 
to the execution of the orders given. 

[50] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

On occasions when the needs of the front line take preced- 
ence over all others, as for example in case of an urgent call 
for reinforcements, all the boyaux may be used for forward 
movements save those for the evacuation of the wounded; in 
this case the signs are turned about in those boyaux whose 
direction has been modified, and the sentries notified. 

Boyaux do not run in straight lines, so as not to be exposed 
to the enfilading fire of machine guns or of batteries of artil- 
lery. Their zigzags are sufficiently marked to form a natural 
protection, without exasperating the troops by constant 
changes in the direction of their march, or excessively in- 
creasing the length of their journey. The principal boyaux 
have the same name from the rear to the front line. 

Boyaux leading to the front spread out in branches which 
become increasingly numerous as they approach the first line 
trench. At the forks are placed signs, which indicate, in accord- 
ance with the names adopted in the official plan of the trenches, 
the principal direction in which each one leads. In imme- 
diate proximity to the trenches these signs should be such as 
to enable the troops easily to find the units, the posts where 
the officers are, and any sort of depot. At important forks, 
sentries are placed in special shelters, so as not to impede 
circulation. 

The men occupying the trenches should soon learn how to 
find their way about without hesitation or mistake in the ele- 
ment occupied by their company and in the neighboring ones. 
They must know the post where their captain is placed, the 
situation of the depots of materiel assigned to their unit, the 
boyaux of access and of evacuation; they can thus furnish 
useful information to any one who comes along. 

LSI] 



POSITIONS 

When the number of boyaux is not sufficient for the num- 
ber of troops who have to use them, passage has to be regu- 
lated by the signals of sentries stationed between the places 
d'armes as on a single track railway. But it is preferable to 
make supplementary boyaux, provided this can be done with- 
out too much difficulty. Above all it is essential to avoid 
having the entrance and exit of the troops, porters, laborers, 
and materiel necessary for a relatively extended front effected 
by a single boyau forming a bottle neck. This arrangement 
will inevitably produce congestion, however many exits may 
be provided in the interior of the position. 

Evacuation boyaux, specially intended to permit movement 
from the front to the rear, constitute, at all times, an admirable 
means of exit; but in principle they are reserved at periods of 
heavy losses for the evacuation of the wounded. Thus they 
are run in a more nearly straight hne, and are wider than the 
ordinary boyaux, so as to permit the passage of htters carried 
horizontally. 

Methodical organization and vigorous poUcmg of the 
boyaux are indispensable to ensure free circulation, smooth 
working of the rehefs, rapidity of reinforcements, and good 
Uaisons. The commander of the position gives all the nec- 
essary instructions to secure this. 

Shelters, observation posts, telephone posts, places 
d'armes, and depots are so constructed as to protect the men 
and the material occupying them from the enemy's fire. 

They are located with reference to the sum total of the 
conditions which they must fulfill, or, when they are contra- 
dictory, with reference to the most important of them, 

[52] 



ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS 

Shelters intended for troops should be dug in the ground, so 
as to resist heavy shells. Their depth varies according to the 
character of the ground, the protection given by the form of 
the terrain, the weather, the number of men, and the material 
means available. One difficulty is that they become graves 
in case of a cave-in. They are therefore provided with exits 
at opposite ends and are permanently furnished with shovels 
and picks. Among them may be included command-posts, 
which are intended to provide shelter for the leaders of the 
different units, and their staffs. 

Observation posts are intended to enable their occupants to 
see; but the finding of places where this condition can be ful- 
filled, as well as the measures which must be taken to protect 
them, inevitably expose them to grave dangers. It is a good 
thing to have several of them for the same purpose. The 
observation post for the commander is always selected be- 
fore the regular command-post, which should be as near to 
it as possible. 

Places d'armes are used to assemble reinforcements and 
reserves, where they will be sheltered from the observation 
and the fire of the enemy. 

Depots occupy central positions, in order to be easily 
utilized by the different units they supply; but they should be 
carefuUy concealed so as to escape being seen by aircraft, and 
soUdly constructed so as to withstand the projectiles shot by 
heavy cannon. 



[63: 



CHAPTER II 

TRENCH DUTIES 

Trench duties include the following: ensuring the occupation 
of < the terrain whose limit is marked by the first line trench; 
preventing the enemy from gaining access thereto; observing 
the dispositions taken in the opposite position; transmitting to 
the Command any information obtained; inflicting losses on 
the enemy; finally, preparing the forward movement. 

Liaison is the word used to indicate the means by which 
the units installed in the trenches are enabled to keep in 
constant communication with their superior officers, with the 
units on either side of them, with the artillery and the other 
arms, and vice versa. It is effected laterally and in depth. 

The proper working of the haisons is of great importance. 
It permits the units in line to understand and to support one 
another; it makes possible communication of all sorts between 
these units and the Command, and also constant collaboration 
between the different arms. By means of these haisons, each 
commander is apprised of every movement, and can give his 
orders rapidly and with certainty; by the same means, the 
infantry, the artillery, the aviators, the engineers and the 
cavalry can collaborate to good advantage. 

The duty of obtaining and forwarding information and 
messages is entrusted to aerial observers, to observers on the 
groimd or to liaison agents. 

[54] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

Observers in airplanes or in balloons are furnished with 
high-power glasses to enable them to obtain mformation con- 
cerning enemy's troops situated far away. Since they com- 
municate with the earth by rapid means (such as wireless in 
the case of the airplanes, telephones in that of the observation 
balloons, or visual signals in both cases) they can pass on in- 
formation speedily to the Command, and also transmit orders. 
They have very powerful photographic apparatus, which 
enables them to verify the information they have secured. 

Observers on the ground have the advantage of a fixed 
position; they remain in place at all times and seasons, day 
and night. They are thus able not only to complete and to 
control the items furnished by the aerial observers, but in cer- 
tain cases they constitute the sole means of information. They 
are installed in observing stations specially fitted out, well 
protected and concealed. The information they furnish is 
gathered in and coordinated in every body of troops by an 
of&cer specially assigned to this task, and known as the 
" intelligence officer." 

The liaison agents of the larger units are not merely means 
of transmitting information, but also means of obtaining it. 

The commander of eveiy large unit, such as an army, army 
corps, or division, details a liaison agent to each of the units 
immediately below liim. This agent should be chosen on 
account of his military knowledge, intelligence, and judgment; 
it is his duty to furnish liis commander all information of 
particular importance, to give him any explanation about 
the state of affairs which may be useful, and to inform him 
in regard to the execution of his orders. 

In the smaller units, on the other hand, such as regiments, 
battaHons, etc., the liaison agents are detailed by the inferior 

[55] 



POSITIONS 

units to the superior ones; practically they are used only for 
the purpose of transmitting information. 

Transmission of information is secured by numerous means 
of Uaison; such as telephones, runners, signallers, rockets, 
Bengal lights, carrier pigeons, dogs, cycles, telegraphs, and 
automobiles; they are chosen according to circumstances, and 
the ground to be traversed. 

AH these means of liaison ought to supplement or replace one 
another according to circumstances; they should, therefore, 
be utiUzed frequently, so as to be kept in working order. In 
every regiment, one officer is specially charged with the organi- 
zation and coordination of the liaisons; usually the telephone 
officer does this. In every unit larger than a regiment, a 
staff officer looks after the Haisons. The commanders of the 
different units, moreover, take great care to provide for means 
of Uaison when drawing up the plan of organization of a 
position. 

Lateral liaisons are effected either by way of the first fine 
trenches or of the communicating trenches, or else by more 
compUcated routes; the boyaux and, if necessary, even open 
places are utilized for this purpose. Liaisons in depth are 
effected by the boyaux and open spaces; in the interior and 
at the rear of a position, roads are utilized for this purpose. 

The most practical and the swiftest means of liaison is of 
course the telephone. In every army there is a general system 
of telephone lines, and connected with it there are special 
systems for each army corps. Each system includes (1) a sys- 
tem for the commanders, connecting the command-posts of the 
different units, and also connecting the units of infantry 
(regiment or battaUon) with the artillery wliich has been 

[56] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

given the task of supporting it; (2) a system for the artillery, 
connecting the artillery commanders with one another, and 
with their observing stations, as well as with the infantry 
which it is their duty to support. The liaison of the artillery 
and the infantry is thus doubly provided for by the system for 
the commanders and by that for the artillery. 

The plan of these telephone systems is drawn up by the 
heads of the telephone service of the first line; it avoids the 
construction of an excessive number of direct Hnes. Con- 
fidential information should not be telephoned except in 
cipher; telephone commimications should be regulated by a 
rigorous discipline so as to avoid cumbering the lines with 
useless conversations. 

The telephone system for an army is set up and operated by 
army telegraph sappers. In that of an army corps the system 
for the commanders is set up and operated by army corps 
and division telegraph sappers; in the case of regiments and 
smaller miits, it is operated by the infantry telephone men. 
The system for the artillery is set up and operated by tele- 
graph sappers as far as the "centrals" of the artillery groups, 
and beyond them by the artillery telephone men. 

The weak point of the telephone is that it is often broken by 
a bombardment, or by earthsHdes; this can be remedied by 
burying the important Unes, by dupUcating them along dif- 
ferent routes, and by summoning the telephone workers to 
make repairs at the earliest possible opportunity. The tele- 
phone system, both lateral and in depth, is the first thing to 
be installed in a trench. For this purpose, gangs of telephone 
men, furnished with all the requisites, follow the troops. The 
Hnes are run above ground at first, so as to save time, but are 
subsequently buried. 

[57] 



POSITIONS 

Wireless and ground telegraphy serve to double the tele- 
phone lines and to replace them when they have been cut. 
Portable machines for this purpose are distributed to the army 
corps and divisions; but only in small numbers on account 
of the fact that their currents interfere with each other. 
Wireless installations moreover hinder the working of the wire- 
less haisons with the airplanes, and those for ground telegraphy 
make difficulties for telephone conversations and for listening 
posts. 

The runners, or liaison agents, are alert, brave, and intelli- 
gent soldiers, who are given the task of carrying orders or writ- 
ten information. They go two, or even three or four at a time, 
in the case of important messages, separated by a sufficient in- 
terval so that two shall not f aU victims to the same sheU. Their 
duty is to bring the message entrusted to them to its recip- 
ient, come what may. They often find opportunities to look 
about and observe during their trips, and thus to furnish 
useful information. In certain cases, chains of runners are 
estabUshed by means of relays, each of which has two or three 
men at its disposal. 

Signallers have the duty of maintaining haison by arm 
signals, with or without flags, during the day, and by lanterns 
or projectors during the night. This is a dehcate task, for 
they must manage, by choosing their positions well, to be 
seen by those with whom they would communicate, without 
being exposed to the enemy; such conditions are frequently 
almost impossible to realize. There are not more than so 
many signallers in each battalion or regiment, and they receive 
a special training; if they are absent or out of action, or 
insufficiently trained, signalling becomes very difficult. There 
are in fact so many difficulties in the way of securing good 

[58] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

liaisons by means of signallers, that they should be looked 
upon merely as subsidiary. 

Signalling by projectors ought however always to be 
organized with a view to supplementing or temporarily re- 
placing the telephone lines. In order not to reveal the position 
of the instruments to the enemy, it is used as far as possible 
only for sending messages from the front to the rear. 

Rockets are used to estabUsh immediate Uaison from front 
to rear, especially with the artillery. They may have different 
meanings, according to the rules laid down for their different 
colors: a call for a barrage or for a deeper or for a shorter 
fire, notice of a hostile attack, announcement of arrival at a 
determined point, etc. Bengal lights of different colors may 
be used, when the terrain is suitable, to obtain the same 
results. The code adopted must be very simple, and identical 
throughout the army, if errors are to be avoided. 

Carrier pigeons and dogs can take the part of messengers 
from front to rear; but they run the same risks as the infan- 
trymen whom they accompany, and may be put out of action 
before they have accomplished any purpose. They have the 
advantage of runners in that they are faster and less vulner- 
able; but on the other hand they cannot vary their course to 
suit the sender. The pigeons utilized by the units of the first 
line are grouped at pigeon posts; they are cared for there by 
men who are specially trained for the purpose; they ought to 
be treated less well there than at the dovecote, in order to 
cause them to return to the latter at once, when they are let 
go. Any message which they bring back to the dovecote 
should be sent on without the least delay to the person for 
whom it is intended. 

[59] 



POSITIONS 

Cyclists are used to advantage inside the position, as soon as 
there is a practicable road; they are swifter than runners, 
without being any more vulnerable. It is worth while to 
create relays of cyclists on such routes, to replace severed 
telephone Hnes or runners. 

Telegraphs and automobiles are the means of liaison which 
are used especially for communication between the position 
and the rear. Wireless telegraphy, however, is employed by 
thq commander of the position and by the artillery, especially 
in broken country, when keeping Uaison with the airplanes. 

Under exceptional circumstances, automobiles are used 
in the interior of the position; for instance, motor-carried 
machine guns, when they have had occasion to make a dash 
forward, will do better to bring back important and urgent 
information to the commander themselves, rather than try to 
send it through by means of uncertain intermediaries. 

To sum up, two means of liaison are essential, telephones 
and runners; others are of service in special circumstances, or 
when the former are lacking. 

The Stay in the Trenches 

It is not especially dangerous to remain and to go about in 
a normally constructed trench, except in case of an intense 
and well-conducted bombardment, provided, of course, one 
respects the rules derived from experience. On the other hand, 
even a momentary stay in a trench may, at any time, prove 
fatal to the newcomer or the greenhorn, as well as to the fool 
or the braggart. 

In the presence of an attentive enemy, every fault receives 
severe chastisement at his hands; individual imprudence is in- 
stantly punished by death ; the revelation of collective move- 
ment draws murderous fire; an ill-concealed machine gun 

[60] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

is a target for artillery fire. Thus, prudence must be the rule 
of all those who stay in the trenches, or pass through them. 

Silence is one of the essential rules of the trench. It should 
become the unvarying habit of the troops, because of its many 
advantages; it keeps the enemy in ignorance as to the strength 
in which the trench is held; it helps the sharpshooters and the 
observers to do their work, and to detect the least noise; it 
enables the chief to transmit an order from man to man, with- 
out raising the voice; in case of alarm, it helps each man to 
take his place quickly. It is one of the first qualities of well- 
disciplined troops. 

Role of the Commanders 

The commander in a trench has various duties, according to 
the extent of his command. He must take account of the pro- 
fessional ability of his subordinates, the morale of his soldiers, 
the task confided to him, the situation of his trenches, and of 
all special or unforeseen circumstances, in order to determine 
for himself his line of conduct. 

One principle which no commander should forget is the 
necessity for his frequent presence in the midst of his men. 
It would be cliildish to try to determine the exact number 
of hours which the leader of a small unit should pass in his 
trenches, or the number of visits wliich the leader of a large 
unit should pay to them : so many conflicting necessities arise 
that each must learn from his conscience alone how to fulfill 
liis whole duty. 

Direct contact with the troops on as many occasions as 
possible is the most certain way to gain their confidence. A 
leader whose face and voice are known, whose reputation is 
estabhshed with his subordinates, can have a pronounced 

[61] 



POSITIONS 

influence before, during, and after the combat. On the other 
hand, a leader who has not taken the trouble to make himseK 
known cannot enjoy the same ascendancy, no matter how 
great his coolness in face of danger. 

The frequent presence of the commander is, moreover, in- 
dispensable for other important reasons. It permits him to 
ascertain whether the orders given have been well executed. 
Such verification, carried out within the limits appropriate 
to feach grade of the command, forestalls possible neghgence 
and cruel surprises. 

It also helps the leader really to know the trenches, to take 
cognizance of all the difficulties, and to avoid giving any 
orders which are impracticable or impossible of execution. 

Finally, it gives him the chance to examine his position as a 
whole, to improve and draw together the links of his chain, to 
face all eventuahties, either of attack or of defense, to dis- 
cover and fill in aU gaps — in a word, to look ahead. 

To see means to foresee. Neghgence and carelessness on the 
part of the leader are generally reflected, httle by httle, right 
down to the lowest steps of the hierarchy, and produce deplor- 
able effects. 

On the contrary, the commander who has seen with his own 
eyes the trench and the terrain, with reference to which his 
orders are drawn up, expresses his thought with a precision 
and a certainty which no theoretical instruction can impart. 

Activities of the Troops 

If the leader of a medium-sized unit seems to lose interest in 
the trenches, or at least to neglect them, the leaders of the small 
units under his orders will have a tendency to take root in their 
command-posts. From that moment the troops ' stagnate, 

[62] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

grow slack, and think of but one thing — the relief. Their 
attention, instead of being continually directed forward, is 
turned to the rear. Thus work, even during periods of calm, 
is indispensable for the moral and physical health of all. 

An excellent way to occupy the soldier, and to sustain 
his capacity for offense, is to turn his. thoughts continually 
towards the opposing trench and to direct his activity 
against it. 

The best shots of the company are given the task of cover- 
ing the vulnerable places in the enemy's line, and all eventual 
objectives. 

Men of careful attention and tested judgment are chosen as 
watchers, to discover the enemy's movements, the hours of his 
relief or supply, his offensive or defensive works, the location 
of his trench weapons or machine guns, and his observation 
posts. They are furnished with watches, spy glasses, and 
periscopes. 

The most active and venturesome serve as patrols, and 
endeavor to reconnoitre certain important points, to gather 
information as to the adversary's intentions, and to take 
prisoners. 

It is well to point out to the soldier the effect of attrition; 
thus, let him see how, by putting out of action, every day of 
the week, and on every mile of the front, a small number 
of enemies, immense damage to the opposing army will 
ultimately result.^ 

The necessary activity in the trench degenerates into fruit- 
less and dangerous enterprises, if it has not predetermined 
ends, or if it involves the troops in costly struggles. The initia- 

' Sixteen men per mile each day put out of action makes 240,000 per 
month on a front of 500 miles. 

[63] 



POSITIONS 

tive in small operations, if left in the hands of leaders of units 
who are inexperienced or impatient, may cause useless loss of 
men, or regrettable waste of artillery ammunition. Thus, the 
Command watches carefully over the leaders of the units in 
line, in order to avoid abuses as well of action as of inaction 

Besides this activity directed towards the enemy, there is 
considerable work to be done every day in the trench itself. 
This work, whose importance escapes those who are not 
acciistomed to trench life, consists in rebuilding parapets, 
boyaux, and shelters destroyed by bombardment, by water, 
or by frost; in replacing and completing accessory defenses, 
digging wells and drainage channels, putting in new latrines 
and refuse-pits and filhng up the old ones; taking measures 
against landsUps; repairing the endless damage caused by 
shells, which uncover bodies, obstruct passages, and cut 
telephone lines. In fact, in periods of intense bombardment, 
this work is so exhausting that it uses up the troops who 
are going to fight, and should be, in part, turned over to 
workmen sent from the rear during the night. 

The supply of the trench with food, munitions, and materiel 
of all sorts should be effected daily. It can generally take 
place only at night, in order not to expose those who are 
entrusted therewith to loss or delay. 

Food is brought by the cooks and, if need be, by certain 
fatigue parties placed at their disposal by their units; the 
personnel of these parties is changed as much as possible in 
order to increase the number of soldiers capable of establish- 
ing haisons day and night between front and rear. The 
kitchens are situated behind the front, so as to be compara- 
tively sheltered from bombardment and not betrayed by their 

[64] 



TRENCH DUTIES 

smoke. Since it is a long way from the kitchens to the first 
hne trenches, it is worth while to shorten the trip as much as 
possible by the use of Ught railways, barrows, and push carts, 
both in order to relieve the cooks, and to increase the com- 
fort of the soldier in the trench. 

The kitchens in each company are under the charge of a 
responsible non-commissioned officer, and are inspected with- 
out warning by officers and N. C. Os. detailed by the captains 
or majors; they must be kept absolutely clean, and also their 
surroundings, and must employ none but men regularly 
assigned to them. 

The supply of infantry munitions is usually effected by the 
relieving units. Each man carries a specified number of car- 
tridges; if he has not used them up at the moment when he 
comes back, he turns the surplus over to a munition depot 
organized for the company and at the disposal of the captain; 
there is also a battahon depot, supplied by similar means. An 
account exhibiting the daily intake and distribution enables 
the commanding officers to know at any moment whether the 
number of cartridges is sufficient for such needs as may arise. 
The same system of depots is employed for grenades, for 
trench-weapon ammunition, for lighting or signaUing rockets, 
etc., but the supply is carried out by special details coming 
with those which bring the materiel. 

Artillery munitions are generally replenished by employing 
all the improved means of transport which are compatible 
with the situation of the batteries. The supply of the heavy 
pieces depends especially upon the service in the rear; every- 
tliing is done to improve the railways and motor transports, 
which insure a rapid and regular arrival of projectiles at a 
convenient distance from their pieces. 

[65] 



POSITIONS 

The supply of materiel includes the bringing up of wire and 
posts, of all sorts of accessory defenses, tools, beams, wood, and 
straw, in short of all the utensils and articles necessary to the 
organization, the security, and the comfort of the trench. 

It is determined by the daily demands of the leaders of 
units, based upon their immediate needs or their expectations 
for the future. The transport of materiel is continued as far 
as possible by mechanical means in order to gain time and to 
save labor and waste of men; then it is carried forward by 
special gangs of workmen, taken from the troops in the rear. 
At the point where the materiel is distributed to the workmen, 
the leader of each gang receives a Ust of what is turned over to 
him; for this he must bring back a receipt signed by the com- 
mander of the unit supplied. 



[66] 



CHAPTER III 

RELIEF 

Relief is the operation of replacing the troops occupying a 
certain group of trenches by other troops, either equal, 
superior, or inferior in strength. It includes the march of a 
unit from its cantonment to the trench, the replacing of the 
unit in line, and the return of the unit relieved to the rest 
cantonment. 

General relief is the term applied to the relief of a whole posi- 
tion, when the troops relieved are large units, such as army 
corps or divisions. Interior relief is the term applied to the 
relief of one sector or a portion of a sector, when the troops 
relieved are brigades, regiments, or battalions. 

General Principles of Relief 

Interior relief is executed every six days. This period may 
be reduced when the stay in the trenches is particularly 
arduous, or prolonged when it is comfortable; it constitutes 
the minimum necessary for getting acquainted with a new 
sector, for undertaking and carrying out works of construction 
and installation, or for preparing and executing raids. 

It is advisable to arrange the relief between units which 
have friendly relations to one another, such as battalions of the 
same regiment, in order that the trench duties may be more 
easily carried on and continuity of effort maintained. For 
this purpose it is necessary that the units in service, such as 
regiments, should be echeloned in depth, one part at the 

[67] 



POSITIONS 

cantonment of " part-rest " (such as the brigade or division 
reserve), while the other part holds the trenches. 

It is also advantageous not to shift troops constantly from 
sector to sector or region to region, except in cases of tactical 
necessity. Units wliich are sure of coming back to their 
trenches fit them out pleasantly, keep them up with a regard 
for hygiene and cleanliness, and increase the solidity of the 
defenses and the security of the shelters; they show an interest 
in the work undertaken, study all the details of the enemy's 
position, and prepare day by day for the future attack. 

General relief is executed either when large units are going 
to " full rest " at the rear, in suitably chosen cantonments or 
else when units are removed from one part of the front to 
another for strategic reasons. 

It is executed in the same way as interior rehef; divisions, 
brigades, and regiments being reUeved successively, but never 
simultaneously. 

Therefore it is enough to study the mechanism of the rehef 
of small units. 

The march of a unit from its cantonment to the trenches is 

a night march carried out according to the usual rules. 

The time of departure is so fixed that the unit shall arrive 
at the trench and effect the relief early enough for the unit 
reheved to get out of sight of the enemy before daylight. In 
summer, when the nights are very short, the slightest delay 
may be fatal to the unit reheved, if it should be seen by the 
enemy's artillery and taken under fire. 

There is every advantage, even after a rest, in transporting 
the men by motor trucks as far forward as possible, if their 

[68] 



RELIEF 

cantonments are distant, so that the whole unit shall arrive 
fresh in the trenches. 

As soon as the march brings the men within sight of the 
enemy, they should neither smoke, flash electric torches nor 
make any noise. During halts, the roads are left open and 
crossings and forks are kept clear. 

At points agreed on in advance, each battalion finds guides 
sent by the unit which it reUeves. There is usually one guide 
for each platoon leader, one guide for each company com- 
mander, and one for each battalion commander. These guides 
attach themselves to the commanders of the units to which 
they are assigned, and accompany them until they reach the 
commanders of the units reheved; they do not allow them- 
selves to be diverted from their errand, even for a moment, 
under any pretext. When numerous groups of guides are 
assembled at one pomt, the leaders of each one must keep on 
the alert, to see that no battaUon or company goes past with- 
out getting its guides. 

The departures of the various elements are calculated so 
that all the units in hne shall not be reheved simultaneously. 
Care must be taken at the approaches and in the boyaux to 
avoid straggling, clogging, and crossing of units. The com- 
mander of the unit relieved sends in advance to the com- 
mander of the reheving unit all needful information, and gives 
his guides precise instructions as to the routes to be foUowed. 

The replacing of the unit in line constitutes the reUef, 
strictly speaking. 

Its method of execution depends on the number of men 
concerned; since two units of the same theoretical strength, 
may, according to circumstances, be very different in the 
number of men that they actually contain. 

[69] 



POSITIONS 

It also depends on the front to be occupied, for the com- 
manding officer often takes the opportunity offered by the 
rehef to increase or diminish the length of the trench entrusted 
to one unit. 

These are the considerations that govern the relieving unit 
in making its arrangements to hold the first line with elements 
which will afford sufficient density, and to distribute the sur- 
plus, if need be, in the shelters of the second fine, in the sup- 
pott trenches, or in reserve. Such dispositions should be 
planned before starting, in order to avoid hesitation, delay, 
pushing back, and crowding, aU of which are sources of dis- 
order, fatigue, and danger. 

If the rehef is complicated by simultaneous changes in the 
two factors of effectives and front, and thus becomes particu- 
larly difficult to carry out, it is indispensable to take special 
measures for its proper execution ; in such cases a detachment 
of N. C. Os., hke the camping party that is sent ahead under 
command of an officer to prepare a cantonment, goes into the 
trench the night before to prepare aU the details of moving in. 
These details attended to, the N. C. Os. wait in the trench for 
their respective elements, which are brought up by the guides, 
and help the men to install themselves quickly and silently. 

The true unit of rehef is the battahon. 

While the reUeving elements come to take their stations 
and the elements refieved begin to move toward the rear (so 
far as possible by another route or by other boyaux), their 
commanders meet to give each other local information and 
directions. 

The commanders of battahons and companies reUeved 
transmit to the new arrivals, at the respective command-posts, 

[70] 



RELIEF 

all information concerning the trench, maps, sketches, photo- 
graphs, results of reconnaissance, state of works undertaken 
and works projected, positions of depots of munitions, of food 
and of water, condition of these depots, amount of materiel, 
points in the line to be specially watched, indications of the 
intentions of the enemy, dangerous approaches, etc. The 
platoon-leaders do likewise, furnishing all sorts of practical in- 
formation concerning the parts of the trench they occupy. 

As soon as their units are in place, the company commanders 
send to the battahon commander, by telephone, brief notifica- 
tion that the reUef has been accomphshed with or without 
incidents; he in turn reports back in the same manner to his 
superior officer. 

Immediately after the completion of the relief, the com- 
manders of the different units should make sure of their haisons 
both laterally and in depth. For this purpose, they send 
N. C. Os. or inteUigent soldiers to get into touch with the 
elements on the right and the left, and to ascertain that all 
parts of the trench are manned with numbers proportional to 
the needs of the moment. Each company commander has 
the command posts of adjoining companies and battahons 
reconnoitred not only by one agent but by several, so that he 
will never find himself at a loss. The telephone operators make 
sure that their lines are in working order. The battahon com- 
mander, on his part, having as haison agents an N. C. 0. and 
a soldier for each company, causes first one of them and then 
the other to reconnoitre the command-posts of his captains.^ 

1 A practical way of establishing reciprocal liaison between the battalion 
commander and his captains is the following: 

Each company, on leaving the cantonments, sends two men to the battalion 
commander. These men march with the battalion commander's liaison as far 
as his command-post, with which they familiarize themselves; thence they 
rejoin their respective companies, guided by an agent of the commander of the 

[71] 



POSITIONS 

The mechanism of relief, apparently quite simple, is com- 
plicated by a mass of detail arising from the terrain and 
the circumstances. The way of accompUshing it, therefore, 
should not be too narrowly or precisely laid down. But it is 
necessary for the battahon conmiander to give exact orders, 
and for the captains to see to it that they are strictly executed. 

A rehef badly carried out results in masses of men being 
huddled in the boyaux, able neither to advance nor retreat, 
and to whom it is impossible to give orders. If the enemy at- 
tacks at such a moment, or even if he limits himself to well- 
adjusted artillery fire, the results of the errors committed may 
prove disastrous. 

One may judge of the degree of instruction of troops by the 
manner in which they carry out a relief; but as there are 
always two units involved, care must be taken, in making this 
judgment, not to attribute the mistakes of one to the other, 
which is often the first victim. 

As soon as the Haisons are estabUshed, the leaders of the 
different elements make their initial tests after taking their 
stations. They have the battle alarm given, so as to cause 
each man to occupy the post which he is to take in case of 
an attack, and to make certain that the trench is well de- 
fended. The roll call is taken at this juncture. 

These initial tests are for the purpose of making all the 
necessary verifications and observations. They are directed 

battalion to be relieved, and accompanied by another agent of the commander 
of the relieving battalion. The agents of the two battalion commanders bring 
back with them two other men from each company. The second liaison agent 
of the relieving battalion commander then goes back with these two men to 
identify his company. 

This movement of going and coming, utilized for the transmission of daily 
items, of orders and of reports, familiarizes a considerable number of soldiers 
from the outset with a route which it is absolutely essential to know in case of 
unexpected events or of breakdown of the telephone connections. 

[72] 



RELIEF 

upon the communications between the different command- 
posts to make sure that their itineraries are properly chosen 
from the tactical point of view, and arranged in the best 
possible way from the practical standpoint; on the state of 
the parapet, which should not be obstructed by shelters, and 
ought to be maintained at a sufficient height and thickness; on 
the state of the accessory defenses, shelters, observation posts, 
boyaux, latrines, refuse-holes, munition depots, etc. 

These reconnaissances permit the different leaders to get a 
look at the trench which they occupy as a whole, and to decide 
on any improvements to be made; they enable them to make 
certain how the work of their subordinates is organized and 
performed, and to know whether the liaisons established are 
working properly. They form the subject, in each company, 
of a written report. The battaUon commander summarizes 
and coordinates these reports, at the same time that he keeps 
in mind everything wliich he has himself observed. He thus 
sends to his superior officer the report of the installation, 
accompanied by a sketch. 

A sketch made at night is of slight value; it can do little 
more than reproduce the sketch which is usually passed on by 
the commanders of the unit that has been reUeved, together 
with an indication of the places occupied by the elements of 
the relieving force. In this manner, inaccurate sketches are 
transmitted indefinitely, from unit to unit, because the guiding 
principle is to furnish without any delay the information de- 
manded. It is the duty of the captains and battahon com- 
manders to verify the exactness of every kind of document 
handed over to them, and to indicate all the rectifications to 
be made in it. They make use, to this end, of all the infor- 
mation obtainable, and particularly of photographs taken by 

[73] 



POSITIONS 

aviators. Such a work can only be accomplished in the day- 
time, and demands care; it should be regarded as performed 
not only for the benefit of the unit in actual occupation, but 
for that of all those which succeed it in the same trench. 

Reconnaissances during the daytime thus complete those of 
the night, and above all make it possible to study the enemy's 
position. They ought to be made by officers and N. C. Os. of 
all ranks, for they serve to give the men exact information 
about their situation and that of the units close to them, about 
the enemy's trenches, and about all the points to be specially 
watched. 

The soldier, arriving at night, his body tired from carrying 
his pack, ammunition and provisions, his mind dulled by the 
march and by the danger, is not generally apprised of the lay 
of the land when daybreak comes; and if the trench possesses 
important sahents or advanced posts, this lack of local topo- 
graphical knowledge may cause mistakes. He should be 
enUghtened as early as possible by precise information from 
his superior officers. 

The return of the unit reUeved to its rest cantonment in- 
cludes getting out of the trench, and then the march to the 
cantonment. 

Detailed orders concerning the relief are given by the 
battalion commanders, who carefully provide all the necessary 
measures. Only the battalion commander can regulate the 
movement so that there shall be no coUisions, crowdings nor 
delays; good intentions and previous agreement between 
captains are never sufficient, unless they are directed by clear 
and precise orders. 

[74] 



RELIEF 

Getting out of the trench requires as much method as 
getting in. It is, if possible, effected by different boyaux and 
different routes, at least at the start. 

The march is made by platoons, the platoon leader leaving 
the trench last, after giving full information to his successor 
and making sure that the new platoon is installed; an N. C. 0., 
accompanied by a man who is intimately acquainted with the 
route, marches at the head of the platoon. 

The captain appoints a place for his platoons to reassemble; 
he does not leave his trench until the guides sent to bring up 
the relieving platoons have come to report on the execution of 
their errand; these guides attach themselves to his liaison 
until they are able to rejoin their platoons. The place of 
assembly of the company is fixed far enough away to clear 
the approaches of the position entirely, not to block general 
traffic, and to be as far as possible protected from the enemy's 
fire. Roll call is taken in the platoons and reported to the 
captain. 

On the way out, the most absolute silence must be pre- 
served. Men who have been reUeved have a tendency to 
scorn the danger which they are leaving behind; they should 
remember that the men who have taken their places are ex- 
posed to the fire of artillery whose observers are hstening for 
the shghtest noise. This artillery will not limit itself to the 
first Une when it opens fire, and may make them pay dear for 
their rashness by accompanying them on their return journey. 

AU rules of conduct for the march in the boyaux are strictly 
observed. In case of doubt, troops relieved always give way 
to relieving troops. 

The battalion commander, who gets in touch with his suc- 
cessor at the command-post, receives there, either by tele- 

[75] 



POSITIONS 

phone or by liaison agent, the report of the reUef of each 
company. He leaves with his Uaison as soon as the last com- 
pany is reheved; he is accompanied by the four stretcher- 
bearers usually located near his command-post, so as to bring 
along or to report any wounded who may have been left 
behind. 

The march to the cantonment is conducted in accordance 
with the ordinary rules for night marching. It is the first 
occasion on which the men are once more taken in hand, after 
the relaxation of their habits which often results from a stay 
in the trenches; discipline of the ranks is therefore vigorously 
maintained. 

Save in case of necessity the battalion commander does not 
fix a spot for his battaUon to assemble; in order to spare the 
men useless waits and fatigues, each company goes directly 
to the cantonment which has been assigned to it. 

The cooks depart before the battaUon is reheved, as soon as 
the last meal has been prepared, under the conduct of a 
N. C. 0., designated by the battaUon commander; they 
march in perfect order, with their small carts if they have 
utensils to transport, or else with the necessary carriers; they 
instaU themselves at the cantonment in sufficient time to be 
able to provide hot soup or coffee. 

The ambulance outfit and the horses of the battaUon come 
out from the cantonment where they were stationed in the 
rear, repair to a pomt determined by the commander of the 
regiment, and wait there for the companies of the battaUon 
to pass. 

During the march, an energetic N. C. 0. and several men 
are placed behind the rear rank of each company, in order to 
prevent any laggard from stopping. If a man is so sick or 

[76] 



RELIEF 

tired that he cannot keep up, he is given a certificate signed by 
the captain, and awaits the battalion ambulance. This ambu- 
lance follows the last company reUeved, and is accompanied by 
the rear guard of police of the battalion. No laggard must be 
left behind; if necessary the pace of this rear guard is slowed 
down. 

Marches executed after a stay in the trench are painful, 
especially in winter, because the men's bodies are numb from 
immobility, and their feet tortured by cold and wet. When a 
long distance must be covered, the use of auto-transports 
brings great reUef to the troops. 

On arrival at the cantonment, the companies rest. The 
next morning, before beginning any work, the captains and 
the majors make a rapid inspection, in order to prescribe such 
modifications as are often necessary in the arrangements made 
by the party preparing the cantonment and adopted during 
the night; modifications made at a later date would cause use- 
less fatigue and loss of time. Then the men settle themselves; 
they care for the needs of their health, as well as for the clean- 
ing of their arms and of their effects. The duties of the place 
are taken over at the hour fixed by the commander of the regi- 
ment, in accordance with the agreement concluded with the 
preceding one, if such there was; sentries are placed at the 
exits, the pohce guard is posted, the patrols ordered and their 
rounds prescribed. 

The major and the captains look out for the sanitation of 
the cantonment; they insist that the location of the latrines 
and of the refuse pits be fixed, from the moment of arrival. 
They inform themselves concerning the attitude of the troops 
towards the local inhabitants, and examine any complaints or 
claims that may be made. A unit with habits of order and 

[77] 



POSITIONS 

discipline is well received by the local population, which knows 
that it deserves respect and admiration. 

Good conduct and carriage, and external marks of respect, 
are rigorously exacted. No man ought to go out before he has 
washed and cleansed himself and liis equipment in the man- 
ner prescribed. At each meeting of the company, a few of the 
regular evolutions, or a part of the manual of arms, will 
restore to the soldier a sense of the discipline of the ranks. 

A body of troops which is clean, carries itself well, salutes 
correctly, and manoeuvres properly, shows the good leadership 
and discipUne wliich bring victory. 



[78] 



PART III 
ATTACK ON A POSITION 



CHAPTER I 

GENERAL REMARKS ON OFFENSIVE 
COMBAT 

The general form of offensive combat is an attack on a 
position. 

Even in the war of movement, the encounter between two 
forces takes this form. For, whenever troops are in contact, 
they take advantage of short cessations of fighting, and, above 
all, of night time, to dig trenches, to make shelters for them- 
selves, and to anchor themselves to the ground; in other 
words they organize positions. 

Thus the offensive, starting from an organized position 
and having as its objective a hostile position, opens with 
an assault. 

This assault should be preceded by a preparation, whose 
object is to facilitate it in every way. 

It has not the character of a rapid and decisive act, but is 
developed progressively, with alternations of movements and 
stationary periods. It may thus be designated by the name of 
an attack, in order to reserve the name of assault for the 
separate acts forming parts of a struggle which is often 
protracted. 

In case of success, the offensive is continued, either by pur- 
suit, in case the enemy attempts to get away, or by a march 
of approach, in case he occupies a second position behind the 

[81] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

first. As soon as the enemy resists, the phases of the offensive 
are renewed. 

These phases succeed one another in the following cycle: 
preparation of the attack, attack, pursuit, march of approach 
— up to the moment of definitive victory. This order is invari- 
able, whatever the initial phase may be — march of approach 
in a war of movement, attack in case of a surprise — but the 
duration and importance of each phase depends entirely on 
circumstances. They should follow one another, without res- 
pite, in such wise as to prevent the enemy from occupying at 
need the successive positions which he has previously organ- 
ized, or from preparing fresh ones. 

These phases will now be studied and described in their 
complete development, as carried out by the divisions of an 
army corps which has been given the task of attacking a posi- 
tion. By reducing, according to circumstances, the scale of 
one or another of them, it will be possible to get a picture 
of a specific offensive combat. 

Part played by the different Arms in the Engagement 

The infantry and the artillery, acting in close and constant 
liaison, are the two arms which play the principal part in the 
combat. 

The heavy and the field artillery prepare the way for the 
infantry to enter the battle, by smaslung the enemy's position 
with their fire, by reducing his artillery to impotence, and by 
destroying his defensive organization. During the attack they 
protect the infantry — by fire directed against the enemy's 
batteries, as soon as the latter get into action, and by barrage 
fire, intended both to prevent the arrival of the enemy's re- 
serves, and to stop counter-attacks. They also facilitate the in- 

[82] 



OFFENSIVE COMBAT 

fantry's progress by concentrating their fire on specific 
objectives. 

Because of this interdependence, a general commanding a 
first-line division has under his orders, over and above his 
divisional artillery, batteries of corps artillery, and batteries 
of heavy artillery, so that he can utilize them during the com- 
bat. Rapidity and efficacy of fire against the enemy's bat- 
teries, many of which are not unmasked till the very moment 
of the attack, are of such importance that it is sometimes 
worth while, if the number of guns be large enough, to allot to 
certain artillery units the special task of acting as counter- 
batteries ; those who are acting as observers for them, both on 
the ground and in the air, see to it that fire is opened as rapidly 
as possible on such of the enemy's batteries as are taking the 
attacking infantry for their target. 

The infantry is launched against the indicated objectives 
without afterthought; that is to say, with the certainty that 
they will not be left to their own resources, in case they reach 
their goal in reduced numbers. It is the duty of the army 
corps commander, who has calculated beforehand the numbers 
necessary for each task, to see to it that the combat is carried 
on methodically, and if need be to call on the army commander 
for such measures as are necessary for the accomplishment of 
the task assigned to him. 

The aviation corps affords valuable assistance in the con- 
duct of the combat. From the beginning of the period of 
preparation, it seeks to blind the adversary by striking at his 
airplanes and captive balloons. Before, as well as in the course 
of the action, it furnishes information in regard to the move- 
ments of the enemy's troops, and the location of his batteries. 
It also adjusts the artillery fire. It therefore makes possible 

[83] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

the disorganization of a counter-attack, even before it has 
been launched, by discovering the point where it is being pre- 
pared, and adjusting the fire on that point. During the com- 
bat, it is obhged to expose itself especially freely, in order to 
make precise observations; but it thus plays one of the most 
useful and heroic parts possible. Fighting airplanes protect 
from the enemy's machines those planes wliich are used for ob- 
servation and for directing fire, as well as the captive balloons. 
Spmetimes, too, the airplanes take a direct part in the battle, 
by attacking reserves, concentrations, troops on the march, 
important points, etc., with bombs and machine-gun fire. 

The engineers help in preparing the assault, and subse- 
quently, in organizing the conquered position. 

The cavalry, utilized in case of pursuit, does not move with- 
out reliable information, in order to avoid premature action 
and fruitless sacrifice.^ 

1 In February, 1915, the author compiled a " Memorandum " in order to 
recall to his young ofBcers, in half-humorous and half-serious fashion, the modi- 
fications which have taken place in the conduct of battle. This little work 
adopted, and at the same time transformed, the phrases of our old regulations, 
and expressed itself, for example, as follows: 

" The principal arm in combat is no longer infantry; it is artillery. 
" The artillery conquers and holds the terrain; the infantry occupies it. 
" Brave infantry, energetically led, may, however, march against trenches 
provided with machine guns and barbed-wire entanglements, without artil- 
lery preparation; it is certain to get possession of the terrain, but in a 
tragically fatal manner. The same holds true of infantry launched in an 
attack against intact artillery. 

" Experience of recent combats has indeed demonstrated that in the 
struggle between metallic and human projectiles, the former are bound to 
win." 

And elsewhere, 

" The organism of the army may be compared to that of the human body: 
the High Command constitutes the head and brains of the army ; the artil- 
lery is its body with its strength and power of resistance ; the infantry are the 
legs, indispensable for forward movement; the engineers are the arms which 
are used for manual labor; the aviators are the eyes without which all effort 
[84] 



OFFENSIVE COMBAT 

R6le of the Command 

An army corps commander, when he has learned from the 
army commander the hmits of his zone of attack, his task and 
his successive objectives, proceeds to make his reconnaissances. 

Before the attack, he establishes a detailed plan of action, 
arranges his divisions, gives them their instructions and their 
objectives, determines the placing and eventual duty of his 
reserves; he indicates to the artillery and to the engineers 
their essential tasks, he orders the artillery commander to 
draw up a plan of action, distributes the airplanes and the 
balloons wliich have been placed at lais disposal and tells them 
what is expected of them, and provides the necessary measures 
for supply and evacuation. In liis plan of action, he takes into 
account the reliefs which may become necessary, as well as the 
manoeuvers for widening possible breaches. He assigns to 
each unit a front which should be narrow and deep when the 
terrain of attack is suitable to an advance, but widely ex- 
tended when the chances of progressing are slight. 

During the attack, he decides on the reliefs necessitated by 
losses or fatigue, and divides up the artillery at his disposal, 
according to the ends to be attained. He reports to the army 
commander frequently on the situation of his troops. 

If the attack succeeds, he maintains contact with the enemy, 
gives all necessary information to his cavalry, and pursues the 
adversary vigorously. When liis troops are stopped by a new 

is fruitless; the cavalry, an elegant adornment, left behind with the baggage 

where it will be sheltered from the hazards of conflict." 

This military parody contains ob\'iou8 exaggerations, particularly on the 
subject of the cavalry, which played a heroic part in the early stages of the war 
and many units of which have, since that time, fought on foot with as much 
bravery as the infantry ; but it nevertheless reflects very faithfully the feelings 
experienced by the troops in regard to combat. 

[85] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

position, he calls for a march of approach, takes all measures 
necessary for attacking the position, and strives to carry it. 

He thus continues until he has attained the position fixed 
upon as his ultimate objective. At this moment, if the pursu- 
ing troops run up against a new position, he executes a march 
of approach, gives orders preparatory to the attack, sends 
forward the necessary artillery, and reports to the army 
commander, whose directions he then awaits. 

Division commanders, and commanders of smaller units, 
should concentrate their minds on the task of fulfilling the 
instructions given to them, and of attaining the objectives 
assigned to them. 

It is indispensable to the good progress of the combat that 
the tasks assigned to all ranks should be clearly defined, and 
the objectives exactly determined. Soldiers must know what 
is expected of them; they ought also to be assured that, if 
they devote themselves entirely to their task, they will not 
be abandoned to their own resources in case of difiiculties. 

If there is an objective beyond which the advance should 
not be pushed, this fact should be clearly indicated. The 
division commander and the leaders of the smaller units must 
halt their men without pushing on further, and without mak- 
ing decisions which belong to the High Command. It is much 
more useful, moreover, in many cases, to secure possession of 
one captured position than to press forward with insuffi- 
cient means to the attack of another; the former course serves 
both to confirm a success that has been won, and to avoid a 
possible check whose consequences might prove serious. 

The momentary halt on a line previously fixed, and the 
organization of the conquered terrain should in no wise pre- 

[86] 



OFFENSIVE COMBAT 

vent the commander of a small unit from taking all the meas- 
ures necessary for eventually continuing the forward move- 
ment. His patrols and scouts should remain in contact with 
the enemy; they furnish him information which he does his 
utmost to expedite to his superior officers. 

If the continuation of the movement is ordered, and if it is 
assumed by fresh troops, he passes on to those troops all the 
information that has been gathered, furnishes them guides if 
need be, and holds himself in readiness to support them. 



[87] 



CHAPTER II 

PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

The preparation of the attack is the more deUcate the longer 
the troops have occupied the same trenches, because the 
enemy has had leisure to organize and fortify his position, and 
to furnish it, little by little, with all the most perfect means of 
defense. 

It is, on the other hand, much shorter, and at the same time 
it presents better chances of success, if the enemy has but re- 
cently been installed in Ms position. This case occurs during 
a pursuit, when the conquered side tries to face about and 
resist; then, it is advisable to hurry the attack. 

The preparation comprises several parts, successive or 
simultaneous, according to circumstances. These are: 

The detailed study of the two opposing positions; 

The material am^nagement of the position of departure; 

The complete smashing of the position to be attacked; 

The physical and moral training of the attacking troops. 

The detailed study of the two opposing positions pre- 
cedes, in principle, all other operations. 

As far as the position of departure is concerned, the com- 
mander of a small unit, such as a regiment or a battalion, ought 
not to restrict himself to consulting the frequently unreliable 
topographical sketch which may come into his hands; it is his 
duty to go through the trenches himself, to know their windings, 

[88] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

and to rectify or establish the plan of them; an exact plan is 
specially valuable for the reserves, in order to permit them to 
move rapidly and know exactly where they are coming out. His 
reconnaissances should not be limited to the places occupied 
by" his own troops, or to those which are assigned to him to 
attack; they should be extended to the ground adjacent to 
liim, so that he may become familiar with their topography. 

The study of the position to be attacked is effected by the 
aviators, the infantry and the artillery in collaboration. A 
detailed plan is drawn up from their observations. 

Usually only the aviators can obtain a general view of the 
position; they take photographs, wliich make it possible to 
locate on a large scale map the trenches, fortified works, 
and artillery emplacements; they furnish, moreover, all the 
information they collect each day concerning the occupation 
of the trenches by the enemy's troops, the state of liis works, 
the progress of the destruction effected, and the situation of 
his batteries; they thus help to rectify and to complete the 
map which has been drawn up by means of photography, and 
on which abandoned trenches, unfinished earthworks, and 
even sham emplacements for batteries may appear. 

Observations on the ground are made from the observing 
stations of the Command, and of the artillery. A plan of 
observation, drawn up in each sector, furnishes the occupants 
of these observing stations such information as they need, 
and defines their duties. The artillery observing stations 
are different from those intended for fire adjustment; their 
purpose is to seek out targets, particularly hostile batteries; 
but, even the observing stations for adjustment must not fail 
to forward any information which they may obtain. 

[89] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

The infantry devotes itseK to a minute observation of the 
enemy's first lines. By means of lookouts specially chosen 
and placed, and of scouts and patrols, it determines the con- 
tours of his lines, and the situation of his machine guns. In 
order to discover certain means of defense, which were not 
intended to be revealed until the last moment, it makes, if 
need be, a sham attack, taking all possible precautions to 
avoid losses. It never neglects to question prisoners and 
deserters, and, if possible, it makes them define, on the 
ground, the information which they have given. 

The artillery can obtain very useful information, if its 
observers carry out their task with unfailing attention. By 
virtue of their powerful and rigidly mounted telescopes, these 
observers often have the means and the time to render definite 
certain indications, which, as furnished by the airplanes and 
infantrymen, were a little vague. 

Thus the communication and reciprocal control of the infor- 
mation obtained by the three arms make it possible to lay out 
a detailed plan of the enemy's position. 

This plan, drawn up under the direction of the commander, 
is communicated to the leaders of the subordinate units, 
including, if possible, the very lowest, in order that it may 
come to the knowledge of all the officers. 

It is accompanied by information obtained concerning the 
enemy's means of defense; for a difficulty that has been fore- 
seen takes the heart out of men much less than an obstacle 
which reveals itself unexpectedly. 

The officers should not limit themselves to the study of the 
plan on paper; it is their duty to visit frequently the observ- 
ing stations wliich are assigned to them; they should go to 

[90] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

places whence they can most advantageously examine the 
terrain, carefuUy identify the principal points, select land- 
marks in the zone where they are going to operate, determine 
the location of fortified redoubts, batteries or machine guns 
which have been called to their attention, and strive to see 
and fix in their minds these eventual objectives, in all their 
different aspects. In this way they can avoid having to make 
geographical identifications, find directions, and consult their 
maps, in the midst of the preoccupation and excitement of 
combat. 

Tliis practical and visual knowledge of the enemy's position 
will have been already acquired, as a result of the observations 
and incidents of each succeeding day, by a body of troops which 
has been given the duty of attacking a position, opposite which 
it has been stationed for a long period; it gives it a great advan- 
tage over any other body. But it may be a very delicate matter 
for newly arrived troops to acquire it; this task should, there- 
fore, be facilitated by detailed explanations furnished by the 
detachments which are being relieved. 

Material Amenagement of the Departure Position 

This has for its object to facilitate the task of the attacking 
troops and to enable them to continue the combat until the 
position is taken. To this end, it brings them as close as pos- 
sible to the enemy's lines, and affords them the means of leav- 
ing the trenches and of moving forward with the minimum of 
loss. It provides for the installation and the rapid deplace- 
ment of the artillery which cooperates with the attack. It 
ensures perfect liaison between the different units, especially 
between the infantry and the artillery. Furthermore, it should 
also prepare ways of access suitable for ensuring the speedy 
arrival of reserves and of fresh supplies, as well as means of 

[91] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

exit which permit the easy evacuation of the wounded and 
prisoners. 

This task is confided to the engineers, aided by laborers 
from the infantry, who have been placed at their disposal by 
the Command. It should be finished, in so far as possible, 
several days before the attack, because it is always susceptible 
of rectification and perfection, and because hasty labors are 
badly performed, and also cause the troops great fatigue. 

All these preparations are carried out according to a com- 
prehensive plan; they form the logical continuation of the 
work done during the period of installation and occupation, 
under the eye of a commander with an appreciation of his 
responsibilities. 

The line of departure for the assault is generally brought 
close to the enemy's line by means of saps. The distance to be 
traversed by the troops ought certainly to be short, above all 
in open ground, where the assaulting infantry can be instan- 
taneously caught by a barrage fire; it should, however, be 
long enough to permit of an artillery preparation without 
endangering the attacking troops. In view of these conditions, 
it is well to place the departure parallel about two hundred 
yards from the enemy's line. Its direction should be such as to 
place the troops face to face with the objective to be attained; 
it should thus run parallel, not to the first line trench, but to 
the line of the enemy's defense; the saps, if necessary, are thus 
of different lengths. The departure parallel thus obtained is 
a straight Une trench, without traverses, which permits an 
instantaneous rush forward. 

Since the construction of departure parallels has the dis- 
advantage of revealing the plans of attack to the enemy, it is 

[92] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

sometimes better to start from the trenches themselves. In 
this case, steps are constructed in the trenches to allow the 
troops to debouch easily. If the troops debouch simul- 
taneously from several parallels, echeloned in depth, foot 
bridges are tlirown across the intervening trenches. 

The installation of the artillery needed in the attack is 
effected according to the artillery plan of action; it involves 
the construction of important works, on account of the large 
number of pieces of all calibres which take part in the offensive. 
It is so planned as to get the most out of the batteries, the 
observing stations, the visual and telephonic liaisons between 
the batteries and the observing stations, the munition shel- 
ters, and the supply routes, and to facilitate the deplace- 
ments of all of these in view of a possible advance. 

The construction of those works which are sufficiently 
remote from the first line need not be so rapidly pressed as 
elsewhere; the main thing is to hide them from the enemy's 
observation by camouflage. Such works become more 
important the nearer they approach to the first line; but 
camouflage, like the construction of sham batteries, is at all 
times an excellent means of defense. Finally, each piece of 
artiUery may have several emplacements, in order to discon- 
cert the enemy's observations and lessen the effects of his 
fire. 

The ammunition depots must have carefully chosen situa- 
tions, so that the work of delivery, discharge, and evacuation 
may take place without congestion; they must be spread 
over a sufficiently large area to prevent complete destruction 
by airplane bombardment. 

The approaches, and means of assuring the arrival of the 
reserves and of fresh supplies, differ in kind. 

[93] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

Towards the rear there are railroads, provided with all 
needful improvements, such as double tracking of the exist- 
ing lines, laying down of new ones, creation of branches going 
towards important centres; they make possible the rapid 
transportation of the troops and of the reserves, thus facilitat- 
ing secrecy and surprise; there are also roads, whose constant 
upkeep and enlargement make it possible for automobile 
convoys to move speedily and securely. 
' Nearer the front, there are narrow temporary ways, laid out 
in a direction parallel to the trenches, with branches running 
perpendicular to them. 

Finally numerous boyaux, furnished at their entrance and 
at their forks with very plain sign posts, make it possible to 
get up as far as the departure trench. 

Places d'armes for the reserves, depots for munitions, for 
water, for provisions and for grenades must be made at con- 
veniently chosen spots; command-posts, shelters, and observ- 
ing stations must also be estabhshed. The places d'armes may 
be made out of trenches or shelters already in existence, or 
they may be specially constructed for the attack. They 
should be as near the first line as possible. 

Exits are of the same description as approaches, but must 
be kept separate from them in order to avoid crossings, con- 
gestions, and blocking. Such wounded as can walk, as well as 
stretcher bearers carrying the severely wounded, should fol- 
low evacuation boyaux, larger than the others, on their way to 
the dressing stations: it is of great importance not to retard 
the working of the liaisons, the arrival of munitions, or the 
march of reserves. 

The forwarding of reserves and artillery is made possible by 
the preparation and equipment of routes, paths, sidings, com- 

[94] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

mand-posts, observing stations, and emplacements for bat- 
teries ; whenever possible the works, right up to the first line, 
should be executed in advance and finished with camouflage. 

Particular attention should be paid to the installation of the 
telephonic, visual, and radio-telegraphic liaisons; these liaisons 
must be carried forward at the same time as the troops. 

The importance of all of these works depends, in large meas- 
ure, on the activities of the opposing front, and the counter 
activities planned. Like many another factor in the combat, 
it is determined by the information furnished to the Command. 

Smashing the Enemy's Position 

The smashing of the enemy's position is effected by the 
heavy and field artillery, aided by the trench artillery and 
the engineers. 

Its object is to facilitate the march of the infantry. It 
should consequently endeavor to destroy all the obstacles that 
impede the latter's march, that is to say, the enemy's artillery, 
his defensive works, and his morale. It should likewise pre- 
vent the enemy from re-forming, or getting himself in hand. 

Its activity is by no means limited to the strip of territory 
which contains the first trenches, but extends over the entire 
position, and even the succeeding ones, so as to prepare an 
easy, continuous, and deep advance. 

The action of the artillery is carefully regulated by a plan 
drawn up, in the case of each large unit, by the artillery com- 
mander, in harmony with the main plan of action of the gen- 
eral commanding the unit. This plan determines the groups 
of the pieces, chooses their emplacements and fields of fire, 
assigns their tasks, organizes their liaisons, ensures their 
supply, and arranges for their deplacement. 

[95] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

The destruction of the enemy's artillery, or, at least, its 
neutralization at the moment of the attack, is only made pos- 
sible by the efforts of careful observers on the ground and in 
the air. It can only be accompUshed when the aim is perfect, 
and when the pieces are abundantly supplied with ammu- 
nition. A plan of the enemy's batteries should always be 
accessible at each headquarters. Continual observation is, 
moreover, needed to adjust the fire when it has ceased to be 
accurate. 

Only the heavy artillery is capable of producing sufficient 
effect to permit the infantry to go forward to the attack, 
when the enemy has had time to perfect his organization in 
advance. It alone can secure results against the deep and 
buttressed shelters by which the infantry is protected, and 
against shelters for machine guns, against fortified villages 
and hamlets containing deep vaulted and fortified cellars, 
against heavy batteries and even sometimes against first line 
defenses. Long range guns make trouble in the rear of the 
enemy's lines by firing on his supply convoys, on his reliefs, 
on his works, and on his lines of communication. 

Field artillery is cliiefly employed to destroy barbed wire 
entanglements or other obstacles, and to compel the defenders 
of the position to dig themselves in. It is also used against 
field batteries. Finally it is always ready to start a bar- 
rage fire in opposition to the enemy's efforts to disturb the 
preparations for the attack. 

Trench artillery is used against men and against materiel. 
It supplements to good advantage the effects obtained by the 
heavy and the field artillery on those points which lie within 
its range. It can be given the task of smashing the first line 
trench all by itself, in case the fire of the other kinds of artil- 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

lery is difficult to adjust upon tliis target, or is dangerous for 
the assaulting troops. 

The emplacements of this trench artillery of different cali- 
bres are arranged one behind the other. Part of them ought to 
be placed near the first line, in order to diminish the amount 
of moving forward that has to be accomplished during the 
advance; but they should not be accumulated in narrow areas, 
for fear of being neutrahzed by the enemy's guns, and 
especially by asphyxiating shells. Their emplacements are 
selected with a view to the tasks assigned to the different 
pieces and to their special qualities and characteristics, as well 
as to the topography of the position. 

The zones of action are normal or eventual ; the normal ones 
are side by side, the eventual ones overlap. When a target is 
signaled, fire is opened by the group of guns in whose normal 
zone of action the target lies; if tliis group experiences diffi- 
culties in hitting the mark, it asks some other group, in whose 
eventual zone of action the target lies, to open fire. Thus there 
is never such a dupUcation of fire as to interfere with the 
adjustment; but duplication does occur when a concentration 
of fire is called for. 

Observers are either in the air or on the ground. 

Aerial observers are placed in airplanes or balloons. Their 
duties vary. Sometimes they are detailed to furnish informa- 
tion to the Command about the organization and works of a 
sector of the enemy's line, sometimes to watch the activity of 
the troops in a sector, sometimes to maintain liaison between 
the artillery and the other arms, or to adjust the artillery fire. 

The airplanes generally communicate with the ground by 
means of wireless telegraphy; they also use wireless telephones, 
projectors, weighted messages, and rockets. By means of 

[97] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

the Morse code, the observer is able to make himseK known to 
the receiving station, to furnish information about the troops 
of either side, to point out objectives, and to indicate errors of 
fire. At the receiving station are an artillery officer and a 
wireless oflBcer who forward this information to its destination. 
On the other hand the receiving station can give the observer 
simple messages about the conduct of the fire, by the aid of 
squares of white cloth or projectors. 

( Balloons communicate with the ground by telephone. On 
the ground, if there is no telephonic communication with the 
command-posts and with the artillery groups, these liaisons are 
maintained by a wireless post. In practice it is hard for bal- 
loons to rise above 1600 yards, and often they cannot go as 
high on account of the wind. They must remain half a dozen 
miles from the enemy, owing to their vulnerability. 

Observers on the ground are placed in carefully chosen 
observing stations; they must always be on the watch, even 
in sectors which appear to be quiet; at times they have to 
fill the place of the aerial observers, who cannot go out in 
every kind of weather. Some observing stations are in- 
tended to furnish information, and so have a wide outlook; 
others are used for fire adjustment for specified artillery bat- 
talions or batteries, and can consequently ensure their rapid 
action and effective use. 

The aviators have an important role. 

The airplanes and the balloons not only furnish the Com- 
mand with all the information possible concerning the enemy's 
position, but also adjust the fire of the artillery. The air must 
not be encumbered with so many planes that they hinder one 
another, nor must too long a time be spent in the process of 
adjustment; for these reasons, the aviators operate in accord- 

[98] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

ance with a methodical program, and are only expected to col- 
lect information unobtainable by observers on the ground. 

The use of airplanes with projectors, and of those carrying 
weighted messages, makes it possible to increase the number of 
planes operating at once; if too many of them used wireless it 
would cause confusion in the messages. 

In addition, the airplanes have the task of blinding the 
enemy, by preventing his aerial fleet from crossing the lines, 
from taking observations for the adjustment of his fire, and 
from obtaining uninterrupted opportunities of reconnoitering. 
The destruction of the enemy's planes and balloons has the 
double result of preventing information from reaching the 
enemy, and of limiting the action of his artillery. 

The smashing up of the enemy's position is as carefully 
executed as it has been thoroughly prepared. 

Batteries of different calibres fulfill the special functions 
which have been assigned to them. Heavy artillery of the 
long-range type fires on points where the troops pass and con- 
centrate in the rear, on the principal roads and crossroads; 
heavy artillery of great power destroys strongly organized 
points of support; ordinary heavy batteries demolish the 
trenches and their different shelters; field batteries destroy 
the accessory defenses, and execute barrage fires. Batteries 
of all caHbres are used to oppose the fire of the enemy's 
artillery. 

Thus, while fresh supplies of men, munitions, and provisions 
are held back by an impassable barrage, the positioh to be 
attacked is smashed from top to bottom, without any respite; 
and the artillery which defends it is taken under fire the 
moment it reveals itself. 

[99] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

The general progress of this smasliing is attentively followed 
by the airplanes which take daily photographs. They them- 
selves participate in the operations by going to bombard 
stations, road forks, concentrations, headquarters, and all 
other suitable objectives. 

All possible means are employed to determine the effects of 
the bombardment of the first line; the reserves of the different 
arms pay special attention to it, and patrolling parties go as 
far as possible at night to ascertain the results secured. Sham 
attacks are even made, in order to make certain whether any 
macliine guns or undiscovered flanking positions remain intact. 

The engineers contribute to the destruction of the enemy's 
position by the use of mines and countermines; they aim to 
blow up important flanking positions, and to throw disorder 
among the adversary's troops. 

The carrying out of the smashing process ought to give to 
the attacking troops entire confidence in their success. The 
leaders of these troops have the right and the duty of indicat- 
ing to the commanding officer those points on the first fine 
where they judge the artillery preparation to have been insuf- 
ficient; in such a case, observation officers of the artillery in 
immediate liaison with the infantry officers concerned devote 
themselves to obtaining the desired results. The utilization 
of this method of procedure relieves the troops intended for 
the assault of any apprehension wliich might militate against 
their spirit and dash. 

The physical, professional, and moral training of the 
troops is the work of leaders of all ranks. 

During the days which precede the attack the troops take 
turns in resting behind the front, in order to shake off the 

[100] 



PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK 

sluggishness engendered by life in the trenches. At this 
moment, the commanders of the small units make it their 
business to continue and improve, in the most diverting 
possible ways, the phj^sical training previously acquired. 

Instruction is the surest means of giving the troops the best 
chances of success; it should be the constant preoccupation of 
the commanders during periods of rest, in such wise that it 
should suffice to recall to the men certain basic principles on 
the eve of the attack, in order to be certain that they will give 
a good account of themselves. And instruction is not only the 
surest road to victory, but also the surest means of avoiding 
the useless sacrifice of countless lives. Troops that have been 
well taught attain success with a minimum of losses. 

The moral preparation is a work of long duration, and con- 
sists in cultivating in the officer and in the soldier military 
virtues and lofty sentiments. If this preparation has been 
carefully made since the beginning of the war, it bears fruit 
during a whole campaign. It remains a permanent possession 
of certain corps, in spite of the new men who come in, for it is 
passed on as a precious heritage to the recent arrivals, through 
the almost unconscious intermediary of those who have sur- 
vived. In these corps, an intimate camaraderie, which does 
not in the least prevent strict discipline, unites all the com- 
batants from the commander down to the humblest soldier. 

Such are the feelings which must be stimulated before 
combat. On all sorts of different occasions, the officers and N. 
C. Os. should inflame their men with the love of their country 
and the resolve to uphold the honor of the flag; they should 
affirm the certainty of victory, so as to inspire their troops 
with the necessary confidence and to endow their ranks with 
irresistible ^lan. 

[101] 



CHAPTER III 

ATTACK 

Attack is the essential feature of combat. It may last 
several days, or even several weeks. 

* The choice of the moment of attack is in the hands of the 
Command. It depends on the results of the artillery prepa- 
ration, as determined by all the means of observation, includ- 
ing the patrols; on the state of the weather, since rain is a 
great hindrance; on the clearness of the air, which should be 
such as to permit a proper adjustment of artillery fire. 

The object of the attack is to seize the enemy's position and 
hold it soUdly, in order to permit an immediate or subsequent 
continuation of the advance. 

This role is assigned to the infantry, aided by the fire of the 
artillery, the labors of the engineers, and the aerial obser- 
vations. 

It consists in seizing the first line of trenches, and then the 
succeeding lines, so as to reach the hne of the enemy's artillery 
as soon as possible; in reducing such centres or works as may 
resist; in pushing forward to the hmits of the position, and 
organizing them against a retour offensif ; and finally, in 
taking the preliminary steps for a continuation of the move- 
ment, never losing contact with the enemy. 

Just as in an offensive combat, which aims to capture suc- 
cessive positions, the different phases should follow one an- 
other rapidly, so in an attack on a position, the assaults on the 
successive objectives should take place without delay, in order 

[102] 



ATTACK 

that the enemy may have no time to re-form. The landmark 
assigned to each miit to guide its march should be chosen be- 
yond the final objective to be taken, in order to make certain 
that the reconnaissance of the next position will be carried out. 
But it is the duty of the Command alone to provide such 
measures and give such orders as are necessary for the attack 
on the succeeding position. 

The formations adopted for the attacking units are of great 
importance for the proper progress of these units, and, conse- 
quently, for the success of the operation. 

The first troops advance in waves. A wave is formed by the 
infantrymen of one rank simultaneously leaving the departure 
parallel. The various units in lateral contact are each one 
echeloned in depth, in such wise that a battalion can have 
its four companies divided into four successive waves, or that 
each company can be divided into two successive waves. 

This formation enables the leader to command his unit more 
easily, and to manoeuver therewith, if necessary, from the very 
start, which would be quite impossible if it were drawn up in 
one line; it thus gives to the wave an articulation and a flexi- 
bility which it would be far from possessing, did it consist in a 
single deployed unit. 

Since the various waves must follow one another rapidly, it 
is important to bring them as near as possible to the departure 
parallel. This arrangement has the advantage of permitting 
them to escape the barrages delivered by the enemy as soon as 
the attack is started; the successive waves take their dis- 
tances at the time of departure or during the advance. All 
such concentrations must naturally be effected with caution, 
so as to conceal them from the observation and fire of the 
enemy; it is also essential to avoid piUng up units in places 

[103] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

where they have no shelter, or in boyaux which should remain 
unencumbered; a well-conducted bombardment might cause 
considerable losses and disorder among the troops, thus 
seriously injuring their morale for the assault. Previous 
reconnaissance by the officers, perfect liaison between front 
and rear, order, silence, and rapidity of movement, greatly 
facilitate this disposition of the successive units for the start. 

Before the attack, the commander contents himself with re- 
fcalUng to all his subordinates the precise task of the unit, and 
its specific objective. Task and objective are the same for all 
fractions of the unit, since it is echeloned in depth; and this 
again is one of the gi-eat advantages of the formation adopted. 

The artillery observers accompanying the infantry, as well 
as the details of engineers assigned to the attacking units, take 
their places with the troops to which they are attached; they 
never start with the first wave, even though they may have 
been directed to join it subsequently. 

The mechanism of march and of combat for the first waves 
cannot be determined by any fixed rules, for it depends upon 
circumstances and upon the terrain. Still, there are certain 
principles which should be observed, and certain methods 
which should be adopted. 

The word waves, which calls up the picture of billows of the 
sea breaking in foam upon the rocks, might give rise to very 
false ideas, were it not explained. The simile is good at the 
moment of departure; it still holds when the waves, encoun- 
tering an isolated obstacle, overrun it on either flank; it 
ceases to hold when the waves break successively against an 
insurmountable barrier. 

A wave should be considered as an echelon suitable for the 
march; it is not, properly speaking, a disposition for combat. 

[104] 



ATTACK 

The first wave alone can carry on the fight effectively. The 
object of the others is to ensure the continuity of the move- 
ment, by completing the work of cleaning up the terrain, 
by reinforcing or reheving the first, and by making possible 
manoeuvers intended to protect a meliaced element or to 
overcome an unforeseen obstacle. 

The succeeding waves should never be hurled against ob- 
stacles which the first wave has been unable to overcome. 
Obstacles of this sort are vanquished with materiel and not 
with men. 

The mechanism of march and of combat, resulting from the 
principles which we have laid down, must now be explained 
in detail. 

The first wave leaves the departure parallel at a prearranged 
moment, or at a given signal. Every platoon has its different 
speciahsts — riflemen, automatic riflemen, grenadiers, etc. — 
arranged in several lines, in conformity with the orders given; 
but these fines, though they are sometimes called "waves," by 
an extension of the meaning of the whole to the different parts 
that compose it, tend generally to merge into one another after 
a short time; it is therefore rather the sum total of them that 
constitutes the assaulting wave or line of combat. 

The first wave should move forth without hesitation and 
wdthout a moment's delay; for at this very instant the artil- 
lery, wliich is holding the enemy's first trench under its fire, 
deepens its aim, thus enabhng the defenders, if they grasp 
the situation in time, to come out from their shelters and 
man the parapet. It advances at a walk, silently, in line, and 
without shooting, straight on the first Une trench; it crosses 
this trench without halting, while men, designated in advance 

[105] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

for this purpose, take possession of it, exploring the shelters 
and cleaning it up. It then goes on to the second trench. 

The first wave or line of combat advances at a pace which 
has been determined beforehand in accordance with the diffi- 
culties of the terrain and the information received concerning 
the enemy. The artillery opens a barrage fire in front of it, 
which advances at the same pace as does the infantry. In this 
fashion the fine of combat is protected at every moment by a 
deluge of shells which opens the way. 

The Haison between the infantry and artillery is principally 
effected by a prearranged time schedule. If an unexpected 
halt occurs in the line of combat, and the artillery has not 
been notified of it by some method of liaison, the barrage will 
continue to advance and leave the line of combat to its own 
resources. These resources should be increased as far as pos- 
sible, as for example, by having the fine of combat preceded or 
accompanied by tanks. 

When it is absolutely impossible to advance without incur- 
ring certain losses, the fault Hes in the insufficiency of the 
artillery preparation. In such cases the duty of the commander 
is to avoid useless effusion of blood, and to obtain an artillery 
preparation that is more complete. 

If, on the other hand, losses are caused by the normal inci- 
dents of an attack against a tenacious adversary, the Une of 
combat ought to go ahead on its own resources. It cannot 
expect the artillery to clear the ground of all the enemy, and 
it should be wilHng to accept the sacrifices which are inevi- 
table in every war. In case it has been compelled by the 
enemy's fire to halt before the first trench, its rifles, its French 
automatic rifles, and its rifle grenades are used to gain ground; 
then, when it has arrived within a suitable distance, hand 

[106] 



ATTACK 

grenades are thrown, and the men rush to the assault with the 
bayonet. 

The second wave should follow the movement of the first 
at a short distance. It usually starts at the very moment 
when its predecessor has reached the enemy's Une, in order to 
avoid congestion, disorder, or loss, in case of a hitch at the 
start. Its duty is to aid, support, and reinforce the fighting 
wave. It ascertains, on arrival at the first trench, whether 
the trench cleaners are sufficient for their task, and comes to 
their aid if need be. It also includes men entrusted with 
cleaning up the second trench and the boyaux. 

It is essential to make sure that the first wave be not fired 
into from behind, as that would oblige the men to turn about 
and deal with the enemy in their rear. Likewise is it essen- 
tial that no prisoners be left near the fine of combat, as they 
might resume the fight at the first opportunity. 

The second wave is accompanied by machine guns intended 
to secure the retention of the conquered terrain by seizing 
favorable positions from which to fire. 

The succeeding waves are set in motion on the order of their 
commanders, who have been told how to dispose them so as to 
accompHsh their assigned tasks. They are echeloned so as to 
provide reinforcements or reliefs when needed, and to ensure 
the occupation and retention of specified objectives. 

In consequence of the barrage fire usually deUvered by the 
enemy, these waves march in lines of small columns. This 
formation is advantageous not only for the purpose of avoid- 
ing losses, but also for that of controlling the troops, and for 
keeping in place any men who might be tempted to stop in 
the trenches which they are crossing. 

[107] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

A wave is not a tactical unit. Moreover, it is of very vari- 
able size, according to circumstances; for the Command may 
judge it wise not to launch the attack on all parts of the front 
at once. It has not, strictly speaking, an objective; a trench, 
especially a trench in the interior of a position, is not properly 
an objective — first, because no one can describe it exactly nor 
even see it in advance; second, because it is a mere line of 
uncertain direction and ill-defined lateral limits. An objec- 
jtive is a tactical point towards which the efforts of the unit 
converge, and whose occupation is a step towards the conquest 
of the position. It is rather the units constituting the ele- 
ments of the successive waves which have objectives; these 
consist sometimes merely in intermediate landmarks, but they 
always lead to the well-defined objective, which has been fixed 
beforehand by the Command. 

It is however indispensable that each wave should maintain 
its own lateral cohesion, for fear of splitting up into little 
individual groups, threatened with failure and destruction. 
This cohesion is effected by perfect lateral liaison between the 
different elements of the contiguous units. Each wave must 
also have a sufficient number of officers to watch it, and regu- 
late its march. If all the contiguous units were arranged ac- 
cording to the same plan, all the majors, for example, would be 
in one wave, all the captains in one, and so on. It is thus 
incumbent on the Command so to distribute the leaders of 
units, that there shall be with each wave officers capable of 
making a decision, of giving an order, of assuming responsi- 
bility, of drawing up a report or of meeting an unexpected 
situation. 

When it happens that the first wave in its advance has 
sustained too great losses to be able to maintain its effort 

[108] 



ATTACK 

without help, then the second wave must reinforce it and weld 
the two into one. 

It is to be noticed that, in the course of the attack, the first 
waves cannot, usually, maintain their initial rigidity; at some 
points the enemy will resist more stoutly, owing to an insuffi- 
cient destruction of his works by the artillery; while at other 
points the waves will sweep on, almost without effort and 
without loss. When reinforced, the units of the first fine 
which have suffered least can extend their front, by means of 
their lateral liaison, and avoid offering too dense a formation 
to the enemy's fire. 

The reinforcement of the fighting wave by the succeeding 
ones is effected, when it is needed, by means of the Haison from 
the rear to the front. When one part of the attacking Une has 
sustained loss, the reserves of the corresponding units are sent 
thither. It should be noticed that these reserves are intended 
to execute some manoeuver which shall serve to make the 
obstacle fall, not to renew fruitless and bloody assaults. 

It is the duty of the commanders to see to it that this re- 
inforcement takes place at the opportune moment, and that 
the succeeding waves are not mixed in automatically with the 
first wave, nor piled up at a short distance behind it; these 
mistakes would ex'pose the troops to needless losses, deprive 
them of the use of reinforcements at the critical moment, 
and create between the attacking line and its reserves a gap 
prejudicial to the favorable development of the combat. 

In spite of all, there will arise various modifications in the 
composition of the waves, regardless of the officers. In the 
crisis of the fight, the most ardent groups, led away by their 
enthusiasm, will be found in the midst of the first wave, while 
others, delayed by one pretext or another, will mix in with the 
following ones. [109] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

For this reason it is well to have in each company, battahon, 
or regiment a detail of police, commanded by an energetic 
leader marching with the last wave of the unit; its object is to 
pick up isolated men and stragglers, and to send them back to 
their places. Indeed this is one of the important advantages 
of the echelonment in depth; the men, knowing that they are 
followed by officers, non-commissioned officers, and comrades 
of their unit, are restrained from lagging behind, both by self- 
respect and by fear of reproach; if they do lag, they are put 
back where they belong. 

On the other hand, there is no harm in giving free rein to 
that natural selection which places in the line of combat the 
bravest elements of the first waves; provided, of course, that 
this can occur without disorder, by the natural play of cir- 
cumstances, or, so to speak, automatically; it helps to put dash 
into the first wave, and to pull the unit along by the example 
of its bravest. All the elements echeloned in depth are on 
fire to join those at the post of honor. 

The struggle inside the position serves to break up the 
waves, to a considerable degree, since it may involve the most 
diverse sorts of incidents. 

The first task of the assailants is to clean up the conquered 
trenches. In each wave certain details, specially organized in 
advance, are charged with this; the chosen men are armed 
with grenades, revolvers, and knives, for in a narrow trench it 
is extremely difficult to handle a bayonet. It is often simpler 
than one would suppose to clean up a trench; if the enemy has 
been able to man the debris of his trench, he is demoraUzed by 
the arrival of the waves and the storm of grenades, and resists 
but feebly; if he has burrowed into his shelters under the 
stunning influence of terrific artillery fire, he is even more 
[no] 



ATTACK 

likely to beg for quarter; in either case an immediate and 
energetic suppression of any hint of resistance has a salutary 
effect on the occupants. Their task once done, the cleaners 
do not stop in the trench; they go on to the next one to aid 
their comrades, progressing thus, step by step, towards 
rejoining their unit. 

At certain points where the enemy's defensive works have 
been spared by the bombardment, some elements of the waves 
will meet a resistance which they cannot overcome. The 
commanders of the units which are stopped in this way call 
into play the rifle grenade, the portable cannon, and other 
accompanying machines such as tanks; if the results obtained 
with these are insufficient, they wait before advancing, either 
for artillery preparation, or for the adjacent units to reach the 
flanks of the obstacle, or for some manoeuver by the reserves. 
They avoid any useless sacrifice of their men. 

An incident of this sort must never be allowed to retard the 
advance as a whole. It is by the continuity of their progress 
that the attacking troops prevent the enemy from rallying on 
the position. 

Machine guns accompany the first waves; they sweep the 
intervals which the accidents of the advance, or the separation 
of the objectives, have left unoccupied; in this way they pro- 
tect the flanks of the elements of the waves; they halt by their 
fire any retour offensif, or counter-attack; they throw the 
retreating troops into disorder, and can sometimes inflict 
serious losses on them. 

Behind the battahons which constitute the first waves, and 
which feed the fine of attack, march those other battahons 
which constitute the brigade and divisional reserves. These 

[111] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

are intended eventually to reinforce the fighting wave by- 
sandwiching themselves into its gaps, by manoeuvering 
against nuclei of resistance, by holding up counter-attacks, 
and by providing total or partial rehefs. They learn what is 
expected of them from the commander at whose disposal they 
have been placed. 

Large reserve units, such as brigades and divisions, can 
reUeve, during the progress of the fight, those units which have 
heen engaged since the beginning of it, in case the latter have 
been too sorely tried by losses or by weariness. In such cases 
the reheving units pass on beyond those reUeved. To permit 
this, the first units engaged halt on a line that has been agreed 
upon, give the new units all possible information in regard to 
the enemy and the ground, and let them go forward. They 
then get a chance to re-form and may in turn become reserves. 

In the course of this fight for a position, the artillery never 
ceases to help the infantry by its fire. 

Its essential task is to counteract the fire of the enemy's 
artillery when the latter is deUvering barrages against the 
waves, either to prevent egress from the departure parallel, or 
to hinder the further advance. Even though the artillery may 
doubt its abihty to destroy the enemy's batteries, it can often 
silence them momentarily, and thereby give the infantry an 
enormous advantage. 

The barrage which precedes the infantry continues to 
advance in the interior of the position, in accordance with a 
prearranged time-schedule. This time-schedule should be 
slow, so as to enable the infantry to follow the shells without 
difficulty. The barrage cannot, as a matter of fact, be brought 
back, on account of the dangers involved; and it should 

[112] 



ATTACK 

not advance too fast, for fear of leaving the infantry without 
immediate protection. Its aim should be constantly to pre- 
vent the enemy's riflemen and machine gunners from firing. 

In order that there may be complete accord between the 
advance of the barrage and that of the infantry, numerous 
preliminary exercises should be held, in order to enable the two 
arms to familiarize themselves with one another. In case they 
get out of touch in the course of the combat, the infantry 
should be able to make signals to ask for (1) an advance of the 
barrage, (2) an increase of its intensity, (3) its maintenance 
on the same point beyond the allotted time. 

It is impossible to foresee everything that may occur in the 
interior of a position. The troops are not confronted with 
clearly-marked trenches, such as furnish comparatively easy 
targets for the artillery; they have to traverse a chaotic region 
which the shell-holes formed by the artillery preparation 
cause to resemble a bit of the surface of the moon. The enemy 
is at once nowhere and everywhere : a single machine gun in 
a shell-hole can hold up one or two battaUons. There is no 
clearly defined target for the artillery. 

The plan of action, then, can do no more than provide for a 
halting of the advance of the barrage on known lines of resist- 
ance. Every such halting permits the infantry to re-form, to 
be reinforced, or if necessary to be relieved by another unit 
advancing beyond it. 

Over and above this duty of directly supporting the in- 
fantry, the artillery has other more general tasks. It delivers 
barrages against the enemy's reinforcements, his counter- 
attacks, and his reserves; it does not hesitate to take under its 
fire any concentrations of this sort which are pointed out to it, 
in order to disorganize them at the start. It fires on the routes 

[113] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

of access to the zone that is being attacked, and it maintains a 
protecting barrage on its flanks. In this way it isolates the 
various adversaries with which the infantry is at grips. 

In these operations the scouting, observing, and fire-adjust- 
ing airplanes render great services to the batteries engaged. 

The artillery may also, when the infantry asks for it, support 
the latter's attacks against nuclei of resistance. Under these 
' circumstances it must obtain all possible information and 
take every precaution necessary to the success of this opera- 
tion which is sometimes extremely delicate. The infantry is 
particularly likely to be demoralized by the least error on the 
part of its artillery; in case of doubt, it is better to let the 
foot soldiers get along as best they may with such accompa- 
nying pieces as have been allotted to them. 

When, on the other hand, the enemy resists in a well- 
defined section of the line, or in a sharply delimited centre, 
the batteries may effect a concentration of their fire, which 
constitutes, from the tactical point of view, a real manoeuver; 
the projectiles of the artillery will often afford more helpful 
aid than infantry reserves. 

This intervention presupposes that the distribution of the 
artillery among the various sectors, which was adopted during 
the period of stationary fighting and preparation, has been 
abandoned at the beginning of the combat, in order to leave 
the various artillery units in the hands of those leaders to 
whom they regularly belong. The commander of a first line 
division can thus concentrate his shells more easily than his 
foot soldiers on that part of the battle field where he judges 
they will be of most use; to this effect the artillery commander 
assembles groups of batteries of heavy or field artillery, to 

[114] 



ATTACK 

which clearly defined tasks are assigned. Some of these 
groups are placed at the disposal of the brigade or regimental 
commanders, to enable them to overcome any difficulties 
which they may encounter. 

Artillery reserves are constituted by artillery units which 
have been temporarily taken away from troops who are not 
engaged, or else are located in the quieter sectors. They are 
placed far in the rear and intervene at the order of the Com- 
mand, either as a manoeuvring body to attain a particular end, 
or else as a relief to replace exhausted units. 

Finally, if the attacking troops push forward, the batteries 
move on, in order to continue their support. This movement, 
which is always dangerous, should only be executed when it 
serves a purpose. As far as possible it should take place during 
the night. It is carried out according to some well defined plan 
by echelons, in such wise as not to break the continuity of the 
fire. In order that there be no delay, emplacements for the 
pieces must be sought out beforehand; moreover, the materiel 
and gangs of workmen must be in readiness to effect the 
complete installation of the pieces. 

No matter what care has been given to planning the advance 
of the barrage, no matter how carefully and continuously the 
supporting artillery performs its deplacements, the infantry 
will often inevitably be confronted with obstacles which it 
must overcome by its own resources. For this reason it must 
be furnished with every weapon which can faciUtate its 
advance. Success in the interior of the position may come 
from the use of cannon, light enough to accompany the in- 
fantry, yet powerful enough to overcome obstacles. In any 
case the infantry is greatly aided by skillful utihzation of the 
weapons which can be handled by the foot soldier; the rifle 

[115] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

grenade, hand grenade, French automatic rifle, and machine 
gun. 

Night fighting is the natural continuation of fighting by day; 
its object is to consoUdate and complete results already 
obtained. 

Night permits the organization and fortification of the con- 
quered terrain, the reconstitution or relief of the units engaged, 
the supply both of munitions and provisions, and the prepara- 
tion, by local progress or partial actions, for the resumption of 
the movement at daybreak. 

Troops can only continue their general advance during 
the night if they already know the terrain on which they are 
operating, or if the enemy is demoralized; otherwise, they run 
the risk of making costly mistakes, or of f aUing into murderous 
ambushes. 

The liaisons are maintained even more closely than during 
the day. Every movement of one unit must be communicated 
to the neighboring ones. 

Night fighting is not generally speaking adapted to an 
advance on a wide front or to a great depth; it does, however, 
permit of small operations called raids, which can be of con- 
siderable importance for the continuation of that advance. 

These raids are executed by platoons, companies or bat- 
tahons, and aim at such objects as the taking of a trench, the 
occupation of a group of houses, the seizing of a post, or the 
enveloping of a nucleus of resistance. An important element 
of success is surprise, which is harder to achieve than during 
stationary periods; still it is during the night that the enemy 
tries to reconstitute Ins forces, to carry out the relief of his 
exhausted troops, to fortify the positions to which he has been 

[116] 



ATTACK 

driven back, all of which are sources of momentary weakness 
and inattention. 

The observers and patrols observe the slightest symptoms 
indicating a relaxation of the enemy's guard or watchfulness. 
At a signal given by their leader, the troops attempting the 
raid steal forward in perfect order and absolute silence; on 
reaching the enemy's entrenchments, they leap in with gre- 
nade, revolver, and knife. The men are, for the most part, 
unencumbered with knapsacks, guns, or bayonets, so as 
to increase their freedom of action and agihty; those among 
them who are ordered to retain their equipment take the 
greatest pains to avoid all clicking of their arms during the 
march. The conquered entrenchment is at once reversed, 
organized, and connected with the place of departure; the 
arms and knapsacks of the grenadiers are brought up by a 
reinforcement. 

The artillery cannot bear effective aid in night operations; 
it limits itself, before the arrival of darkness, to finding the 
ranges of the points held by the enemy, or of dangerous out- 
lets, so as to be able, at the call of the infantry, to let loose a 
barrage to prevent a retoicr offensif, or counter-attack. The 
heavy artillery adjusts its fire for the night on the crossroads 
or ways of approach used by the troops and the supply 
columns, in order to cannonade them. 

The artiUery takes advantage of night time to alter its posi- 
tion with some measure of security, to move to those emplace- 
ments which have been located during the day; to organize 
its observing stations, and its telephone lines. The airplanes 
and the dirigibles have the task of bombarding important 
railway stations and lines, cantonments and bivouacs of the 

[117] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

reserves, storehovises, workshops and artillery parks behind 
the first line. 

The attacking troops are required, even if they do not judge 
it wise to try raids, on no account to lose contact with the 
enemy, and to watch his every movement. This surveillance 
will sometimes enable them to occupy without loss points 
which for the moment are weakly held; it reveals the enemy's 
retreat, if that takes place, and furnishes useful information 
for the resvunption of the advance. 

Orders, reports, and liaisons are of extreme importance 
during the combat. 

Orders, which are the decisions of the commander, should 
contain everything that it is necessary for the subordinate 
oflBcer to know, but nothing more. 

A commander, in giving his orders, should not leave to his 
subordinate the duty of prescribing the measures for which 
he himself should be responsible; on the other hand he ought 
not to limit his subordinate's initiative by prescribing to him 
details of execution. 

All orders in regard to operations should include: 

1. Information about the enemy. 

2. The intention of the commander who gives the order and 
the ends which he is aiming to accompUsh. 

3. The objectives to be attained, and the movements to be 
executed by the unit to whose leader the order is given. 

4. The place where the commander can be found. 

5. The movements of the neighboring units. 

An order should be perfectly clear, precise, and complete; it 
should contain nothing vague. Indefinite expressions such as 

[118] 



ATTACK 

" daybreak," " night time " should never be used; and it is 
better if possible to say " north, east, south, west," than 
" to the front, to the rear, to the right, to the left." It is 
often very important to state what particular map has been 
utilized for drawing up the order. For times of the day and 
night the hours and minutes should be given. The French 
number the hours from 1 to 24. 

Save in cases of special urgency, the transmission of orders 
should go down the scale of authority without omitting any 
intermediate rank. In case an intermediate officer of any 
grade has to be omitted, the commander who gives the order 
informs him, and the junior officer who receives the order 
communicates it at once to his superior. 

Specially important orders are carried by officers. Every 
man who carries a written order or a report ought to be pre- 
pared to get rid of it safely at a moment's notice. 

Orders relative to the general purpose to be fulfilled, the 
successive objectives to be reached, and the principal disposi- 
tions to be made, are communicated before the action, not 
merely to the first attacking units, and their brigade and diAd- 
sional reserves, but also to all troops who have any chance of 
taking part in the combat. 

Secrecy, so indispensable during the period of preparation, 
should be abandoned on the eve of action, for at the last 
instant, when departure is imminent, the units cannot assimi- 
late the idea of the sort of effort in which they are going to 
participate. Troops who have arrived after hasty transporta- 
tion or marching, frequently at night, on an unfamiliar terrain, 
face to face with obstacles wliich they cannot see, and without 
adequate information as to the situation, are unquestionably 
placed at a disadvantage for purposes of taking part in corn- 
Dig] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

bat. On the contrary they are well prepared for their work if 
they have been fully instructed before the begirming of the 
action, kept in touch with the march of events, and have 
clearly faced the tasks which await them. 

Orders become simpler and simpler as one goes down the 
scale of authority. Nevertheless, they should, as far as pos- 
sible, be given in writing, even in the case of a small unit such 
as a battalion or company, and they should be few in number, 
'in order to avoid hesitation, delay, and error. 

Reports should contain precise information in regard to the 
place, date, and hour at which the events set forth occurred. 

A report should always give the name and assigned task of 
the sender, and those of the person to whom it is sent; also 
the day and hour at which it is sent. The man who draws it 
up should also always distinguish between what he has seen 
himself, and what has been reported to him by others, by 
indicating the sources of his information. A good way to 
remember the order in which information should be given is 
by the formula, " Who, When, Where, How, What." 

Who refers to the effectives, the regimental numbers, 

etc., of the enemy. 
When indicates the exact moment when the observation 

reported was made. 
Where indicates the place occupied by the enemy's troops. 
How refers to his situation and movements. 
What indicates the intentions of the officer sending the 
report. 
It must always be borne in mind that the report should reach 
the commander in such a condition that it can be read, and all 
the necessary precautions must be taken to secure this. 

[120] 



ATTACK 

Reports should be frequent during the combat. Too much 
care cannot be given to explaining and checking up the infor- 
mation which they contain, for they constitute important 
elements for a decision on the part of the commander. 

Liaisons during the attack are of fundamental impor- 
tance. 

Each commander of a unit, when he executes a forward 
movement, chooses an observation post, close to which he 
places his command-post. 

Observing stations for information and for the artillery 
should be established in suitable places during the course of 
the advance; they should make it possible to follow the 
march of the combat and to watch the signals made by the 
attacking hne. 

Observations from airplanes and balloons afford a particu- 
larly advantageous means of establishing good liaisons, and 
of enabling the Command to obtain exact information. 
Photographs make it possible to become acquainted with the 
situation in any particular zone, and in particular, to learn 
the effects which have been produced by the artillery. 

Airplanes have various duties. Some accompany the in- 
fantry, never losing sight of the attacking line, but communi- 
cating with it, and watcliing the enemy opposite; these are 
the accompanying planes. Others, called command planes, 
observe the enemy in a particular sector and inform the Com- 
mand of his situation, his concentrations, and Ms movements. 
A third category, called messenger planes, establishes the liai- 
son between the Command and the corresponding units by 
transmitting orders and information. 

Balloons fulfill functions of the same general sort. They do 
not confine themselves to artillery adjustment, but also 

[121] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

observe the attacking line and transmit signals {infantry bal- 
loons) . Others, generally one for each army corps, follow the 
progress of the combat for the information of the Command 
{command balloons). 

The liaisons between the air service and the troops are 
effected in the following manner: 

The infantry communicates by signals with the accompany- 
mg planes. In front, the attacking Hne indicates its position by 
Bengal lights, signalling cloths, called panneaux de jalonne- 
ment which are opened out on the ground, projectors, mirrors, 
and all sorts of means. These signals are made along Unes 
determined in advance, either at the request of the airplanes, 
or on the initiative of the company commanders. All other 
troops, save those of the attacking line, are forbidden to make 
signals, so as to avoid confusion. Behind the attacking hne 
the command-posts for battalions, regiments, or larger units, 
communicate with the planes or balloons. They use cloths 
bearing special marks and spread out on the ground to indi- 
cate their location; they also use cloths or projectors for 
messages. 

Accompanying planes never fly at a greater height than 4000 
feet, and carry distinctive marks which should be familiar to 
all who cooperate with them. The observer communicates 
with the infantry by means of signal cartridges, after he has 
revealed his identity by an audible signal or identifying 
cartridge. He receives signals from the infantry and notes its 
position. He transmits urgent information by wireless, while 
other less pressing matter is sent by weighted messages; these 
latter convey all his observations relative to the disposal of 
the line of attack and the command-posts, on sketches 
prepared in advance. 

[122] 



ATTACK 

The infantry balloons (generally one to each division) carry 
distinctive marks. They receive signals from the attacking 
line or the command-posts, but reply only by very simple 
signals, such as " Understood " or " Repeat," preceded by 
the indicative of the receiver. They may even remain in the 
air during the night. They communicate with the ground 
by telephone. Thence the messages are forwarded to their 
destination by telephone, or, in exceptional cases where tele- 
phone lines have not been run, by wireless. 

During the course of the advance, the rapid establishment 
or repairing of telephone lines is of great importance. These 
operations are much easier if the telephone system of the 
departure position has been established with care, and if the 
forward movement has been arranged beforehand; the plan of 
the telephone system to be eventually constructed should be 
studied, the work thereon pushed as far as possible, and the 
necessary workmen held in readiness. All the supplementary 
means of Uaison must also be planned out. 

As a means of avoiding all errors, the use of other signals or 
other means of communication than those determined on by 
the Commander-in-Chief should be absolutely prohibited; 
signals must be exactly the same along the whole front. 

The liaison of the attacking troops with the artillery is 

primarily intended to show the latter the exact location of the 
infantry at each instant, and, whenever possible, its tactical 
situation, its purpose, and its needs. In this way it doubles 
the Uaison with the Coimnand and avoids delays, for the 
artillery must be quickly informed, not only when to fire, but 
also when not to fire, or to lengthen the range. 

This liaison does not give the commanders of waves or small 
units any right to open with their artillery at their own dis- 

[123] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

cretion; it rather gives them a guarantee against errors of 
range or misunderstandings, and a means of pointing out 
those objectives wliich cannot be overcome without the aid 
of guns. The divisional commander, assisted by his artillery 
officer, is responsible for using the batteries for the greatest 
good of all; he distributes them in tactical groups proportioned 
to their assigned tasks; he may, however, put a certain num- 
ber of batteries at the disposal of the brigade or regimental 
cc^manders. 

The means of liaison are the usual ones, runners and tele- 
phones; at the same time it is more practical to use rockets or 
visible signals, on account of their instantaneous action, when 
it is necessary to indicate the presence of friendly troops at a 
certain point, to ask for the cessation or lengthening of the 
fire, or for a barrage to stop a counter-attack. 

It is precisely under special circumstances such as these that 
the commanders of artillery battalions or of batteries may 
exercise their discretion, provided the measures adopted are 
not inconsistent with the general plan, and are reported 
immediately to their superior officers. 

The aircraft, airplanes, and balloons render important serv- 
ices to this liaison. They foUow the troops in their advance, 
always remaining in the zone of the division to which they are 
attached. Airplanes communicate with one of the centres of 
information by projectors on board, by rockets, and weighted 
messages; this centre of information is close to the divisional 
command-post. It is moved forward in conformity with 
the advance of the troops, and the command-post moves 
along with it. It communicates by all the means at its 
disposal with the aviation field behind the original point of 
departure for the attack. But a landing ground should always 

[124] 



ATTACK 

be sought for in the immediate vicinity, in order that the 
airmen may come and be told precisely what their tasks and 
their objectives are, and learn what information has been 
obtained. 

The forwarding of reserves, munitions, and food during the 
attack is one of the constant cares of the Command; if there is 
to be continuity in the forward movement, there must be con- 
tinuity of supply. If the reserves do not arrive at the right 
moment, if the ammunition gives out, even momentarily, or if 
the food is lacking, success is endangered. 

This forwarding involves two aspects, a tactical one, since 
it is ordered by the Command; and a practical one, since it is 
greatly accelerated by special material preparations. 

In order that the Command may issue its orders, it is essen- 
tial that it be exactly informed as to the situation of the troops, 
their progress, the results which have been accomphshed, and 
those which are to be expected. Thanks to precise and fre- 
quent reports, the commander is able to make his decision in 
complete knowledge of the facts, to know at what moment to 
call up his reserves and to what point to direct them, and to 
see whether they ^411 suffice to carry out the purpose he has 
in view. 

In order that there may be no hitch when it comes to the 
actual execution of the orders, it is essential that the amenage- 
ment of the departure position should be carried out mth 
diligence and foresight during the period of preparation for 
the attack, and that no means of access or evacuation be 
overlooked. 

The most rapid and certain means of access from behind the 
lines are railways; the Command should not hesitate to 
double or treble them, to multiply their ramifications, or add 

[125] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

to them branches leading towards the front. As for the roads 
whose utiUzation is no less severe on account of the circula- 
tion of automobile trains, their maintenance is constantly 
ensured by special gangs of men. Strict orders must be issued 
to clear these roads during the combat, in order to reserve 
them for supply work of all sorts. Similarly, near the front, 
the narrow temporary roads and boyaux are strictly super- 
vised so as to avoid all loss of tune in the process of forwarding. 

Depots for munitions and food are utiUzed as turnouts or 
halting places. They permit the resei'ves to be brought near 
to the hue without piHng them up, and make possible the 
accumulation of ammunition and food near the firing line. In 
the places d'armes or other fixed points, the reserves should 
find guides sent back by the troops whom they are going to 
support. 

Evacuation routes present the great advantage that they 
make it possible to avoid passing and congestion, which are 
fatal to free circulation. When they do not exist, or are not 
sufficiently numerous, it must be an absolute rule that supply 
takes precedence over evacuation. 

The organization of the conquered position is, in principle, 
the work of the engineers, who follow close on the first waves. 

When the enemy's first fine trench has been occupied, it is 
joined to the departure parallel by boyaux, permitting it to be 
approached under cover, and making it into a new trench. 

Without waiting for the termination of this work, which is, 
at times, fairly protracted, the succeeding trenches are cleared 
and reversed as rapidly as they are occupied. 

The object of all this is primarily to faciUtate the progress 
of the reinforcing or reheving units and of the reserves, by 

[126] 



ATTACK 

improving the more difficult passages, both with a view to 
their security and to rapidity of movement. Another object 
is to ensure the retention of the conquered terrain, by revers- 
ing the trenches against the enemy, and then by furnishing 
them with means of defense, whenever there is a check in the 
forward movement. 

When the attacking troops arrive at their assigned objective, 
the conquest of the position is generally assured. The engi- 
neers, aided by workers from the infantry, organize it on the 
same principles as the previous position. 

The general limits of the position are determined, both by 
topographical considerations, and by the situation of the 
troops; the latter must be speedily provided with defenses so 
as to prevent a retour offensif, or counter-attacks. To this 
end, the commanders of the attacking units fix the outUne of 
the new trench; detachments of engineers help the infantry- 
men in fortifying this line, making as much use as possible of 
the enemy's works, the inequalities of the ground, ditches, and 
hedges. Above aU, speed is necessary in order to ensure the 
retention of the new conquest, and to save the victorious 
troops from needless losses. The infantry sappers, who have 
already been trained in these different jobs, and especially in 
the setting up of accessory defenses, are at this moment of 
very real assistance. 

In the position itself, the engineers construct artillery ob- 
serving stations and create or refit the shelters for the men 
and their officers, while the telephone men speedily carry their 
wires to these different points. Places suitable for observing 
stations are pointed out by the infantry officers in the course 
of their advance, and accepted, if need be, by artillery officers 
specially detailed to accompany the infantry; no sooner is the 

[1,27] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

choice made, than the artillerymen use all means at their 
disposal to estabUsh permanent liaison with their batteries. 

The need for the speedy completion of these works, both 
along the front and in the interior of the conquered position, 
is entirely subordinate to their tactical importance. Thus, 
while some details of engineers, distributed among the attack- 
ing units, are engaged on the methodical organization of the 
different sectors, those elements which have remained at the 
disposal of the Command are grouped in detachments varying 
in size with the tasks to which they are assigned; these de- 
tachments fortify sohdly points of tactical importance and 
parts of the front exposed to a retour offensif or menaced by 
counter-attacks. 

A judicious distribution of machine guns, both by the leaders 
of the attacking units and by the generals, and their timely 
use, will give most effective aid in the defense of the position. 

The guiding principle, both in ordering the construction of 
works and in the adoption of measures, is perfectly simple; a 
position once conquered must never be lost. 

The organization of the position is the immediate and logi- 
cal consequence of its capture; in no sense does it imply a 
halt in the advance. On the contrary, the organized position 
furnishes a base and a place d'armes for those fresh troops 
whose duty it is to pursue the enemy, if he gives up resisting, 
or to attack the next position, if he has prepared one. 



[128] 



CHAPTER IV 



PURSUIT 



The capture of a position is but a means of achieving vic- 
tory; the only sure sign that victory has been won is the 
destruction of the enemy's forces. 

It is, therefore, necessary to pursue troops forced out of a 
position and overtake them by every possible means; at the 
same time troops remaining in line to right and left of the zone 
of attack must be taken in the rear, cut off from their com- 
munications and reserves, and either destroyed or surrounded. 
Thus the line is pierced, not only because the material barrier 
is overthrown at a given point, but also because the army 
which was sheltering itself behind it is reduced in numbers 
and broken up, and because its fragments are easier to crush. 

The crushing of the fragments of the enemy is the indispen- 
sable complement to a successful attack upon a position; it 
must be immediately undertaken, so as to prevent them from 
reassembling and from forging new links to bind themselves 
together. 

Speed is the condition essential to the success of these opera- 
tions, and this is obtained by resolution on the part of the 
Command, by the rapid despatch of sufficient reserves, and by 
the spirit, the audacity, and the endurance of the troops. 

The maintenance of contact with the enemy is effected by 
the attacking troops until they are relieved by the arrival of 
new elements. 

[129] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

The limits of a conquered position are in no sense absolute 
or impassable. While estabUshing themselves in it, the attack- 
ing troops send out patrols and reconnoitring parties beyond 
it to observe and harass the enemy. The echeloning one be- 
hind the other of the units of attack permits them to re-form 
easily, by closing up on the foremost elements; in this way 
the men once more come under the command of their accus- 
tomed leaders, which would be impossible if other formations 
^ere used. The despatch and functioning of patrols are also 
better secured in this way. 

The attacking troops suffer less in direct proportion to the 
rapidity of their success; but even if they are not obUged to 
reorganize they do not leave the position that has been won 
and go themselves in pursuit, except upon order from the 
Command. 

Continuity of movement beyond the position is secured by 
the Command wliich, being accurately informed by frequent 
reports, makes the necessary arrangements, directly it can see 
the possibiUty of success. 

Fresh troops of infantry brought successively up to the 
field of action advance beyond the conquered position and 
take the place of the patrols and reconnoitring parties sent out 
by the attacking troops; they constitute the element of shock 
and of resistance in the pursuit. In exceptional cases this 
task may be entrusted to the first attacking troops, who are 
then replaced in the occupied position by others. 

Motor cannon, motor machine guns, and bicycle groups use 
the roads which the sappers accompanying the attack have 
taken care to repair. These units constitute the element of 
speed which is so important in pursuit. One or two armored 

[130] 



PURSUIT 

motor cars go ahead to clear the road in order to avoid an 
accumulation of vehicles in front of an unforeseen obstacle; 
they transport some sappers for the purpose of making quick 
repairs; special gangs of workmen at points along the road 
have the task of inspecting and repairing it. 

The enemy, moreover, needs these roads up to the last 
moment for the evacuation of his artillery, his materiel, and 
his convoys, so that he is prevented, if closely pressed, from 
injuring them. The zone in which the roads have been rendered 
useless by defensive works and constructions, and the effects 
of the bombardment, is, comparatively speaking, not deep; 
it Ues in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's first line 
trenches. Beyond it, the retiring troops often lack the time to 
effect the destruction of the roads, as originally planned, 
particularly as they are obhged to utiUze all the ways of com- 
munication up to the very last moment. 

The cavalry is brought close to the position along itineraries 
previously reconnoitred, and does not take part in the cross- 
ing of the zone of trenches until after new reconnaissances 
have been made. It is often obliged, in order to avoid encoun- 
tering insurmountable difficulties, to make use, at the out- 
set, exclusively of roads. In every case it assumes formations 
calculated to avoid the effects of the enemy's artillery fire. 
It constitutes an element both of acceleration and of resist- 
ance; but it would sacrifice itself uselessly if it hurled itself 
against infantrymen protected by trenches. 

The artillery goes to emplacements previously determined. 
It maintains its Uaisons with the elements entrusted with the 
pursuit, so as to facihtate their progress, if they encounter 
obstacles, and to bombard hostile concentrations if any are 
seen. The artillery officers detailed to accompany the infantry 

[131] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

gather information regarding emplacements and observing 
stations to be occupied on the occasion of fresh advance. 

The forward deplacement of the artillery is planned as com- 
pletely as possible in advance. 

The troops entrusted with the pursuit may, at least at the 
start, be preceded by an artillery barrage, similar to that 
which precedes the attacking troops. This barrage protects 
them at the moment of their leaving the conquered position, 
and is continued as long as need be; it is effected by a rapid 
deplacement of a portion of the artillery, especially that por- 
tion which took no part in the attack. Tliis barrage is gen- 
erally kept up only for a short time, in order to give perfect 
freedom of action to the troops in pursuit. 

It is important, on the other hand, to give these troops con- 
stant protection against the fire of the enemy's artillery. To 
this end it is necessary to deplace rapidly a certain part of the 
long-range mobile artillery and of the field artillery, and to 
arrange groups of pieces to destroy, or at least to neutralize, 
the artillery of the enemy. These groups are constituted, 
either by batteries previously located near the line of depar- 
ture, but inactive during the attack, or by batteries reserved 
for this purpose, or, finally, by batteries whose range has been 
exceeded by the progress of the advance. 

The deplacement of the artillery is effected in several 
echelons, in such wise that the same battery shall be deplaced 
as few times as possible and may utiUze its full range before 
being moved forward. It is always the rearmost echelon which 
is moved; it is placed in front of the foremost one, obtaining 
therefrom all available information, and always maintaining 
liaison with the infantry which it supports. 

[132] 



PURSUIT 

The engineers are given the task of reestabhshing and im- 
proving the means of communication. The railways, whose 
use has been made possible by the advance of the troops, are 
repaired; existing lines are prolonged if there is opportunity. 

The aviators follow attentively the various movements of 
the enemy's troops; they furnish the Command with informa- 
tion as to the direction of the retreat, the intervention of re- 
inforcements, the whereabouts of reserves, and the occupation 
of new positions. 

If the defeated troops are pursued without respite or delay, 
they can neither reorganize nor oftentimes even occupy posi- 
tions prepared beforehand in the rear; they hastily abandon 
defenses which have been laboriously constructed; further- 
more, they bring disorder among the reserves designed to 
reinforce them, and involve the latter in their own disaster. 

Thus a position organized in the rear of the first, and 
capable of offering a like resistance, may fall into the hands of 
the pursuing troops, if they fall upon it by a bold, rapid, and 
decisive stroke. This bold stroke, the consequences of which 
may be considerable, should always be attempted; its success 
depends primarily upon the disorder and demoralization 
obtained by the pursuit. 

The disorder and demoralization of troops in retreat and of 
reserves are the work of the various units to whom is en- 
trusted the duty of ensuring continuity of movement. 

The motor cannon and motor machine guns are moved 
boldly forward, as are also the bicycle groups, who may, as cir- 
cumstances direct, either support them or operate independ- 
ently. In every case these units maintain connections with 
each other, so as not to get in each other's way, and so as to 
concentrate their efforts. 

[133] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

Armored motor-cars have as their special task the destruc- 
tion of hostile machine guns which have remained in place or 
have been set up quickly in position to fire; being provided, on 
account of their small calibre, with a supply of munitions 
sufficient for their immediate needs, they perform a part which 
less light and mobile cannon cannot play. They become use- 
less as soon as their ammunition is exhausted. They must 
therefore avoid all waste, and provide in advance the means 
' of re-suppljdng themselves. 

Motor machine guns try to embarrass the retreat of the 
infantry, which they attack on the flanks and in the rear, and 
also of the batteries and convoys, whose horses and drivers 
they kill. They can obtain considerable results in the way of 
disorganization and dispersion, thus preparing the task for 
the infantry. 

Furthermore, infantrymen can be transported by automo- 
biles, following after the motor artillery, up to a point where 
prudence compels a halt. Movements appearing at first 
unlikely to succeed are easily carried out if the enemy's artil- 
lery has been silenced, if it runs short of ammunition, or if it is 
engaged in beating a retreat. 

The cavalry resumes a greater freedom of movement after 
crossing the zones of trenches. It completes the work of the 
motor vehicles and cyclists. In the performance of this task, 
it leaves the roads in order to overtake and surround the re- 
treating troops, who, because of their demoralization, often 
surrender without fighting; it takes batteries and convoys 
unawares; it occupies certain important points until the 
arrival of the infantry; it interrupts telegraphic and tele- 
phonic communications; it cuts railways which may be used 
by the enemy. By its multiple contact with the adversary it 

[134] 



PURSUIT 

gathers in valuable information, which it sends with all speed 
to the Command. 

The infantry endeavors to gain ground, so as to support the 
efforts of the more rapid arms and complete their action. It 
should be careful, as soon as it is overtaken by them, not to 
fire in such a way as to interfere with their operations or to hit 
them. It collects the prisoners and conducts them to the rear, 
surrounds resisting detachments in order to make them sur- 
render, and seizes such batteries or convoys as it is able to 
catch up with. It ensures the occupation and retention of the 
terrain, and forms a rampart to whose shelter the other arms 
can fall back, in case there is a retour offensif or a counter- 
attack. 

The field artillery, by dint of a judicious choice of observa- 
tion posts and constant maintenance of its liaison with the 
front ranks can immediately bring hostile concentrations under 
its fire, cut off the retreat of pursued detachments, and de- 
stroy batteries or units in deplacement. The heavy artillery 
directs its fire upon villages, crossroads, railway-stations, and 
railways stiU in the enemy's hands. Artillerymen cannot take 
too many precautions in order to avoid mistakes which might 
paralyze the pursuit. 

Aviators contribute effectively to the destruction and 
demoralization of the retreating troops; some by directing the 
fire of the batteries upon objectives which have escaped the 
sight of observers on the ground; others by bombarding 
columns on the march, batteries in deplacement, cantonments 
of reserves, workmen organizing a new position, troops in- 
tended for the defense, railways stations, and railways. If the 
enemy's artillery is silenced and if the fighting planes protect 
them well, they can fly low and accomplish muoh. 

[135] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

Thus by means of the action of the different arms the task 
of the infantry is facilitated; but the infantry alone has the 
means of reaping the benefit of the disorganization which 
has been attained. After long waiting it has its innings; after 
toilsome and bloody days it wins easy successes which raise its 
spirits to a high pitch of enthusiasm. 

Taking in the rear of the enemy's lines is a logical conse- 
quence of the carrying of a position and of the pursuit of its 
occupants. It is the attacking of new positions on tliree sides 
instead of on one. Its aim is the enlargement of the breach, 
the breaking-up of the enemy's line, and the successive crush- 
ing of the forces which defend it. It is carried out bit by bit 
and its execution is entrusted to fresh troops. 

The cavalry plays the principal part in this expansion of the 
battle. Seeking for free ground beyond the conquered posi- 
tion, it spreads out broadly behind the enemy's trenches, so as 
to interrupt conamunications, prevent the arrival of fresh sup- 
plies of men, food, and munitions, and cut off the retreat of the 
defenders. 

In the accomphshment of this task, the cavalry displays a 
boldness which exposes it to great dangers, but which is fruitful 
in important results. 

Under its protection, the motor cannon and the motor 
machine guns are enabled to advance to places from which 
they fire upon isolated points of resistance, upon troops in 
deplacement, upon batteries in position, upon concentrations, 
and upon convoys. They have some chance of escaping from 
the fire of the enemy's artillery still in action owing to the 
proximity of his trenches and of his infantry; nevertheless, 
their task is as dangerous as that of the cavalry. 

[136] 



PURSUIT 

The infantry alone is able, as in the pursuit of troops from a 
position, to complete the results obtained and to occupy the 
terrain. Its attack on the rear of the position is developed 
according to the usual rules, but with differences of detail; it 
has to execute a march of approach during which it must itself 
ensure the protection of its flank and rear; it does not require 
so intense an artillery preparation, since it encounters almost 
no accessory defenses. 

The artillery, placed at properly chosen points in the occu- 
pied terrain, supports the other arms, particularly the infan- 
try, when it attacks; it seizes every occasion to destroy or to 
disperse the enemy. 

The maintenance of liaisons of every kind is the more care- 
fully to be watched in proportion as it becomes more difficult; 
the slightest remissness may entail irreparable errors, particu- 
larly in artillery fire. It should be noted that there are in 
operation not only heavy pieces and also some of the field- 
pieces originally designed to batter the occupied position, but 
also all the artillery facing the trenches taken in the rear. If 
precise and frequent information is not sent to the Command, 
if the observing stations and the aviators are not careful to 
report the movements of troops, the projectiles intended for 
the enemy may have the result of delaying the advance. 

The role of the Command, limited during the attack to that 
of a spectator desirous of full information, becomes more 
active in the pursuit. 

The duty of the commander of an army corps entrusted 
with carrying a position is to give an account to the com- 
mander of the army, at the earliest possible moment, of the 
progress of events. This task is easy because of the relative 
certainty of the telephonic and telegraphic communications 

[137] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

established between the large units. In accordance with this 
information, the High Command gives orders relative to the 
pursuit of troops driven from position, and later to the taking 
in the rear of the adjacent troops. 

The pursuit of troops driven from the position may be en- 
trusted to reserves belonging to the army corps which has 
carried out the attack. But the taking in the rear of adjacent 
troops is really a new attack, requiring new forces; it is only 
'developed in accordance with available means. 

The advance of the victor, in depth as well as in width, 
must be limited by well-defined instructions and by clearly 
determined objectives. While necessarily bold and rapid, it 
must be methodical and certain. For that purpose com- 
manders of the units involved must go forward at the same 
time as their troops; not only will they thus be more fully and 
quickly informed, but they themselves will understand the 
situation better, and be able to make use of all those qualities 
of quick observation, decision, and character by which they 
have justified their right to command. 

It is by trusting to the value of their information, to the 
acuteness of their judgment, and to the ingenuity of their 
arrangements, that the Commander-in-Chief is able to throw 
in at this point the reserves necessary to complete the local 
success and transform it into a briUiant victory. 

These reserves are distributed in proportion to the difficulty 
and importance of the tasks to be accomphshed; on some 
occasions they all come in together under the command of a 
leader assigned to them; on others they participate in the 
work of a large unit already in line, as, for example, by taking 
in the rear a position which this unit is attacking from the 
front. 

[138] 



PURSUIT 

All the troops in a battle thus enlarged are placed under 
the orders of a Commander-in-Chief; he knows the end to be 
attained and the size of the forces on wliich he can count, and 
he determines the sphere of activity of each of his subordi- 
nates. 

The inrush of many troops upon a relatively restricted posi- 
tion and their passage through the same breach before it is 
fully opened up are operations all the more delicate because 
the rapidity of their execution is indispensable to success. 
The Command regulates their transportation by railway and 
automobile, their crossing over into the zone of trenches, and 
their debouching towards the indicated objectives, in such a 
way that the flow of men shall correspond with the urgency of 
the operations. 

The order and speed of these movements depend in great 
measure on the manner in which the attack has been prepared 
and carried out. Every measure intended to facilitate the 
sending forward of troops commanded to take the position is a 
help to those who follow them. The knowledge of the terrain 
acquired by the units of attack must, moreover, be utilized. 
Finally, trustworthy guides in sufficient numbers, provided by 
these units, are more valuable than any topographical de- 
scription or any sign post, to ensure the rapid bringing up of 
the reserves. 

The supply of food and munitions is provided for and over- 
seen by the Command; it is facilitated by measures previously 
adopted. The arrival of ammunition when required, particu- 
larly for the artillery, takes precedence of every other need. 
Victory goes to that one of the adversaries whose projectiles 
are exhausted last. 

[139] 



CHAPTER V 

MARCH OF APPROACH 

The object of the march of approach is to bring troops within 
Assaulting distance of a position, without incurring losses. 

When an attack starts from the first line trenches, there is 
of course no march of approach for the first waves; for the 
later waves and for the reserves, it is reduced to the operation 
which is called " advancing through the boyaux." 

But when the attack is the immediate sequel to other 
operations, the march of approach assumes a different aspect. 

After taking the position, the troops sent forward in pur- 
suit may encounter, either at the beginning of their progress 
or after they have advanced some miles, a second position, 
previously organized. 

If, by a bold surprise attack, they succeed in taking it, its 
occupation is accomplished with all possible speed, in accord- 
ance with the usual rules. 

If, on the other hand, they encounter a vigorous and obsti- 
nate resistance, their only means of overcoming it is a new 
attack, whose importance may equal or surpass that of the 
previous one, and whose execution requires a new prepara- 
tion. The Command is the sole judge when the moment is 
ripe for this attack. As soon as it is decided upon, it necessi- 
tates a march of approach between the position already cap- 
tured, and the one that still remains to be taken. 

[140] 



MARCH OF APPROACH 

The preparation of the approach is designed to ensure, during 
the march of the troops, relative security, a constant direction, 
and perfect order. 

It constitutes the initial act of an eventual attack and has, 
for just that reason, a considerable bearing upon its success. 
Troops badly started find difficulties to overcome, whereas, 
once well launched, they go straight on to victory. 

The fresh troops who have been sent forward in pursuit are 
generally entrusted with the new attack. For reserves, they 
have the troops who have carried out the previous attack and 
who have been re-formed in the conquered position, until the 
arrival of other units to whom the Command may assign this 
task. The principles and the procedure according to which 
they execute their march of approach are applicable to all 
other troops. 

The question of speed, essential in pursuit, is important 
in the approach; but it is subordinated to two other con- 
ditions — the safety of the troops, and the determination of 
the directions in which they are to go. Whereas in the pur- 
suit, the troops expose themselves boldly in order to overtake 
the enemy, and capture with a rush such objectives as they 
may chance to discover in their advance, in the march of 
approach they must take every precaution to arrive intact at 
assaulting distance, and from the outset make for definitely 
determined objectives. 

Previous study of the position is the surest way of obviating 
unnecessary losses; it permits a choice of suitable itineraries, 
and an avoidance of dangerous changes of direction. It is 
made by means of every kind of information gathered by the 
Command. Photographs of the aviators furnish the most 
precise data. The advanced elements of the pursuit check up 

[141] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

these data; in the exceptional case of war of movement, this 
task is performed by scouting parties of cavalry, and the fore- 
most elements of the covering troops. These last, by their bold 
dashes, manage to determine the contours of the position, the 
best routes of access, the weakest points, and the morale of 
the defenders. All this information, coordinated with that sup- 
plied by the maps of the country, by observations taken on 
the ground, and by prisoners and deserters, gives a general idea 
6f the forces and means necessary to approach and to carry 
the position. 

The Command can then assign to each unit its task, deter- 
mine its itinerary, and indicate its objective. Before starting 
out on the march, each unit has its route reconnoitred and 
places itself squarely opposite its objective in order to avoid 
irresolution and delays, as well as changes of direction under 
fire. 

These dispositions do not give sufficient security to the 
infantry if they are not supplemented by the installation of 
batteries. The infantry cannot defend itself by its fire either 
against rifles and machine guns, or against cannon; it looks 
solely to its own artillery for protection, wliich must therefore 
be ready to extend in front of it the curtain of fire under cover 
of which it advances. 

The execution of the approach, faciUtated by a careful prep- 
aration, may be rapid, and may be the prelude to a victorious 
assault. 

Each division of infantry advances in its assigned zone. 

When the distance which separates the conquered position 
from that still to be taken is considerable, the infantry should 
march with cavalry protection, in route columns, extended as 

[142] 



MARCH OF APPROACH 

much as possible. In the first Une divisions the artillery does 
not march in the lead, but only sends forward its reconnais- 
sance personnel, with the telegraphic and telephonic equipment. 
In the second Une divisions, on the contrary, the artillery itself 
should take the lead, so that it may be immediately drawn up 
in line. The information centres which communicate with the 
airplanes are moved forward by sudden rushes. 

When the distance between the two positions is not great or 
when the fire of the enemy's artillery is dangerous, the infantry 
deploys and advances from cover to cover; it does its utmost 
to effect the rapid seizure and immediate organization of 
points which might be used for observing stations. 

The infantry is formed, as for an attack, in successive waves, 
the contiguous units of which are echeloned in depth. But 
the first waves, instead of being lines of skirmishers, are lines 
of small columns; such a formation is less vulnerable, permits 
changes of direction to be effected with less risk in case of 
mistakes in defining the objectives, gives greater facihties for 
manoeuvering if occasion arises, and frees the troops from 
the temptation of useless firing. 

The advanced elements of the pursuit, who have held their 
ground in order to continue their observations, permit them- 
selves to be passed by the infantry, and transmit to it all the 
information acquired; they then fall back under its protection. 

The infantry gains ground Uttle by little; it stops only to 
rest, since its fire is ineffective. It is constantly protected by 
the artillery, which watches its progress and maintains Uaison 
with it. It is accompanied by machine guns and by all the 
movable trench artillery; the advance of this artillery and of 
the various accompanying pieces is regulated in accordance 

[143] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

with the amount of ammunition which can follow without diffi- 
culty, for they should not be impeded by those pieces which it is 
impossible to keep suppUed. 

If a part of the field artillery has remained in its original 
position, it moves forward. As to the heavy artillery, which is 
difficult to move, it does not make its arrangements to advance 
until the attack has progressed beyond the point where it is 
able to support it. When the amount of material available 
permits, the Command keeps heavy pieces upon motor tractors 
and railways in readiness to accompany the forward move- 
ment, as soon as the state of the pursuit makes it probable 
that it can be continued. 

Advances of artillery are generally effected by echelons, 
according to the same rules as are followed in a pursuit. They 
are effected at night by reconnoitred and prepared itineraries; 
but they can often be carried out in the daytime, before the 
enemy has had time to get himself in hand again. 

Indeed, the attack on a position ought to be hurried, so as to 
have better chances of success. Furthermore, while the infan- 
try advances, an intense artillery fire is delivered with the two- 
fold purpose of protecting its march and preparing its assault. 

The adjusting planes cooperate with the batteries, while 
the scouting planes continue to gather information concerning 
the disposition of the enemy. 

The engineers work hard at the improvement and security 
of the roads intended for the reserves, the heavy artillery, and 
ammunition. 

As soon as the first waves are exposed to the fire of the 
enemy's infantry and machine guns, they deploy as skir- 
mishers in order to continue their march. As the distance 

[144] 



MARCH OF APPROACH 

grows shorter, their progress becomes more difficult and is 
accomplished by the quick rushes of elements of different 
sizes, advancing from cover to cover; the N, C. Os. see to 
it that a relative alignment is maintained, so that the waves 
remain solidly constituted. The artillery pieces assigned to 
the infantry battalions and the machine guns accompany the 
first wave, so as to facilitate its march and to prepare for its 
assault. 

When it has arrived at assaulting distance, the first wave 
re-forms and takes cover behind natural obstacles and in 
hastily-dug individual entrenchments. The artillery opens 
fire energetically against the position, as do also the infantry 
cannon, the machine guns, and other accompanying pieces, 
so as to destroy the supplementary defenses, demolish the 
parapets, and either kill or terrorize the occupants. The 
scouts and the observers carefully watch the effects produced 
by this preparation upon the various points of the line. As 
soon as it is considered sufficient, notice is given the artillery 
to increase its range at a given signal or at a given moment. 
This signal or moment is that of the assault. 

If the assault fails and cannot be quickly renewed with 
chances of success, there begins a period of stationary fighting; 
trenches must then be organized. 

The role of the High Command, when the combat is thus 
enlarged, increases progressively in importance. The generals 
in command of army groups and the Commander-in-Chief, 
who have already issued general directions in regard to the 
pursuit, must now make more definite decisions, and issue 
orders for attack. 

While the troops told off to capture the second position 
perform their march of approach, others proceed to take in 

[145] 



ATTACK ON A POSITION 

the rear the positions adjacent to the first one. A battle of 
large extent begins. If the second position is carried, a deci- 
sive victory is in sight. The chance must not be allowed to 
escape; the fruit of patient, prolonged, and bloody efforts must 
not be lost at the last moment. To this end, the High Com- 
mand sees to it that the battle front is well supplied with men 
and ammunition, while at the same time it limits the efforts 
made at other points in the line and even confines them 
strictly to the defensive. 

The responsibiUty assumed is crushing, but the task to be 
accomplished is magnificent. Every organism in the army 
comes into play and works without respite. The railways and 
motor trucks convey the reserves, the heavy artillery, muni- 
tions, and food, whose immediate forwarding or temporary 
maintenance are carefully regulated. Every service is engaged 
in this task, according to the instructions of the Command. 

In the general advance, the forwarding of heavy artillery 
often presents great difficulties; it must, however, be accom- 
pUshed whatever the cost, so as not to expose victorious troops 
to the risk of being definitively held up. At this stirring mo- 
ment more than at any other, a close liaison must be main- 
tained between the different arms, so as to ensure continuity 
of movement and to make the most of the success obtained. 

The infantry is powerless to extend the radius of its action 
and to maintain its advance, unless it be faithfully followed up 
not only by the field artillery, but also by the heavy artillery. 
It may be victorious over a fleeing or demoraUzed adversary, 
when supported only by field artillery; but it is doomed to 
failure when, without heavy artillery at its disposal, it hurls 
itself against strongly organized positions. Even if it carries 
these positions, at the price of costly efforts, it will neverthe- 

[146] 



MARCH OF APPROACH 

less be obliged to evacuate them and fall back again under the 
sheltering wing of this indispensable ally. 

The rapidity of marches of approach and of assaults may 
hamper the enemy's artillery in its fire for a short time, owing 
to its uncertainty regarding the respective positions of the two 
adversaries; but this period of uncertainty cannot continue 
indefinitely, particularly if the enemy's artillery, in order to 
save a dangerous situation, does not scruple to fire on its own 
men. 

The rapidity of the assailant's success or the skill of his 
manoeuvers may place the enemy's heavy artillery in danger 
and may even result in its capture. In that case the light 
artillery once more plays the principal part. 

The successive positions, moreover, are naturally in less and 
less close lateral connection, which permits of manoeuvering; 
they are also less and less organized, which facihtates attack. 
In fact the war of movement begins again. 

The army which has been able to bring this about has 
already won the victory. It devotes itself wholly to following 
up its success with those means which the Commander-in- 
Chief thenceforth distributes with lavish hand. 



[147] 



PART IV 
DEFENSE OF A POSITION 



CHAPTER I 

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DEFENSIVE 
FIGHTING 

The defense of a position aims to oppose the progress of the 
enemy, until such time as it be possible to change over to the 
offensive. 

It is rendered necessary either by the need of awaiting favor- 
able circumstances and sufficient material means for attack, 
or by the decision to hold certain parts of the front with a 
minimum of troops, so as to be able to make a more con- 
siderable effort elsewhere. 

When the defensive goes on with no other symptoms than 
rifle fire, bombardment, reconnaissances, patrols, mining, and 
raids, it becomes a mere process of stationary fighting in the 
vicinity of the enemy; it is simply " trench warfare " over 
again. When it is opposed to a methodical and stubborn 
attack, dehvered by the enemy with every resource at his 
command, it is " defensive combat." 

Defensive combat extends over that part of the front 
which is attacked by the enemy, that is to say, over one or 
more contiguous positions. 

The study of its development in any one of these enables us 
to grasp it in its entirety. This development includes, as 
successive phases: 

[151] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

The organization of the defense; 

The defense of the position; 

The retreat, when the enemy is victorious; 

The retour offensif, designed to retake the lost terrain. 

The immediate aim of defensive combat is the holding of 
the position in spite of every attack; but it is intimately 
bound up with the general aim which dominates every act of 
'war — namely, the destruction of the enemy's army. The 
commander in charge of the defense, while always energetically 
maintaining his hold on the terrain entrusted to his protection, 
seeks to inflict the heaviest possible losses upon the attacking 
troops, and to diminish the general capacity of the adver- 
sary for future fighting; he thus prepares the way for the 
victorious offensive of the morrow. 



[152] 



CHAPTER II 

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSIVE 

Defensive combat takes place in the position on which the 
troops have been established, sometimes for many months. 

It is the sudden realization of an event constantly antici- 
pated. It should not, therefore, involve any special prepara- 
tion; in the first place, because such preparation is being 
made every day during the time of stationary fighting; and 
also because the enemy's attack is generally in the nature of a 
surprise. 

An attack, nevertheless, does not take place until significant 
symptoms have indicated its imminence to attentive observers. 

The accumulation of batteries of artillery, the labor neces- 
sary to install them, the activity of the air service, the great 
number of trains bringing troops and supplies of all kinds, the 
massing of reserves in the cantonments and bivouacs close to 
the front — no one of these symptoms should escape the watch- 
ful eyes of the aviators. 

The preparatory work carried on by the enemy's first line — 
saps, mines, departure parallels, openings in the accessory 
defenses — are discovered by the sappers and engineers, by 
the artillery observers, and by the watchers and the patrols, 
whose vigilance must never relax. 

Prisoners and deserters, who have seen the preparations 
and who often have on their persons instructions from their 

[153] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

commanders, furnish valuable information and a means of 
verifying what has already been learned. 

Finally, an intense artillery preparation, often lasting 
several days, precedes the assault on the position. 

As soon as there is prospect of an attack, the troops occupy- 
ing the position are notified. They redouble their watch- 
fulness and their precautions. Their commanders of every 
^rank take all the necessary measures to enable them to fulfill 
their tasks. 

The troops maintain their organization and perform their 
regular duties in accordance with the usual rules, but are 
specially forewarned against the effects of a surprise. There 
are also certain measures which will render them even better 
prepared for the ensuing struggle; these have to do with the 
detailed study of the two opposing positions, with the material 
amSnagement of the position, and with the physical and moral 
preparedness of the troops. Lastly, the Command must not 
forget any of the duties which fall to its lot. 

The detailed study of the two positions is carried out in 
advance by all the troops which may be called upon to fight on 
this terrain. It is as advantageous for the preparation of the 
defense as for that of the attack. 

As regards the position to be defended, this study helps in 
attaining a thorough knowledge of the various routes; in 
consequence, it facilitates rapid execution of reUefs, avoidance 
of dangerous passages, the bringing of immediate assistance to 
contiguous units, the reinforcement of menaced points with- 
out hesitation or delay, withdrawals with avoidance of losses, 
and successful execution of counter-attacks or retour offensifs, 
even at night. 

[154] 



ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE 

As regards the opposing position, it facilitates the discovery 
of the enemy's arrangements, and his eventual means of 
attack; it makes possible the anticipation of his probable 
routes of access, and the adjustment of the barrage fire in 
advance, the determination of the most vulnerable points in 
his line and the preparation of counter-attacks, the location 
of the openings made in his accessory defenses, with a view to 
bringing them under machine-gun fire. 

Furthermore, the study of the two positions should be made 
as for an attack, not only by consulting the maps of the topog- 
raphers and the aviators, but also by personal inspection and 
traversing of the trenches themselves in every direction, and 
by always keeping some one in the observing stations. 

The material amenagement of the position consists simply 
in the inspection and improvement of its organization during 
the period of stationary fighting. These are effected in accord- 
ance with the latest information received concerning the 
enemy. 

In the advanced part of the position, the orders to be given 
are as follows: Inspect daily the condition of the accessory 
defenses, restoring as soon as possible those which have been 
destroyed or impaired. Rectify any parts of the outUne of the 
trench which cannot be held without exposing their defenders 
to losses disproportionate to the advantages gained, or which 
may endanger the security of the line. Reinforce the guard 
and observation service. Ascertain whether the machine 
guns can take under flanking and enfilading fire those zones 
which the enemy must cross. Make certain by actual trial 
that the transference of the machine guns from their shelters 
to their fire emplacements is as near as possible instantaneous, 
and that their mechanism works perfectly. Dig false trenches, 

[155] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

and cover the real ones with camouflage as thoroughly as pos- 
sible so as to dissipate the fire of the enemy's artillery. Main- 
tain a complete supply of munitions of all sorts, and of food. 
Strengthen the liaisons, both lateral and in depth. 

The liaisons must be watched with particular care at the 
points of junction of the different corps. The enemy knows 
that these points are vulnerable, in consequence of the divided 
command, and is watching them carefully, with a view to 
•attacking there. 

In the interior of the position, the following measures must 
be taken : Look after the condition of the observation posts, 
shelters, communicating and support trenches, and make others 
in different places, if need be. Make sure that the obUgatory 
points of passage, and the points of tactical importance can 
be taken under the fire of machine guns whose shelters are in 
good condition, whose firing emplacements have been recon- 
noitred, and whose crews know their job. Arrange for the 
supply of the depots for munitions, water, and food. Construct 
new access and evacuation boyaux in view of the possibiUty 
that the intensity of the fight may render them necessary. 
Increase the number of sign boards, poUce posts, liaison agents, 
and guides; this will ensure good order and rapidity of move- 
ment. Increase also the number of places d'armes where 
reinforcing and relieving troops may be kept near the line of 
combat, without being congested or exposed. Prepare all 
sorts of obstacles and means of resistance, such as barricades 
for the boyaiix, stations for grenadiers, etc., in case the enemy 
should break into the trenches. 

As regards obstacles, one of the most effective consists in 
wire entanglements on the reverse slope; these cannot be 
destroyed by artillery, since they are in a dead angle; more- 

[156] 



ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE 

over, they stop the progress of the attackers, who are either 
demoraUzed at encountering them, or decimated in trying to 
cross them. If there be no natural reverse slope, it is a good 
plan to prepare an artificial one, at least several yards wide. 

For the rear of the position, the orders to be given are as 
follows: Every line of communication used in forwarding 
troops, ammunition, and food must be kept in the best of 
condition. Special gangs of workmen must be in readiness 
to keep these ways in repair; they will be subjected to ex- 
ceptionally heavy strain, owing to the violence of the bom- 
bardment, and the great amount of traffic. With regard to 
railways, these should be double-tracked and extended when 
necessary, and those sections which are specially exposed to 
the enemy's fire should be shifted so as to prevent their being 
cut. Constant watch should be kept on the general circula- 
tion, remembering that the necessities of the defense take pre- 
cedence of everything else. 

In general, a close cooperation of the different arms, each 
fulfilling its proper function, tends to create an organism which 
leaves nothing to chance; the administrative departments, 
especially the sanitary service, whose activities may save so 
many lives, should make every effort to prevent being inter- 
rupted in their work. 

The physical and moral preparation of the troops takes a 
long time, and grows more and more arduous with the approach 
of defensive combat. 

The troops assigned for rehef, and more especially those 
detailed for counter-attacks, will recover their agihty, their 
spirits, and their vigor in the cantonments or bivouacs to the 
rear of the position; they in their turn take the places of those 

[157] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

who have been in the trenches, while the latter seek repose 
after their fatigues and losses. 

The commanders of every rank try to raise the morale of 
their men to a high pitch, and quicken their patriotism; they 
instill into them the idea that they must hold the position en- 
trusted to their charge, come what may, and let themselves be 
killed on the spot rather than allow it to fall into the enemy's 
hands. 

The role of the Command consists in foreseeing the events 
which may arise, and in taking the proper steps to avoid or at 
least to limit the scope of a reverse. 

The commander who is given the task of defending a posi- 
tion draws up a plan of defense: he studies the situation of 
the enemy, decides upon the distribution of his own troops, both 
laterally and in depth, assigns their duties to the different arms, 
and estimates what reinforcements may become necessary. 
He should not only prepare to resist to the last, but must also 
keep in mind the possibility of an evacuation. If he should be 
forced to retreat he will have to direct his troops and his 
materiel to a position in the rear, so as to be able to make a 
resistance there, with the support of fresh troops. This 
second position should be situated four or five miles behind 
the first, so as not to be in range of the same artillery fire, and 
so as to escape the possible effects of asphyxiating gas. In 
case such a position has not been previously chosen, and in 
case its selection and organization have not been entrusted 
to the commander of the first one, the latter should ask for 
orders in regard to it from the responsible commander as soon 
as possible. 

The commanders, up to the very highest rank, should deter- 
mine the measures to be taken on the actual ground and in 

[158] 



ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE 

person; their presence, their advice, and their observations 
infuse into everyone a desire for work, and a dash which no 
written word or telephone message can hope to equal. 

Conscious of the responsibiUty weighing upon him, the 
commander never takes his mind off the task with which he is 
entrusted; not only does he look ahead and give orders, he 
sees to it also that his orders are carried out. He should bear 
in mind that if there is anything lacking in the organization of 
a position in which troops have been stationed for a long time, 
it is because their commander has given proof of incapacity, 
and has failed in the performance of his duty. 



[159] 



CHAPTER III 

DEFENSE 

The object of the defense is to drive back the enemy when 
he attacks the position, and at the same time to inflict upon 
him the heaviest possible losses. Not only does it thus en- 
sure the inviolability of the front; it also lowers the 
adversary's morale, exhausts his strength for future struggles, 
and favors the offensive either at the place defended or at 
some other point. 

The maintenance of the troops under bombardment is 
the first phase of the defense. 

This phase is almost wholly passive, at least for the in- 
fantry. It consists in remaining in place, in spite of the 
shells of every calibre which demolish the trenches, break 
down the parapets, destroy the accessory defenses, smash in 
shelters, blow to pieces or bury their occupants, and cut com- 
munications with the rear. The morale of the troops prevents 
their weakening in these critical circumstances, and enables 
them uncomplainingly to occupy ground where death is 
everywhere; the ascendency and example of the leaders help 
greatly in maintaining this morale. 

During the luUs, particularly at night, the infantry, helped 
by the engineers, hastens to repair the accessory defenses, to 
rebuild the parapets, to free the trenches, and to reconstruct 
the shelters and observation posts; it sees to the burial of the 
dead and to the evacuation of the wounded. 

Artillery alone is able to diminish the intensity of the bom- 
bardment by attempting to destroy or to silence the enemy's 

[160] 



DEFENSE 

batteries. Aided by the observation-balloons and by the 
fire-adjusting planes, the heavy and field artillery make every 
effort to accomplish this result. 

These groups ought to avoid " zone fire " which does not 
serve to destroy the enemy's pieces; they should devote their 
attentions to definitely determined " nests " of hostile guns. 
They may use special toxic or laclu-ymatory shells for this 
purpose to good advantage, in order to neutralize the enemy's 
fire; for the enemy's artillerymen, since they are obliged to 
seek shelter or to put on their gas masks, are thus rendered 
incapable of serving their pieces effectively. 

When the attack seems imminent, as is indicated by move- 
ments taking place in the enemy's lines, the artillery carries 
out a counter-preparation, which may be very effective both 
upon the concentrations which have been pointed out and 
upon the trenches in which the assailants are massed. 

Since the enemy frequently uses asphyxiating gases in the 
periods preparatory to his attacks — the defenders of the 
position should be thoroughly trained in the means of pro- 
tecting themselves. Strict orders obUge officers and men to 
have their masks with them on all occasions, ready to be put 
on — even when they are several miles behind the lines; for 
not only can gas waves be blown a considerable distance by 
the wind, but also asphyxiating shells can carry the terrible 
poison a long way. Only by rigorous discipline, and con- 
stantly reproving the natural carelessness of the men, is it 
possible to defend their lives against this barbarous practice, 
specifically forbidden in treaties.^ 

' The use of these methods was forbidden, as contrary to the laws of 
humanity, by (1) the Declaration of Petrograd (11 Dec, 1868) and (2) the 
Declaration of the Hague (29 July, 1899), signed and ratified by Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. 

[161] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

The defense of the first line is ensured by close coopera- 
tion between infantry, maclaine guns, and artillery. 

As soon as the enemy's real attack (not merely a trial 
wave) leaves its trench, it is greeted with a barrage fire from 
those batteries which have been given the task of stopping it. 
Other batteries fire upon reinforcements as they move forward 
and upon reserves at their stations. Isolated pieces of artil- 
j lery, or even advanced batteries, which until then have kept 
silent so as not to run the risk of premature destruction, un- 
mask themselves at the opportune moment, and open fire 
upon the advancing masses; pieces which move on rails are 
specially valuable for this purpose, since they can be taken to 
desired points in a few minutes, and then be put in shelter as 
soon as their task is fulfilled. 

The defenders of the first line, sheltered as completely as 
possible during the bombardment, are notified by their watchers 
as soon as the enemy begins his advance. Then instantly 
rifles and machine guns are mounted in the remaining ele- 
ments of the trenches, the shell holes, and mounds of earth 
which constitute the line. The infantrymen, who have been 
careful always to keep their arms in good condition, and to 
prepare sheltered positions from which to fire upon their 
assailants, breathe more freely because the enemy's artillery 
is obliged to lengthen its range. The machine-gun crews 
immediately come into action, and try to take the enemy 
in flank or in enfilade, adjusting their fire calmly; the riflemen 
take deliberate aim, at a distance and under conditions in 
which every bullet should tell. 

If the enemy's troops, despite their losses, reach the acces- 
sory defenses, they encounter an obstacle which, notwith- 
standing its partial destruction, is generally not to be despised; 

[162] 



DEFENSE 

it causes delays in their march and disorder in their ranks, 
and diverts their attention from their real objective. The 
machine-gun crews and the infantrymen seize this moment 
to finish their work of destruction; the grenadiers render 
them great assistance by throwing their hand grenades among 
the assailants, who are in difficulties with the debris of the 
wire-entanglements. When the survivors of the waves or 
assaulting columns reach the immediate vicinity of the trenches 
they are bayoneted; but they are often so few in number, 
so demoralized, or so worn out, that they surrender; in this 
event, they are immediately sent to the rear and questioned. 

Directly any element of the trenches falls into the enemy's 
hands, the adjacent elements strive to inflict losses on its 
occupants and to surround them. A retour offensif is 
attempted as quickly as possible, before the enemy has had 
time to reorganize. 

Unity of purpose constitutes the true liaison between the 
troops. Whereas on the offensive it is obtained by the con- 
verging of efforts upon the objective, it is realized on the de- 
fensive by the common will to resist at any price, and to retain 
the terrain held. 

The artillery, in addition to executing barrage fire in pre- 
determined directions, may also take the attacking lines or 
columns at an angle or in enfilade; it must not let such a 
chance escape. Furthermore, the Command, in case the dis- 
tribution of batteries is that which was adopted during the 
period of stationary fighting, should be on the watch to 
change it as soon as the enemy attack occurs. New groups 
are constituted with reference to the needs of the defensive as 
it develops; sometimes they can be provided beforehand in 
the plan of defense. 

[163] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

Fighting in the interior of the position presents cer- 
tain analogies to the defense of the first Hne, since the enemy 
attacks successive lines defended by the same methods ; but it 
differs from it in the fact that the Unes are much less sharply 
marked, and that the enemy is scattered about in a number 
of shelters such as shell-holes and sections of boyaux. 

The assailant has a moral advantage, OT^ing to his first 
success; but he is under the disadvantage of fighting on un- 
known ground full of traps, where the defender can find his 
way about without any hesitation, even at night. Fighting 
in the boyaux is full of dangers and surprises for anyone who 
is not conversant with their windings. The elements of 
trenches connecting shell-holes cannot be clearly discerned by 
the aviators, nor taken as targets by the artillery; they may 
even be hidden from the infantry, and, especially when on a 
reverse slope, they may constitute formidable obstacles. 

The machine guns which have been previously installed in 
the communicating and support trenches, as well as at all 
important points, so as to command the points of obligatory 
passages at an angle or in enfilade, come suddenly into action 
at the moment when the target they are awaiting can be most 
advantageously fired upon; they inflict upon the enemy in a 
short space of time enormous losses, whose effect is as great 
on the moral as on the material side. A single machine gun, 
which has remained unharmed in a casemated shelter, can 
often perform the greatest services if it is served by a brave 
and active crew; it can stop important forces in their ad- 
vance, until the moment when the infantry is able once more 
to resume the struggle. 

The defending troops try to impede the advance of the 
assailants by means of counter-attacks. These coimter- 

[164] 



DEFENSE 

attacks are delivered by fresh troops. They are thrown for- 
ward at the moment when the enemy is exhausted by his 
effort and tries to recover his breath or hesitates in his ad- 
vance. They can be deUvered advantageously at night in 
case the troops employed are well acquainted with the posi- 
tion. The choice of the moment, which is of great importance 
for the success of these counter-attacks, is left to the judg- 
ment of the leader who orders them to be delivered. 

Counter-attacks, instead of being local, may be launched 
from a neighboring position wliich is stronger or less severely 
attacked, and may free the position menaced by demoralizing 
the enemy. 

In any case, one of the important factors of success is the 
mutual support which all the troops in line give one another. 
This support is easiest to effect when information as to the 
situation is most expeditiously transmitted and when all the 
different liaisons are best maintained. 



[165] 



CHAPTER IV 

RETREAT 

The retreat consists in abandoning, by order of the Com- 
, mand, either a part of the position, or the whole of it. It 
includes the evacuation both of men and of the materiel. 

It is usually rendered necessary by a reverse suffered in the 
position itself or in a neighboring position, and is performed 
with the intention of retaking the evacuated terrain as soon 
as possible. 

Re-alignment of the front is the operation of retreat per- 
formed voluntarily over a certain part of the line, in order to 
preserve the liaison with troops which have suffered a check, or 
to improve a dangerous tactical situation. It constitutes the 
means either of reestablishing an enfeebled resistance, or of 
avoiding a probable reverse. 

When the line has been driven back over a large zone, the 
army which has been thus broken permits the enemy to have 
complete freedom of movement, if it does not succeed in re- 
organizing itself in the rear. It is therefore necessary that the 
troops occupying the zones adjacent to that which has given 
way should try to re-align themselves with it. These troops 
fall back upon positions previously organized, which form 
the outhne of the new barrier opposed to the enemy's efforts. 

Similarly, when, for whatever reason, certain elements of 
the line have been obliged to fall back, the neighboring ele- 
ments become salients dangerously exposed to the enemy's 
attack. If the Command considers that the defense of these 

[166] 



RETREAT 

salients involves useless sacrifices, it orders them to be 
evacuated. 

The re-alignment of the front which has been thus neces- 
sitated by a general or a local situation should be effected 
without the knowledge of the enemy. Prepared quickly but 
carefully, it is performed at night, and every precaution is 
taken to see that no feature of it arouses suspicion in the 
opposite trench. It becomes a very much more delicate affair 
if hampered by a sudden attack, or by an intense bombard- 
ment. 

The difficulties of this operation consist especially in the 
evacuation of the artillery. If the artillery is removed gradu- 
ally, the enemy, noticing the progressive diminution in the 
activity of the fire, may decide on a sudden attack, and find 
the infantry, so to speak, without means of defense; in such 
cases the infantry is crushed. If the artillery is not removed 
till the last moment, there results a congestion along the 
roads, and there follows a critical moment during which a 
sudden attack by a watchful enemy may cause disaster; the 
artillery in deplacement is captured, and the infantry is 
forced to seek safety in hasty flight. 

When the re-aUgnment of the front can be performed un- 
observed, it permits of traps being laid for the enemy. The 
commonest of these consists in leaving in the evacuated 
position a thin advance-fine of lightly equipped riflemen and 
alert engineers, whose task is to divert the enemy's attention. 
As soon as a hostile attack on it seems about to begin, the 
riflemen rapidly evacuate the position, so as to leave the coast 
clear for a carefully-prepared artillery-fire. The engineers 
increase the losses caused by the artillerymen by exploding, at 
the proper moment, previously prepared mines and fougades. 

[167] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

The enemy thus pays very high for his advance, without 
causing the defenders any injury. 

Retreat under hostile pressure is the operation per- 
formed as the result of a direct reverse, in order to continue 
in a new position a resistance which for the time being has 
become impossible. 

The Command is the sole judge of the circumstances and 
of the moment when a retreat is necessary. No leader of a 
unit should abandon on his own initiative the terrain which 
he is given to hold; he defends it to the last, informs his 
superior officers of Ms difficulties, and lets himself be killed on 
the spot with all his men if he does not receive the order to 
retire. Such a sacrifice is at times indispensable to the safety 
of larger units; for the premature retreat of one element of 
the line may seriously endanger the security of the others. 

When the Command considers a retreat necessary, it sees 
to it that its orders reach all the units in proper time. In the 
midst of violent fighting communications become very diffi- 
cult; telephone wires are cut, liaison agents are killed or 
wounded during their journeys, signalling is impossible. 
Taking all these contingencies into consideration, the Com- 
mand determines the time and the conditions of the retreat in 
such a way that the most advanced elements can be notified; 
it makes sure that these elements are thorouglily prepared to 
fall back, and that no one is forgotten, by verifying the 
acknowledgments of orders received. Order and method are 
worth more than haste and impulsiveness in critical situations 
of this sort. 

The retreat is performed whenever possible by night, so as 
to avoid the murderous fire which in daytime is opened upon 
troops in movement. 

[168] 



RETREAT 

In every case it is indispensable for the units to have per- 
fectly definite directions in which to march, and well-deter- 
mined tasks to perform. " Beating a retreat " is not an aim; 
it is a means of escaping from the enemy in order to resist him 
successfully in another position. The itineraries are chosen 
so as to avoid crossing, crowding, and delays; the roads are 
reserved, in principle at least, for the artillery and the materiel. 

The evacuation of the artillery is a delicate operation. 
The artillery is very useful up to the last moment to protect 
the retreat of the troops; but it runs the risk of capture if it 
delays too long in the position. The heavy pieces whose 
removal is difficult leave first and are followed by the field- 
pieces. The orders relative to their departure are issued by 
the Command, which, however, should be careful to leave a 
certain latitude to the commanders of the artillery units, since 
they are the only persons capable of estimating the situation 
as it actually is. Rapidity of comprehension, coolness, and 
method on the part of these commanders of units play a large 
part in the proper carrying out of the evacuation. If the 
pieces are irretrievably lost, they are disabled at the last 
moment. 

The retreat of the various troops, including the first-line 
artillery, is carried out under the protection of the batteries 
remaining in position, whose barrage fire is directed upon the 
points by which the enemy must necessarily pass. It is also 
protected by machine guns and automatic rifles, whose skillful 
use can be of the greatest ser\'ice. 

The units of the rear guard have a difficult and dangerous 
task; since they are entrusted with holding certain points for 
a definite length of time, they are sometimes obliged to sac- 
rifice themselves entirely in the performance of their duty. 

[169] 



DEFENSE OF A POSITION 

Mutual support of the troops in line or in echelons, as well 
as maintenance of liaisons both lateral or in depth, are of 
great help in preserving order and security. 

Mines and fougades prepared by the engineers, obstacles 
piled up at points where the enemy has to pass, retard the 
march of the hostile forces. The communication routes are 
destroyed as completely as possible, so as to impede the move- 
ments of the hostile artillery, the arrival of munitions and 
fiuppUes, and to hamper haisons on the ground. But counter- 
attacks, ordered at the precise moment when the spirit of 
the assailants begins to weaken, are the best of all methods 
of stopping the pursuit. 

A resistance maintained step by step, contesting every inch 
of ground with the enemy, is not always the best method of 
attaining the desired result. It is often a better plan to escape 
from the enemy's clutches by a sudden rapid retreat, and at 
the same time to hold laim back by artillery fire, and at night 
by a curtain of troops; and then finally to reorganize in a 
position against which he will hurl himself in vain, suffering 
losses which will be the greater in proportion as he fancies 
himself certain to succeed. 



[170] 



CHAPTER V 

RETOUR OFFENSIF 
The retour ofifensif aims at retaking the lost position. 

It is carried out as soon as possible after the retreat, so as 
not to give the adversary time to consolidate his conquest. 
As soon as the enemy's troops, overjoyed by their initial 
success, encounter the next position defended, they often 
attack it in a haste and fury, inconsistent with proper prep- 
aration and suitable security; they suffer heavy losses and 
renew their attacks until they are exhausted. This is often 
the most favorable moment to attempt a retour offensif. 

Fresh troops, who either know the abandoned position or 
who are supplied with numerous guides, are thrown against 
the decimated, disorganized, and discouraged assailants. They 
execute their attack in the same way as an ordinary attack 
on a position, but they also have several advantages: the 
defenses are neither as numerous nor as strong; the defenders 
have used up their troops, their reserves, and their munitions; 
they have not always got the range for their heavy artillery; 
and, lastly, they are demoraUzed by the attack of an enemy 
whom they imagined to be defeated. 

The retour offensifmsiy be aided by local counter-attacks de- 
livered by adjacent troops, or by strategic counter-attacks car- 
ried out on other parts of the front, in order to draw thither 
the enemy's reserves or to keep in place such as are there. 

Its success, since it increases the attrition and the dis- 
organization of the enemy, may be the prelude to a victorious 
offensive. 

[i7i: 



CONCLUSION 

The principles laid down in this study have been deduced 
from the actual events of the war. From the outset, a certain 
number of them have forced themselves upon the minds of 
many officers. 

The synthesis which we have made is founded upon the 
personal observation of daily occurrences, from which the 
logical conclusions have been drawn.^ 

The exposition does, however, draw upon the imagination, 
since it describes phases of the present war which have not yet 
occurred. 

But this imagination does not contemplate a " war of 
movement " wherein the enemy will have kindly removed 
from the territory in his rear all wire entanglements, all 
trenches, and all organized positions, so as to let the cavalry 
go prancing gaily through! It seeks merely to see the fighting 
as it must logically develop, in the present state of arma- 
ments. 

The events of Verdun and on the Somme are a striking 
exemplification of the principles laid down in the chapters on 
the defense of a position, and on the preparation and execu- 
tion of an attack. It is to be hoped, for the glory of the 
Allied arms, that some future day will witness the actual real- 
ization of such phases as "the pursuit" and "the march of 

1 The writer's first draft of the present work, La Guerre acluelle, Reflexions et 
Souvenirs, of which copies were deposited in the Archives of the Ministry of 
War at Paris, and at the Bibliothdque Nationale, March 2, 1916, is based on his 
personal experiences. 
[172] 



CONCLUSION 

approach," and that the enemy will be forced to " re-align 

his front " and to " retreat." 



It is impossible to summarize in a few pages a study which 
enters into the details of fighting, and which defines the parts 
played at each moment by the various arms. But it is per- 
missible to emphasize a few underl5dng principles, whose very 
simplicity often causes them to be overlooked even by the 
best-informed minds. 

Modern warfare is dominated by two factors : the offensive 
power of artillery, and the defensive power of field works. 

These two factors determine its characteristics; it is "a war 
of positions."^ Movement is in nowise excluded; but it is 
limited for a twofold reason : the encountering of organized 
positions and the difficulty of transporting and emplacing 
heavy artillery. 

An attack which is well prepared and then carried out with 
the help of a large quantity of heavy artillery, abundantly 
provided with ammunition, has the best chances of suc- 
cess. In fact it should always result in the capture of the first 
trenches without great difficulty. The better the preparation, 
the less the assailant suffers. The result of the attack is a 
forward movement. The rapidity and width of this movement 
are proportional to the ease with which the heavy artillery 
can be deplaced. 

Heavy artillery, indeed, has at its mercy those positions 
which it first subjects to a bombardment and then deUvers 

1 Certain military critics, who have heard this expression without under- 
standing it, speak of a war of position (in the singular), conceiving it as a war 
of stationary forces, as " trench warfare " (in the sense of warfare in holes in the 
ground), and contrast it with an imaginary war of movement! 

[ITS] 



CONCLUSION 

over to the assaults of an energetic infantry. The second 
position is often stronger than the first; it is selected to suit 
the needs of the defender, whereas the first position has been 
forced upon him by circumstances. But the positions beliind, 
whatever may be their tactical advantages, cannot be or- 
ganized as completely as the two first, owing to lack of means, 
of time, and of men. 

The methodical advance of the attacking troops causes them 
ihus to encounter positions which become progressively less 
organized and more widely separated. The advance, for that 
reason alone, becomes more extended. But it would be folly to 
expect, on the part of an intelligent adversary, a sudden 
absence of organized positions. Any body of troops, when it 
has to fight, digs itself in and thus creates a position. 

The enemy's defense also diminishes progressively in 
intensity, owing to attrition in men, which leads either to a 
shortening or to a withdrawal of the fronts; in materiel, 
which results in a weakened resistance in the fighting zones; 
in morale, which causes enemy troops to run away or to 
surrender. 

Attrition of the adversary is the more intense when ob- 
tained by a more abundant and powerful materiel. Modern 
war, which is a war of positions, is, therefore, also a war of 
attrition and a war of materiel. 

The object which should be aimed at is not only to have 
more and better troops than the enemy's, but also to have 
cannon and munitions in line when he is deprived of them. 

Even should the adversary possess unlimited reserves in 
men, he is beaten if he has not sufficient artillery to protect 
them. Men are not a defense against cannon. 

[174] 



CONCLUSION 

This principle is as true in the offensive as in the defensive. 
An obstacle is not overcome by repeated infantry attacks, but 
by successive blows dealt by the artillery. 

The battle thus joined between cannon and field works has 
caused the artillery to become more and more powerful, and 
the trenches to become deeper and deeper. The logical out- 
come must be: on the one hand the construction of pieces 
discharging very heavy and highly explosive projectiles; on 
the other hand the digging of trenches and shelters, ever 
deeper, more casemated, and better protected. 

The respective development of these two opposing factors 
may give to modern warfare varying aspects, according to the 
engines of destruction devised and the means of protection 
employed. It does not modify the general principles. But 
at any instant the cannon must be prepared for a strengthen- 
ing of the opposing entrenchments, and the entrenchments 
must in turn be ready for an increased weight of enemy's 
cannon, if either side would avoid finding itself at a serious 
disadvantage. 

There are, however, certain Umits to this double develop- 
ment. Heavy artillery loses in mobility what it gains in 
power; it becomes too difficult to move, and, above all, to 
keep supphed. Deep entrenchments are dangerous because 
men or munitions may be buried in them; their construction, 
moreover, tak^s too much time and effort to be effected over 
large spaces of territory. 

Because of the considerable man-power and the immense 
material means required in modern warfare, it is difficult to 
join battle along an entire front. Attacks are executed in 
certain zones, which may be very large, but are hmited in 
niunber. 

[175] 



CONCLUSION 

It is the choice, first of all, of these different zones, and 
next of that particular one where the fighting must be forced, 
regardless of cost, which constitutes the strategic art of to-day. 
Success will follow of itself. 

The same law controls tactical and strategic efforts. In 
an attack upon a position, a centre of resistance falls if its 
flanks are overrun; in an attack on a zone, the position is 
doomed if its communications are exposed by the capture of 
the adjacent zones. Likewise, in an attack upon a front, an 
advance in one or more zones may lead to the evacuation of 
all the others. 

If an army could dispose of sufficient munitions to begin and 
to continue an artillery action over the entire front, it would 
bring about ideal conditions for obtaining a decisive victory. 
The enemy's army, kept on the alert at all points, decimated, 
and demoraUzed, would be forced back in the zone where the 
attack was most successfully developed. The breach thus 
made would be deepened and widened, forcing the enemy to 
retreat in the adjoining zones. 

The opening of the breach is but the prelude of success, for 
it requires cruel sacrifices of men and an enormous expenditure 
of materiel. It is the drawing in of the other parts of the 
enemy's front which completes the victory; this takes place 
over a considerable extent of terrain and permits an assailant 
who is watchful and active to capture thousands of men and 
of engines of war, almost without striking a blow. 

Attention and activity must be the watchword everywhere. 
No troops, even in the calmest sector, should allow them- 
selves to become slack or idle. If they do, they may well 
permit the enemy to escape unperceived, and thus lose all 
the advantages of a success which has been within their grasp. 

[176] 



CONCLUSION 

Upon every point of the front the soldiers should labor 
unremittingly to prepare for the glorious morrow. It is the 
duty of every commander to organize his position or his 
trench for the offensive as weU as for the defensive; he must 
not spare himself trouble nor quiet himself with the false 
excuse that he occupies a merely provisional position. Un- 
ceasing labor always bears fruit. 

Will-power, method, discipline, and perseverance are the 
means by which Victory is won. 



[177] 



GLOSSARY 



GLOSSARY 

Accessory Defenses (Defenses accessoires) : Material obstacles 
such as barbed-wire entanglements, chevaux de frise, pitfaUs, 
etc., for the purpose of obstructing the approach to temporary 
or permanent fortifications. 

Amenagement {Amenagement) : Preparation of a terrain or of a 
position for the purpose of a miUtary operation. It includes 
the construction of all sorts of works, the bringing up and 
installation of materiel, the organization of commimications, 
etc. 

Artillery: 

(a) Field Artillery (Artillerie de Campagne — A.C.): In this 
book this term is used in its French sense. In France field 
artillery includes only the smaller caUbres such as the 75 
(3-inch), the 80 (3.2-inch) and the 90 (3.6-inch), which 
correspond to what is called " hght artillery " in the United 
States. The larger cahbres, including the 95 (3.8-inch) 
and upwards, are classed in France with the heavy artil- 
lery; but in the United States some of these larger cahbres 
are included, together with the hght artiUery, in the term 
" field artillery." 

(6) Heavy Artillery (Artillerie lourde — A. L.): In this book 
this term has also been used in its French sense. In 
France heavy artiUery includes the 95 (3.8-inch) and up- 
wards; it is subdivided into heavy artiUery of medium 
cahbre (up to the 155 (6-inch)), and heavy artillery of 
larger cahbre (from the 155 upwards). 

(c) Light Artillery (in the U. S.) (Artillerie legere) : This term 
no longer exists in France, and it is not used in this book. 
The American hght artiUery is the same as the French 
field artiUery. (See under " Field ArtiUery.") 

[181] 



GLOSSARY 

(d) Trench AitiHery (Artillerie de TrancMe — A. T.): Includes 
all ballistic weapons, bomb-throwers and mortars of all 
calibres and of all models which are set up in trenches and 
served by artillerists called trench mortar-men. 

Attrition ( Usure) : Indicating wastage of men and of materiel, 
and deterioration of morale. 

Barrage (Barrage): Prevention of passage across a zone by 
means of projectiles from artillery or infantry weapons such 
as, e. g., rifle-grenades. 

B'oyau (Boyau): A ditch used for commimication between the 
trenches and the rear in the dangerous zone. The boyaux run 
in a direction generally perpendicular to the front, and are 
used solely for communication, while trenches are used for 
combat and run in a direction generally parallel to the front. 
The EngUsh call these boyaux " communication trenches," 
which is Mkely to cause confusion. The word boyau is in 
accord with the French usage. To avoid errors which might 
result from the adoption of the Enghsh terminology, the term 
" communication trenches " has been kept out of this book. 
The terms " communicating," " doubling " or " transversal 
trenches " are employed to designate trenches which run paral- 
lel to the front and are used for lateral communication. 

Camouflage {Camouflage) : Any means of concealment of works, 
batteries, materiel, roads, trenches, troops, or any other imple- 
ment of warfare. 

Command (Commandement) : Designates in a general way leaders 
of high rank whose duty it is to make decisions and to give 
orders; it also includes their staffs. 

High Command (Haul Commandement): Designates leaders of 
the highest rank such as the Commander-in-Chief, Generals 
of army groups and of armies. 

Command-Post (Poste de Commandement): Place where a com- 
mander places himself, either in the trenches (organized shelter) 
or during the course of the combat (improvised shelter). In 
current usage the word " station " is sometimes employed, 
together with the rank of the commander occupying it: e. g., 
" Colonel's station." 
[182] 



GLOSSARY 

Counter-Attack (Contre-attaque) : Partial attack directed against 
an attacking body of hostile troops for the purpose of prevent- 
ing its advance. 

Depot (Depot): Place where provisions, water, ammunition or 
materiel can be set down. In zones exposed to artillery fire 
it is a shelter or a wide space where munitions are spread out 
so as to escape the danger of destruction by enemy airplanes. 
In the French military vocabulary the word has another 
meaning, namely, the unit comprising available troops who 
are awaiting their departure for the front, as, e. g., depots des 
regiments (in the cities far behind the Mnes) or depot divisionnaire 
(near the front). 

Echelon, verb (Echelonner): To arrange a body of troops in 
echelons, that is to say, to divide it into two or more portions 
placed one behind the other. 

Echelon, noun {tlchelon) 

1. A portion of a body of troops arranged in echelons. In the 
case of artillery, " to move by echelons " means to move 
the echeloned portions one after another in such a way 
that the rearmost passes in front of the foremost. 

2. In a special sense a portion stationed behind and to the right 
(or left) of another portion of the same body of troops. 
This special sense is the one adopted as the general meaning 
of the word by the British army. " To retreat by echelons " 
means, in the case of infantry, to move back the different 
portions one after another in such a way that one of them 
is placed behind and to the right (or left) of the one adjacent 
to it and under its protection. 

3. In French the word echelon has also several other meanings : 

(a) Schelon de Combat (artillery) signifies combat train; 

(b) Schelon, in the case of a machine-gun company, desig- 
nates a portion of that company consisting of the means 
of transport for those guns and their ammunition which 
are to go directly to the firing hne. 

Echelonment (Echelonnement): Arrangement by which a body 
of troops is divided into echelons. 

[183] 



GLOSSARY 

Effectives (Effectif): Number of men (oflBcers, N. C. Os., and 
soldiers) in a body of troops. 

Emplacement {Emplacement): Point or portion of the ground 
which is or can be utiUzed to install a weapon, an implement, 
an organ of command, materiel, or a body of troops. The 
" location " is the topographical determination of the emplace- 
ment. 

Enfilading Fire {Tir d' enfilade): A fire which catches a hnear 
objective longitudinally, whether from the side or from the 
'front; end-on fire. 

Fascines (Fascines) : Faggots about eight feet long used in field 
fortifications. 

Field Works {Ouvrages de campagne) : In contrast to permanent 
fortifications. 

Flanking Fire ( Tir d'echarpe) : Obhque or slanting fire. 

Fougade {Fougasse) : Buried charges of powder or melinite some- 
times covered over with stones and exploded by an electric 
current or by a detonating fuse. 

French Automatic Rifle (Fusil mitrailleur) : An automatic rifle 
which works by a long recoil of the barrel and is loaded with 
semi-circular cMps containing twenty cartridges each. It 
weighs about eighteen pounds and is served by a marksman 
and two loaders. 

Gabion (Gabion) : Cylindrical basket without a bottom, composed 
of branches tied aroimd stakes; utilized in field fortifications. 

Group (Groupement, — d'artillerie) : The word groupe in French 
designates the regular artillery unit corresponding to the Ameri- 
can artillery battalion. The group (groupement) on the other 
hand is a temporary conjunction of different units — usually 
of different caUbres — as for example a battaUon of field 
artillery and a battery of heavy artillery. 

Indicative (Indicatif, — aviation) : Prearranged signal by means 
of which an airplane or balloon can either call the station on the 
ground with which it wishes to communicate (by wireless or 
by a projector on board) or can make itself known by an identi- 
fying cartridge with one or several flashes. 

[184] 



GLOSSARY 

Listening Post {Poste d'ecoute) : Post situated in front of the first 
line trench for observing and Ustening to the movements of the 
enemy. 

Observation Post {Poste d' observation): Position selected to 
enable commanders of every rank to observe the enemy or the 
terrain. It should be close to the command-post and conse- 
quently determines the choice of the latter in the case of an 
advance; it is organized as completely as possible. 

Observing Station (Observatoire) : A construction specially or- 
ganized for purposes of observation in a place selected because 
of its topographical location and the views it commands. Ob- 
serving stations are provided with a special personnel and a 
special outfit; they are carefully concealed from the sight of 
the enemy and protected against bombardments. There are 
observing stations for the Command and observing stations for 
the artillery. 

The French word observatoire is also appUed to airplanes 
and balloons. One speaks of aerial observatdres in contrast 
to those on the ground. 

Projector (Projecteur) : A machine for throwing beams of Ught 
either to illuminate a zone at night time (as for example in 
front of the trenches) or for correspondence by visual signals 
on the ground or in the air. 

Re tour Offensif (Retour Offensif) : An attack whose object is to 
retake a trench, a work, a terrain or a position which the enemy 
has seized. 

Rifle Grenade {Grenade d, fusil, e. g., dbus V. B., q. v.) : A grenade 
of cyhndrical shape fired by means of a sort of cannon (called 
in French tromblon) which can be fitted to an ordinary rifle. 
The shell is propelled by the powder in the rifle cartridge; it 
explodes from five to seven seconds later, through the action 
of a firing powder which is hghted by a trigger set off by the 
bullet of the rifle. 

Sap {Sape): An excavation which may be subterraneous or not 
dug by men who advance foot by foot; in contrast to a trench 
or a boyau which is made by men all digging at the same time. 

[185] 



GLOSSARY 

Sapper (Sapeur) : Soldier of the engineers; in a special sense one 
who digs a sap. 

Stationary Fighting (Stationnement) : A period of the war of po- 
sitions during which the troops remain in the same trenches 
and are unable to advance. 

Traverse {Traverse): A piece of natural soil around which the 
trench turns, and so placed as to protect adjacent portions of it. 

V. B. (Viven-Bessieres) : Names of the inventors of the V. B. 
rifle grenade used in the French army. (See under " Rifle 
Grenade.") 

Zone (Zone): Space of terrain of variable size, 

(a) A zone of the front might be as much as fifty miles long and 
twenty deep. Such a zone may be defined by Umits existing 
in either of the adversaries' lines. 

(b) A zone of attack, of march, or of stationary fighting is the 
portion of territory, of hmited extent, which is assigned to 
a large or small body of troops, in any phase of the com- 
bat (attack, pursuit, march of approach, or stationary 
fighting). 

(c) Zone fire is an artillery fire directed on a hmited space 
which constitutes the target, without designation of any 
more special objective inside it. 



[186] 



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